Daily Report

East Europe

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NATO, UN 'of One Mind' on Sarajevo Plan

AU1602073794 Paris AFP in English 0129 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 16 (AFP)—NATO and the United Nations see eye to eye on how to control heavy weapons of Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo area as part of a NATO ultimatum to end the siege of the Bosnian capital or face air strikes, a UN spokesman said Tuesday. "Coordination meetings between NATO and the UN have sorted out all points," Peter MacFarlane, a spokesman for the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR], told a press conference.

His comments contrasted with reports from Brussels that NATO was becoming increasingly critical of apparently inadequate UN plans to monitor the Serb artillery around the city.

"On the broader pinciples I can say that NATO and the UN are very much of one mind," MacFarlane. He noted that control involved "monitoring, supervision by UNPROFOR personnel, linked to the question of where weapons are located at the end" of the February 21 NATO deadline for the belligerents to withdraw their heavy weapons or placed them under UN control.

MacFarlane said the issue was being discussed with both the Bosnian Serbs and the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army.

He added that despite the cancelation of Tuesday's meeting of top military officials at Sarajevo airport after the Bosnian Army comander in chief did not show up, the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia, General Michael Rose, "is at this stage fairly happy with the way things are going."

Earlier in Brussels NATO sources said the head of the Atlantic alliance's forces in Europe was to meet with the UN special envoy to former Yugoslavia this week to discuss differences over enforcement of the NATO ultimatum.

NATO General George Joulwan was to meet with Yasushi Akashi in Zagreb at a time yet to be decided, to raise problems of coordination between the two bodies, a NATO military source said.

Separate NATO sources said UNPROFOR plans to have monitors check on Serb artillery surrendered to UN troops in Serb barracks under a ceasefire accord implemented Thursday did not amount to proper control. One anonymous source said: "That's not a proper control. The control has to be strong enough to stop the weapons being used."

The Serbs have placed 33 artillery pieces under UN monitoring within Serb barracks at Lukavica and Mokro, while the mainly-Moslem government forces have handed over 10 mortars to Ukrainian UN forces in Sarajevo.

Bosnian Serb leaders Tuesday rejected demands to withdraw all their heavy arms from around Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb military commander General Radko Mladic told the Yugoslav TANJUG news agency that his weapons would stay put to protect Serbs against "fanatical Moslem units."

But Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said that he was prepared to order regrouping of "part" of his heavy artillery "in order to facilitate monitoring" by UN peacekeepers.

Spokesman: NATO Will Not Extend Deadline

AU1602143294 Paris AFP in English 1426 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Brussels, Feb 16 (AFP)—The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will not extend its deadline of February 21 for besieging Serbs to withdraw their artillery from around Sarajevo or face air strikes, a spokesman said Wednesday.

He was speaking after a meeting of the ambassadors to NATO of the 16 member countries, who fixed the deadline on February 9 after being asked by the United Nations to consider airstrikes following the massacre of 68 people by a mortar bomb in a Sarajevo market. The Bosnian Serbs have denied firing the bomb and a UN commission of inquiry said in Zagreb Wednesday it had failed to determine its origin.

In Sarajevo the handing over of heavy weapons to UN control by both sides, an alternative to their withdrawal, has been proceeding at a snail's pace.

Appeals Court Sentences Ex-Politburo Members

AU1502214194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] A spokesman for the Tirana Court of Appeal reports that an appeal was held in Tirana on 15 February against the criminal convictions of defendants Qirjako Mihali, Pali Miska, Besnik Bekteshi, Vangjel Cerrava, Prokop Murra, Llambi Gegprifti, Muho Artunda, Hajredin Celiku, Foto Cami, and Lenka Cuko .

As senior political and government leaders at the head of a dictatorship, by deliberately abusing their positions the defendants granted economic privileges to themselves and their families, thus causing serious economic damage to the state and the people's interests.

For these reasons, under Articles 106 and 31, Paragraphs B and D of the Penal Code, the defendants were convicted as follows:

Qirjako Mihali—eight years of imprisonment; Pali Miska—six; Besnik Bekteshi—five; Vangjel Cerrava—five; Prokop Murra—five; Llambi Gegprifti—seven; Muho Artunda—five; Hajredin Celiku—five; Foto Cami—six; Lenka Cuko—seven. They were also stripped of their decorations and honorary titles.

Zhulali Orders 'Disarmament' of Army Officers

AU1502094494 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 21 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Martin Leka report: "Safet Zhulali Orders the Mass Disarmament of the Albanian Army"]

[Text] [Page one carries two facsimile passages with the subhead "Extract from the order of Defense Minister Safet Zhulali":

[The first facsimile passage reads: "I order: 1. Personal weapons such as knives, pistols, guns, or automatic rifles given to officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians employed by the army will be deposited in the armories of bases, units, or the relevant institutions by 15 January 1994."

[The second facsimile passage carries the signature "Defense Minister Safet Zhulali"]

Mass Disarmament of the Albanian Army

This, then, is the order of Defense Minister Safet Zhulali issued on 8 January this year, to be carried out by 15 January. One would perhaps envy the "haste" of such an order if it were to arm rather than to disarm officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians employed by the army. Now all officers, except for those not covered by Zhulali's order to "lose weight," will be without their personal weapons, whether knives, pistols, guns, or automatic rifles. According to the above-mentioned order, this is in order to regulate the administration of personal weapons and to prevent unusual events (!)...

The reasoning behind the disarmament of officers described in the order lies open to many doubts. First, we do not think the regular administration of personal weapons means their removal. I think that there are plenty of other measures that might enforce discipline in this area. In this specific case, the word "regulate" has assumed an absolute meaning, excluding all other forms of "regulation." Second, even though there have been cases in which unusual events have taken place, those involving officers seem to us to have been minimal and insignificant compared with those today involving individuals carrying weapons whether with or without licences. Such an explanation holds good least of all for officers, who are among the people most trusted by those who turn their eyes to every citizens whenever the words "enemy" or "war" are uttered.

For reasons of this kind, there has been a great deal of speculation about the disarmament of these servicemen, as many servicemen affected by the order have recently told us.

This speculation includes a possible drastic reduction in the staff of military units, starting from the ministry itself, with the aim of preventing any incident caused by jittery servicemen who do not properly understand the reform in the army. Others explain the order with reference to the new generals' "fear" of the "old soldiers" (!). Others ironically explain that Albania has now run out of enemies, etc., etc....

Only the officers, noncommissioned officers, radio operators, and drivers attached to the main army chiefs are excluded from this order, and have the right to carry weapons.

Now the officers' weapons have been taken away. In short, a person can now seize an officer's cap at whim and run off with it, and the officre will pursue him on foot?! Before seizing the cap, you must only put your trust in the officer's running ability or the Lord Almighty. How far can one trifle with our respected officers today?

At a time when such a thing is happening, something which to our minds is entirely unacceptable, the fact is that a "mafia" that principally uses weapons to achieve its dark aims is ever more clearly emerging. These mafiosi will now be further emboldened. One weapon less in the hands of officers means one more for criminals, because from now on the latter will now be able to step out in front of the finest officer, say "Hands up," search him, and rob him, taking even his briefcase of documents, and finally ordering the officer to stand "to attention" until the armed criminal has quietly departed toward an "unknown destination".

Possible Siting of 'CIA Spy Planes' Noted

AU1502113794 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Feb 94 p 2

[Nikolle Ivesi article: "Gjader Military Airport May Become a Base for CIA Spy Planes"]

[Text] It has now been decided. Two CIA spy planes, a radio station, and 12 experts will shortly arrive in Albania. We make it clear that this equipment and these experts belong to the U.S. secret service and not the U.S. Defense Department.

We have nothing against this idea of Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, or maybe of Berisha, except that the fact that the U.S. secret service is poking its nose in here, and not, as would be more acceptable, the U.S. Defense Department or NATO, makes one suspect the purpose of this "operation." It is the same as if the Albanian National Intelligence Service, i.e. Gazidede, were to establish such a base in the United States. Even more disturbing is the fact that Italian Defense Minister Fabio Fabri himself opposed the establishment of this base at an Italian airport, because it would pose serious problems for Italy if the spread of the war in Bosnia were to lead Serbia to respond with missiles against the site where CIA-commanded GNAT spy planes were based. Italy, although a NATO member, therefore did not agree, while we did immediately. The Albanian authorities have made no statement about the siting of these planes. The problem of their deployment is worrying, because, as foreign news agencies report, these spy planes, if they explode in the air or have defects, are very dangerous for the civilian population of the areas where they are based. If the Defense Ministry is soon going to position them, as is thought, at the airport at Gjader near Lezhe, will it ask the local government representatives of these areas, when these aircraft are known to be dangerous to the lives of local inhabitants?!

Klaus Still Opposed to NATO Air Strikes

LD1502211194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 15 Feb 94

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova on 15 February; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Weissova] Let us turn the page and talk a bit about southern Europe. Yesterday you again described the possible NATO air strikes over Bosnia as unfair in human terms. However, in fact, it should be an action to help end fighting by forceful action. Can you clarify what you meant by this: unfair in human terms?

[Klaus] I said this in an open conversation on Thursday [10 February] and yesterday. I have not repeated it. [passage omitted] Let us leave behind this hyperbole.

Of course, it poses the question first of all whether it is possible to reach some sort of stable solution only by military, or, to be more precise, by air attacks. We hold a certain opinion on this that is [word indistinct] at variance with the rest of the world. I think that today and everyday we repeatedly hear the opinions of politicians on one hand, and the views of military experts on the other, [the latter] saying that these air strikes could not be a lasting solution, [and] that after [air strikes], the army would have to move in. I admit that I believe in the analyses of military experts; they seem to me to be quite realistic. [passage omitted]

[Weissova] Prime minister, you called upon the Slovak Prime Minister Meciar yesterday [14 Feb] asking that the Slovak side withdraw measures complicating the import of the Czech foodstuffs. At the same time, you said that it would be foolish if we answered in a similar way and that the Czech side would not consider this. What are the Czech Government's intentions if Slovakia does not withdraw these obstacles?

[Klaus] When playing chess, I do not disclose my intentions after the first move. I am not going to tell you in advance what will be my second, third, fourth, and so on moves, as the other side can take various countermeasures. Please do not ask me for a ready-made script of our steps. We have to work on it alone and be prepared to implement it. If we demand a halt to any protectionism from the West as well as from the East, it is not wise to treat our neighbors in this way. Therefore, it seems to me that a one-sided action, same in kind—according to [words indistinct] tooth for tooth—is neither imaginative nor very wise. So let us keep the alternatives.

I would be very glad if the Slovak Government assessed our proposal in order to make it possible for this measure (?to be discussed) by the first meeting of the customs union, at which certain concrete rules of these relations are to be established. Unfortunately, I cannot say anything wiser to better. [passage omitted]

Coalition Opposes Klaus Statement

AU1502165694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 12 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Jiri Hracek and Jiri Stastny: "Kalvoda and Pilip Disagree With Klaus and Advocate Military Intervention in Bosnia"]

[Text] Representatives of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and the Christian Democratic Party [KDS] yesterday rejected Prime Minister Klaus's statement about the government's disapproval of air intervention in Bosnia. According to the ODA Political Board, it is a tragic error to assume that, when diplomatic means become exhausted, it is wrong to resort to the use of force.

"This is the moment that has now come in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia. **We demand that our country support NATO's decision on vigorous military intervention in this area,"** says a statement issued by the ODA Political Board. ODA Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda energetically raised their objections to Vaclav Klaus's statement of Wednesday [9 February]: "I am surprised by the information that the government is opposed to air strikes. If such a statement was made, I have to say that the government did discuss the issue, but without adopting any resolution."

In an interview for CESKY DENIK, KDS Chairman Ivan Pilip also reacted to yesterday's statement of Vaclav Klaus: **"We all saw the Sarajevo marketplace. What is happening there is very unfair."** [allusion to Klaus's remark that air strikes against Bosnian Serbs would be "unfair"] For two reasons, his party advocates intervention in former Yugoslavia. "First, from the viewpoint of political morality. The world is globally interlinked, which is particularly true of Europe. The world made a mistake by addressing this problem by means of indecisive wavering and resolutions. This approach has evidently contributed a great deal to the situation being the way it is now." Citing the second reason, Ivan Pilip said that, in the course of its history, our country has repeatedly been in a position when it needed closer links to the world. "Therefore, we should not approach these problems by arguing that everyone must settle them on his own," the KDS chairman added.

A statement approving of the NATO decision was issued yesterday also by the Club of Nonaligned Activists [KAN]. "We believe that, when women and children are being crippled and murdered, it is no longer war but genocide. **Unlike Vaclav Klaus, we see precisely the shelling of the innocent as the unfair conduct of war,"** says the KAN statement.

Baudys Calls Ultimatum 'Correct'

AU1502164994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 12 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by "jop": "Baudys Approves of NATO's Decision"]

[Text] Dobruska—"I am convinced that NATO considered its decision to issue an ultimatum to one of the parties in the Sarajevo conflict for a long time. This decision is correct. Furthermore, I believe that the Alliance secretly assumed that the Serbs would take a positive stand on the withdrawal of their heavy military equipment," Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys said yesterday while visiting Dobruska. Replying to a question from the LIDOVE NOVINY reporter as to whether an emergency plan for our soldiers serving with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in former Yugoslavia had been drawn up, Antonin Baudys said: "Our troops are outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the area of the so-called Serbian Krajina. Should a conflict come about, the Czech side would proceed in the same way as the troops of other countries under UN command."

President Havel Comments on Visit to Kuwait

LD1502144094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] President of the Republic Vaclav Havel returned during the night from his eight-day official visit to India and Thailand. Czech radio correspondent David Stahlavsky, who accompanied the president during his trip, is in the studio now with more details.

[Stahlavsky] President Havel considers the visit to be a success. He reiterated this tonight shortly before landing at Old Ruzyne airport. He praised, in particular, the participation of Ivan Kocarnik, deputy prime minister and finance minister; Josef Zieleniec, minister of foreign affairs; and Radomir Sabela, deputy of the minister of industry and trade. They all agree with the president's assessment of the visit. [passage omitted]

Vaclav Havel made a brief unofficial stopover in Kuwait. He had private talks with the amir in power, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah. This is what the Czech president said about these talks:

[Begin recording] [Havel] The amir and I discussed political cooperation between our countries. We agreed that our views were very close and that no political shadows exist between us. We also discussed economic cooperation. I said that this cooperation is not as good as it could be, that unutilized potential exists in this respect. I explained the reasons we did not use this potential as best we could during the period that our entire economy was undergoing the process of transformation. The amir emphasized that Kuwait is very interested in economic cooperation with the Czech Republic and that our firms are well known in that country. An agreement between Kuwait and the Czech Republic on the protection of investments is due to be finalized and signed in the spring. [passage indistinct] [end recording]

[Announcer] It should be added that our trade with Kuwait amounted to approximately $5 million last year. Czech exports to Kuwait account for the best part of it, while Kuwaiti imports to the Czech Republic are very small.

Klaus Not 'Convinced' on Banning Zhirinovskiy

AU1502200294 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 Feb 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "Speculation About Election Date Is Merely Hypothetical"]

[Text] In his regular column, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus replies to topical questions from reporter Viktor Krejci:

[Krejci] The Slovak Government is planning to introduce special inspections of Czech goods at the border. This measure is evidently aimed at averting the Slovak deficit in the trade balance and the resulting dollar payments to the Czech Republic. Will the Czech side react to this?

[Klaus] [Slovak Finance] Minister Toth has been looking for a long time for some centralized restriction of trade flows to Slovakia, not only from the Czech Republic but also from the whole world, to prevent a deficit in the balances of trade and payments. He came up with this or that idea many times in the past, only to quietly drop it later. We can react only when we are notified of something through official channels. (Editor's note: The interview was conducted a few hours before the Central Customs Administration of the Slovak Republic announced that products without a certificate about their quality would not be allowed to enter Slovakia as of Friday [11 February].)

[Krejci] Interior Minister Jan Ruml is working on a bill to make the StB [communist-era secret police] archives accessible. Has the government come to an agreement on this, or is that his private initiative?

[Klaus] This issue has been discussed for a long time, and the minister of interior is reacting to it correctly, from the bureaucratic point of view. However, this matter has not been discussed as yet at the level of the coalition or the government.

[Krejci] Deputy Interior Minister Zeman said that local elections and elections to the Senate should be held on 19 November. What is your opinion?

[Klaus] These are only hypothetical speculations on the part of the deputy minister. No talks on this issue have been held thus far and a decision is yet to be made.

[Krejci] Should the nationalist Zhirinovskiy arrive in the Czech Republic, or should he be declared undesirable?

[Klaus] Undesirable in the general human sense of the word is one thing and "persona non grata" as a technical term in international politics—that is, whether some person will be formally permitted to enter the country—

is another. Mr. Zhirinovskiy definitely is an undesirable in our country. We do not need him here, do not have to listen to his views, and I assume no one is curious to see him. I am not clearly convinced, however, that we should also resort to the use of the term "persona non grata" in the diplomatic sense. There is a discussion on this issue going on between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. One consideration is whether, by resorting to some extreme bans, we would not actually give this man more publicity than he deserves.

[Krejci] The Czech-Moravian Federation of Trade Unions wants to submit a complaint to the International Labor Organization because the Czech Government is supposedly violating Convention 87 on the free association in the trade unions.

[Klaus] This is an ill-considered and—the gentlemen trade unionists are free to feel offended—somewhat childish step. We should settle matters of this kind among ourselves instead of hiding behind someone more distant and stronger. The idea of complaining to some international organization that I failed to get my way at home rather reminds me of children at play: First I challenge some classmate to a fight, and, when he beats me, I go and ask the teacher for help. I find this approach absolutely unacceptable, disloyal, and wrong.

Tamara Radar Promoted for Use in Middle East

AU1502163394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 14 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "The Tamara Radar Could Monitor the Situation in the Middle East"]

[Text] Prague—The Czech radar, Tamara, which, according to the experts, can even detect the "invisible" U.S. Stealth aircraft, could participate in monitoring the situation in the Middle East. The manufacturer of this state-of-the-art air defense system offered it to the United Nations at the beginning of the year.

According to preliminary conjectures, the Tamara radar could be deployed in Cyprus. From this island, which is some 150 kilometers from the coast of Lebanon, Israel, and other Middle Eastern states, the radar could monitor the airspace above this region. It could also partially monitor the transfer of military hardware on land and sea. Tamara has a range of up to 450 kilometers.

Tamara can detect aircraft against which normal radar systems are ineffective. It is similar to the U.S. AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] early warning system. However, as opposed to active radar systems, which emit radio waves into the atmosphere and assess their reflections, Tamara only receives radio impulses from the atmosphere.

Ludek Stodulka, vice president of the HTT Group, which produces the radar, told us that Tamara can detect air-defense systems and the precise coordinates of missiles, airfields, and warning systems. It can differentiate between the false and real locations of military hardware. It can distinguish types of aircraft, missiles, ships, and radars at great distances.

According to Stodulka, the Czech Foreign Ministry has described the company's initiative as encouraging. However, the appropriate UN offices have not yet responded to the HTT Group's offer. In the opinion of Army experts, the deployment of the Tamara system would have forestalled such tragedies as the shooting down of flight KAL-007 in 1983 by a former Soviet fighter bomber or the shooting down of the A-300 passenger aircraft by a U.S. Navy missile over the Persian Gulf.

Stodulka said that the HTT Group would like to apply to the Association for Czech Republic Quality Awards to grant the system a Czech Made trademark.

Joint Army-Bundeswehr Units To Be Formed

AU1502163294 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by "(per)": "There Will Be Joint Exercises and Also Units With the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Prague—Not only should joint exercises be held in the future between the Czech Army and the Bundeswehr, but also joint units should be formed within the framework of the Partnership for Peace project. This statement was made to reporters on Tuesday [8 February] by General J. Nekvasil, chief of the Czech Army General Staff. He added that "this will not be this year, but next year."

The first joint exercises with a Western army will take place from 15-25 March. Forty Dutch marines will conduct exercises in the Czech Republic with the Czech Rapid Deployment Battalion. Further joint exercises will be held with the French in the May-June period.

Prime Minister Argues for Free Trade

AU1602123894 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 12 Feb pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Martin Danes; place and date not given: "He Who Whips the Cream Before Baking the Cake Does Not Get Far"]

[Text] *The topic of the Czech Republic's international relations that has been raised ever more frequently recently is free trade. In our regular interview with the prime minister, we deal mainly with this issue.*

[Danes] Ministers of four Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) signatory states issued a statement in Prague last week, according to which the deadline for CEFTA implementation should be moved forward from eight to five years. Are you satisfied with this result, or do you believe that the term could have been even shorter and the trade spectrum wider?

[Klaus] These are two different things: There is an official communique and the actual topic of the talks. What the ministers just signed has actually been discussed throughout the last year. The Czech side has exerted exceptional pressure to this effect. I had to step in several times and push the prime ministers of Poland and Hungary, who, fortunately, hold a somewhat different view from the trade ministers of those countries, and therefore it was possible to bring this issue to a successful conclusion. Thus, it was in fact just a formal signing of something that had been agreed upon on the level of deputy ministers before the end of 1993.

Something else was the real topic of the Prague meeting: to progress again a bit further. This time, too, we pushed for a further acceleration of the implementation of the free trade zone, unconditionally supported by the Slovak side. The opinions no longer coincide here. Hungary and Poland demand numerous advantages for themselves and are not interested in speeding up the process. I consider it very bad because the CEFTA agreement on free trade is the core of our cooperation with these three countries and not some superficial proclamations or formal political gestures. Hence, my feelings are mixed.

[Danes] What is our starting point?

[Klaus] Our country does not want to be protectionist. I made arrangements recently for a substantial acceleration of the work on a free trade zone with Estonia, and we have reached an agreement this week with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on the plan to do the same in the near future. We are simply interested in free trade. If we say this in the direction of the West, it is absolutely clear that it is our duty to speak at the same volume in addressing the East.

[Danes] Are these steps towards breaking down the trade barriers a part of some broadly based international political concept?

[Klaus] Everything must be placed in a much more general framework. In Central and East Europe but also in West Europe, the feeling gained prominence that integration equals integration of institutions. That is a completely wrong idea and confuses the issue. Integration does not at all have to be an institutional integration. It could be based on a simple breaking down of the trade barriers and opening borders. This way, every citizen is integrated with a citizen in the neighboring country, every businessman is integrated with a businessman abroad, every consumer benefits from having on the table a product from another country, etc. We really need to make room for interhuman relations in all spheres. What formal integrational steps the states have to take is only the icing on the cake and not the essential part. If we whip the cream before we bake the cake, as is the case in numerous integrational attempts around the world, we will not get far.

Of course, the central evidence of people is only a technical modality of the entire process. I must go back to that whipping cream and cake: It simply is not possible to jump into something head first, if the essence is lacking. We know very well that numerous European countries have suddenly been discovering that charity begins at home, that they are French before they are inhabitants of the European Community. For this reason, the national card is being drawn much more often than one would expect, based on the statements of particular politicians in the past.

[Danes] Do you believe that the physical removal of borders in West Europe is premature?

[Klaus] A border as a barrier, wire, fence—i.e., tangible, palpable, which must be crawled under or climbed over—is one thing. It is another thing completely when the border is a rather symbolic affair. I believe that the borders that are 100-percent located in Europe will remain just symbolic borders, and that as long as can be foreseen. The fact that the borders in the sense of a tangible thing keep disappearing is a matter of course. Thus the borders in the former sense have been and will be disappearing—that is a continuous and natural process—and I believe that the borders in the latter sense of the word will also disappear.

[Danes] There has been a lot of discussion lately about the statements made by Deputy Jiri Payne in the United States regarding the list of [former State Security] agents published in NECENZUROVANE NOVINY. A general question comes to mind: To what degree can a representative of the government majority publicly present his own personal views that are not identical with the official position of the government?

[Klaus] I have not conducted any detective investigation as to what degree the statements of Deputy Payne are authentic and to what degree they were enhanced by the media. I, for instance, was cited by all kinds of world media recently as having said in Davos that, after a stagnation in our country, economic growth will follow. I would never let the word "stagnation" pass my lips. It was by no means stagnation that took place in our country but, rather, an entirely different process of ridding ourselves of the ballast of absurd production that could have existed only in the centrally planned regime.

Therefore, I will stay with a general answer. We live in a democracy, and we cannot order people to hold identical views on everything. I do not take this as a formal question but, rather, as a specific, fact-finding one. I am rather depressed if several ministers announce in advance how they are going to vote. I consider it against the esprit de corps. If the result of the vote is 10:9 or 6:13, I do not even need to explain the outcome—who was in favor and who opposed—to anybody. I am sorry that it is done. The same applies to the alleged statements by Deputy Payne.

On the other hand, we must strictly differentiate between an official statement by a politician at a news conference and statements made in a two-hour discussion with an audience of 500, when willy-nilly—we are all just people of flesh and blood—we succumb to a certain degree to

the atmosphere, the environment, and we are more relaxed, do not use crystal-clear sentences as we would do in an official communique. At an informal discussion with expatriates, it can easily happen that you speak about something significant for 90 percent of the time, and then someone asks a question, to which you reply with a relatively imprecise, unclear answer, and this answer will suddenly dominate in the media. I try to avoid this myself but am aware that one can never avoid it altogether.

Dlouhy Discusses Economic Prospects, Changes

AU1502193394 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Feb 94 pp 1, 22

[Interview with Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy by Pavel Paral; place and date not given: "I Do Not Advocate the Asian Tigers' Principle for This Country"]

[Text] [Paral] The government forecasts economic growth of 2-3 percent this year, while the Czech National Bank [CNB] anticipates 2 percent at most. These figures seem rather small to me considering that they are seen as a turning point in economic development. Apparently, all the basic things in reform have been done.

[Dlouhy] Are you sure that everything has been done?

[Paral] The prime minister declared recently that reform was over.

[Dlouhy] We will certainly still get round to enterprise management, enterprises that have gone through coupon privatization, the role of the privatization funds, and the real state of relations between the owner and management. This is all just in the process of being defined and will be defined. On the other hand, I would not make an issue out of the differences between the government's estimate and that of the CNB. Bankers everywhere are, by nature, more skeptical than politicians, who "must" instill optimism.

[Paral] I am not making an issue out of it. It is just that the two estimates seem low to me.

[Dlouhy] If 2-percent growth is achieved, it will be a very good result, and I will consider it a real success. However, this is conditional on several facts. First and foremost, on whether the current dynamism of exports can be maintained. It will also depend, in the annual context, on how 1993 turned out. I said in July that the second half of the year would be worse and that we should expect decline. I was criticized for this, but we had a decline in the third quarter—for a rather prosaic reason. The third quarter of 1992 was so high that the year-to-year comparison simply had to be worse.

On the other hand, the first quarter of 1993 was very low, so the first quarter of this year may be high. This is what reporters have said, after all. So, when growth is being considered, statistical issues play a role.

It is also of no fundamental importance whether economic growth this year is 1 or 2 or 2.5 percent. On the other hand, what is of fundamental importance is the fact that the trend in the gross domestic product [GDP] is from - 14.2 percent in 1991 to - 7.1 percent in 1992, zero in 1993, and + 1.8 or + 2.2 percent in 1994, which not even RUDE PRAVO, which is associated more with the opposition political parties, can overlook as successful economic development.

Growth will depend on the dynamism of exports. I have to mention that, from the point of view of the UN European Economic Commission, for instance, the Czech Republic was the only former communist country that recorded an increase in exports. In view of the figures already referred to, further growth in the first quarter is virtually certain. Furthermore, we can expect growth in real domestic demand, both in investments and in households' consumption.

[Paral] In your opinion, then, is this year going to be a real turning point in the Czech economy's performance?

[Dlouhy] You always use shock therapy terminology. Why do you always expect a turning point? I like this trend, - 1.1 in 1990, then - 14.2, - 7.1, and 0, and now it is improving slowly and, in time, cyclical fluctuations will become the norm. Would you want economic development like this? (Vladimir Dlouhy draws a V-shaped graph)

[Paral] Yes.

[Dlouhy] I do not advocate the Asian Tigers' principle for this country.

[Paral] Do you think that, after such a profound decline, growth rates between 2 and 3 percent are acceptable for this country?

[Dlouhy] Let us be realists in 1994 and 1995. The basic building blocks for a market economy have been laid in a rudimentary form here and, from this point of view, we are really a market economy. However, from the point of view of privatization, we see that small private enterprises are the only effective segment. This applies to only a few of the large enterprises, and a number of them will still undergo restructuring under the management of new owners. Nevertheless, they will also undergo a certain learning process, how to own and manage properly, which is, without a doubt, a bit of an impediment. Therefore, I do not anticipate particularly rapid growth for the next two years. It will then depend on the kinds of lessons this country learns and on the external conditions. Given a sensible economic policy, we can then achieve greater economic growth. I repeat, however, that I have never claimed that we can become an Asian Tiger. Nevertheless, if I am mistaken, all the better.

[Paral] We have a Polish neighbor, however, who has conducted a very similar economic policy, apart from

privatization, and recorded a growth rate of approximately 4 percent last year and expects to do the same this year.

[Dlouhy] Of course, the situation is a little different in Poland. You have to realize that they have a different situation as far as their debt, inflation, and other macroeconomic indexes are concerned. Apart from this, I feel that there is a danger of the economy in Poland overheating. All the data tells me that we did well when we embarked on a path of maximum macroeconomic stabilization. Now, of course, while maintaining stability, we are looking for growth as fast as possible. If it is 2 percent next year, thank God.

[Paral] Are the Poles not achieving higher growth because they have also paid more attention to structural changes?

[Dlouhy] We compiled special industrial figures for the first three quarters of 1993. We can elicit a specific change in the structure from these figures. Industry is contracting. This is not a tragedy, however. After all, we said that industry has to be reduced in size. Of course, it must not disappear into a black hole, but it is quite in order for industry to be reduced in size from the point of view of the number of employees and from the point of view of its proportion of the GDP. This is a natural restructuring process.

The issue here mainly involves whether restructuring is taking place during a period of decline. An average of 35,000-40,000 people per month are made redundant in our country. Despite this, the unemployment rate is rising relatively slowly. This means that the majority of these people find a new job immediately. At the same time, I see changes in the cost structure, in productivity, and in employment away from heavier branches such as metallurgy, the power-generating industry, and bulk chemicals toward general engineering and certain branches of light industry. Therefore, I am able to argue that slowly but surely changes are taking place.

[Paral] Don't you think that branches such as heavy engineering should be shaped and restructured according to demand? After all, they know that we have to build roads and highways, reconstruct railroads, and modernize the telephone network and that materials and equipment are necessary for this.

[Dlouhy] Am I preventing the managements of these firms from making the predictions you mention? I sincerely hope that they are making them. If they are not doing this, they are bad managements.

[Paral] But the government has a very stepmotherly attitude toward these projects?

[Dlouhy] This is not true. Last year, especially in the second half of it, was the first time we said something more conceptual about the infrastructure. You have to realize that we inherited a divided state. A strategy was devised in the second half of the year to construct a highway network before the year 2005. By the way, the Bavarian industry minister told me that it is clear to him that we will complete the highway from Prague to Rozvadov in 1997, but they will not complete their 35 kilometers from Amberg until the year 2000. This means that these projects do not proceed so fast even in Germany. We now know that the Prague-Berlin, Breclav-Vienna, and Nuremberg-Prague railroad routes will be constructed. Other issues are also under discussion. Tenders are being issued for the Ingolstadt oil pipeline. The fundamental trends in the upgrading of telecommunications are also obvious. No company is being prevented from structuring itself in accordance with anticipated demand.

[Paral] I have heard that only half of the budget resources intended for investment were drawn on last year.

[Dlouhy] I do not know these figures by heart. If this were indeed the case, it would not be due to unwillingness on the part of the government. I have not come across a case whereby the Finance Ministry has not wanted to apportion the funds projected by the state budget for investments. If this is the case, it means that these projects were not ready.

[Paral] As far as I am aware, your opinion of the budget was somewhat different from the current budget concept asserted by the Finance Ministry. Do you think that the budget also has to be balanced in the short term?

[Dlouhy] It depends on whether you look as this issue as the trade and industry minister or as the finance minister. If I were finance minister, I would work for a constantly balanced budget. As industry minister, I like the idea of expenditure temporarily exceeding revenue with its possibilities for rejuvenating the economy and for facilitating the opposite ratio between income and revenue in the future. The problem is that few people have recorded such development in the history of advanced countries. This is an argument against my point of view. The Reagan policy began well in this regard in 1981, then, under political pressure following the deployment of SS-20 missiles, the United States had to increase its armaments, and the potential budget surplus was nullified in this process.

Despite this, I would at least leave it open to discussion that it is unnecessary to be afraid of a sensible deficit if it really has the effect of economic growth. On the other hand, the question is to what extent our economy is ready for such stimuli. To what extent the businessman is capable of using tax relief, the foreign investor will really use such relief for our development, and so on. The question is, what effect would a greater volume of state orders and so on have on demand? We could take the prime minister at his word here. If we have indeed laid the foundations of the market economy, we should begin to believe more in the progrowth effect of the budget deficit.

[Paral] Now, of course, enterprises both private and state are grappling with the fact that they have no money. The reason is widespread insolvency. However, they have not been provided with sufficient capital since the era of state ownership.

[Dlouhy] This is a combination of several problems. The first is the problem of primary and secondary insolvency. A number of people have expressed opinions that insolvency should begin to be perceived as a specific business credit. I am not saying that insolvency has ceased to be a problem to me. It is enforced, whereas business credit is voluntary.

[Paral] I think the fact that the enterprise cannot afford this is an even greater problem. It cannot afford to defer payment because it would not have anything to make purchases with.

[Dlouhy] But this is also because the banks do not want to give it anything because it is in a poor financial situation, and it is in a poor financial situation because the firms it supplies do not pay it. Low capitalization is associated with the level of savings—how people and companies are able to make a profit and how they are willing to turn it into capital. We have too short a time behind us for this. A number of businesses are making a loss. Only a few businesses make such a large profit that they can immediately invest it. Credit is also accessible to only a limited circle of enterprises. There is no long-term financing or long-term credit in this country. After all, RUDE PRAVO should be closer to Marx—from the point of view of membership in political parties—than I am. If something is perfectly described in *Das Kapital*, then it is, in the first volume, the original accumulation of capital. This is quite relevant from the point of view of the Czech economy in the 1990's. In England, the original accumulation of capital took decades, and, although the situation is now completely different, we had an incredibly undernourished economy here after 40 years, an economy that has even received a couple of blows from outside—for example, the collapse of traditional markets and the recession in Europe.

There is another reason we will not emulate the Asian Tigers: South Korea and Taiwan tightened their belts and created a capital basis to the detriment of the population's standard of living. This cannot be implemented in our country. So, in our country, the 1990's will be a period of forming capitalization. All of this will still lead to many changes in the structure of the economy and to changes in employment. By saying this, I am not imparting pessimism. This is sober and real optimism, which, however, forces me to accept that our enterprises are under capitalized, that it is difficult for them to gain access to finance, and that this is associated with a whole bundle of problems that will begin to be unwrapped gradually.

[Paral] In the wake of coupon privatization, a large number of enterprises are in the hands of the major investment funds, and it is not in their interest to increase the enterprise's capital. The fund is interested in having a good enterprise in its portfolio and not in helping an enterprise in difficulty. When an enterprise finds itself in trouble, the fund sells its shares and buys others and does not extricate it from the mess. What are your experiences?

[Dlouhy] Naturally, there are a great many problems here. In part, in the actual execution of ownership. There are difficulties in administration, management, supervision of it, in some places outright gold-digging by means of membership on boards, collecting royalties, and so on.

You say that in advanced countries the funds try to sell an enterprise in difficulty. In this advanced economy—and the more so in our country—they also try to restructure and revive this enterprise before they sell it. We said that the state will do this only in exceptional cases. The new owners should do this. The funds will be in a situation where they will have good and bad enterprises and where they will inherit large holding companies—for instance, Aero. To sell them, they will have to be restructured. A bad enterprise will be divided. The completely inefficient part will be declared bankrupt, and the remainder will be kept or sold. What is happening is not evidence of a poorly chosen means of privatization.

I personally place greater emphasis on the issue of executing ownership rights. It is not that people do not know how to make strategic decisions. The problem is putting such a decision into effect—both from the point of view of the supervisory council and the owner and the board and the director general. This is where I see the weakest element. The issue does not so much involve the managers—we have good ones—but the method of supervising them, encouraging them, and their sometimes unnecessarily high salaries.

Deregulation Leads to Accelerated Price Growth

AU1602085494 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 11 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by "tma": "Prices Rose Almost 2 Percent in January"]

[Text] Prague—Consumer prices rose 1.9 percent in January. While food prices remained virtually unchanged, compared with December 1993, there were marked increases in housing rents, water and sewage rates, the cost of heat, municipal transport fares, and other services.

Payments for housing rents and related services rose 30 percent in the course of a single month. This was made possible by the government's decision to partially liberalize regulated prices in this area. A similar situation pertains to the cost of heat and hot water supply, which is almost 16 percent higher than in December 1993. Gasoline prices went up 2 percent, chiefly as a result of a change in the consumer tax rate. These systemic interventions alone led to 0.8-percent price growth.

These systemic changes were compounded in January by other extraordinary influences. A number of newspapers and magazines raised their prices, for example. Overall, these onetime changes brought a price growth of over 1 percent.

Compared with January 1993, consumer prices are now 10.9 percent higher. The lowest has been the growth in food prices, which went up by less than 5 percent [since January 1993].

Interpol Favors Using Security Services in Drug War

AU1502200194 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Feb 94 p 9

[Interview with Interpol Director General Raymond Kendall by Vladimir Sevela in Strasbourg; date not given: "According To the Interpol Chief, the Drugs Mafia in Europe Is Winning"]

[Text] Strasbourg—Interpol Director General Raymond Kendall declared in the Council of Europe last week that the methods employed so far to combat the organized drug trade have failed. He said that, despite the efforts by police forces throughout the continent, the drugs mafias have become consolidated during the past three years, and the aggression shown by their organizations has also increased.

The Interpol chief appealed to European countries to incorporate their security and information services into the struggle against international drug mafias and to utilize all the potential left behind in this sphere following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. "Let us proceed from the fact that the organized drug mafia is a foreign power set against the state. The current deployment of forces and resources between them and the police is uneven; therefore, it is necessary to apply other courses of action," he said.

Kendall also said that drug-related crime is now spreading dramatically throughout East Europe. Russia, Poland, and the Baltic states have become the main European producers of psychotropic substances, which are beginning to be the most sought-after drugs. According to Interpol figures, several times more heroin was seized in Bulgaria and Hungary last year than in the countries with a long "tradition" of using it—France and Belgium.

Because the drug problem is affecting the Czech Republic increasingly, MLADA FRONTA DNES asked Raymond Kendall for an interview.

[Sevela] How are politicians responding to your appeal to use the intelligence services in the struggle against the drug trade?

[Kendall] At the moment, it is too early for me to outline any specific reactions because this entire idea is, in essence, new. First of all, it is necessary for government and political officials to understand the seriousness of the threat represented by organized crime in the drug trade and to be aware of the kind of resources that it is necessary to use. I think, however, that they are aware of the benefit that will arise from combining efforts in an assault on these criminal organizations. Then, it is necessary to put the security services—this massive apparatus for acquiring and analyzing information—at the immediate disposal of the authorities involved in the struggle against drugs.

[Sevela] Some politicians maintain, however, that the security and information services are already being used for this purpose....

[Kendall] Yes, but intelligence centers always have a tendency to act independently. According to my proposal, they should not operate separately and in isolation. They should be subordinate to the people supervising the struggle against drugs-related crime.

[Sevela] It is possible somehow to prevent corruption in the offices intended to combat the drug trade?

[Kendall] Your question touches upon one of the biggest problems. Organized crime is a source of huge profit and brings with it the possibility of corruption among officials in all posts, including the most senior ones. Therefore, it is important for all countries—but mainly those whom corruption most concerns—to introduce specific measures.

[Sevela] You yourself are an advocate of balance between repression and prevention in the drug sphere. You have proposed orienting efforts toward restricting the demand for narcotics. Should East Europe proceed differently from West Europe?

[Kendall] No, this problem is the same everywhere. Despite this, the countries of the former Eastern bloc are, to a certain extent, lucky because the majority of people there cannot afford the prices the traffickers demand for drugs. Another aspect is that many things from West Europe, including drugs, are attractive, especially to young people. Of course, it is possible to avoid the problems that afflict us by means of prevention. It is enough to learn from our experience, first and foremost, in restricting the demand for drugs and to try to stop them infiltrating into the country—something that is on the increase—until your economy improves.

[Sevela] In what direction should prevention be oriented?

[Kendall] It is simply necessary to explain to people that drugs are bad. It is necessary to explain the health risks from these dangerous toxic substances as is being done for tobacco and alcohol.

Roman Kovac Expelled From Ruling Party

LD1502154094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik have been expelled from the ruling party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. The Movement's press spokewoman Ivana Salczerova confirmed this today. The two politicians called last week for forming a new government as a broader coalition with the opposition, but without chairmen of political parties, including Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

Claims Innocence After Accusations

LD1602103294 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Interview with Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac by an unidentified announcer in Bratislava—live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The Slovak Government was in session in Bratislava today. Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik left the session very early, about half an hour after the beginning. I have Roman Kovac in the studio. Can you tell us, how did the prime minister ask you to leave the government session?

[Kovac] The prime minister accused us both at the beginning of this session of various deeds. He wanted to split the session into two parts. In the first part, various privatization projects were to be approved, and we were to take part in it. In the second part, he wanted to discuss, without us, the internal political situation.

Moravcik's attempt to deny the accusations was not successful. It is true this was in keeping with the agenda of the government session. I, however, still think that his words could be given a hearing. We have asked for permission to depart from the session because the prime minister was directly asking us to go—so we actually complied with his wishes.

[Announcer] You are still members of the government. Therefore, this is anticonstitutional.

[Kovac] The government can be in session if more than half of its members are present. On the other hand, members of the government have the right to take part in its whole session. Therefore, his comment that they will hold a session without our presence really contradicts the way the government should act. I think that this was also one of the reasons we left the session. It was obviously a session about us but without us.

[Announcer] In the press club today, the prime minister accused you of forming a conspiratorial group and of working against the government, against the Movement [for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)]. Could you tell us something about this?

[Kovac] The expression "conspiratorial group" is very strong. I am happy to explain how the idea has come into being. It seemed absurd at first. It was mentioned on a number of occasions—the prime minister also mentioned it—that the opposition wants a government without him, and asked why then not without the top representatives of the other political parties, too. Parliament is not able to pass decisions due to controversies within it. Therefore, the idea has arisen to create a government that would represent the broad spectrum of the political forces in parliament, which would make parliament functional, and whether this government could not be formed without the top representatives of the parliamentary parties. What is now called a conspiratorial group or conspiratorial talks were, in fact, consultations because this idea was not easily acceptable to the other parties, and we would have no chance to present this idea without knowing whether they were willing to consider it. This is why we conducted these consultations. After some time, the parliamentary parties said that the idea was viable, in the interests of enabling the government and the state to function—as parliament was not able not operate.

It is certain that early parliamentary elections is the most democratic solution. I am fully for the elections because the citizens should decide in what way the country is to be ruled. There is, however, the period before early elections when there is a threat that fighting in parliament will continue. The state cannot come to a halt. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The prime minister is to submit to the president the proposal for your dismissal tomorrow. It might happen that the president will sign it. You are deputy not to the Slovak parliament but to the former federal parliament. Have you thought of your political future?

[Kovac] [passage omitted] I have envisioned that the reaction to our proposal might be strong, as our proposal is rather unusual. I, however, did not think that it would be that strong. We have submitted our view, and it was immediately followed by the expulsion, the condemnation, and now by the proposal to resign from the government.

I have said more than once that I will not resign because that would mean admitting guilt. I do not see expressing an alternative view on the system of government or on solving a political crisis as being guilty of something. It is a view that can be right or wrong, but this does not mean working against the government. In a parliamentary system, the government must be seeking the confidence of parliament. If it is unable to get the majority in parliament, something needs to be done.

I am not aware of any shortcomings in my work as deputy prime minister; I was not criticized for any errors that would force me to admit that I did my work badly. If, however, the prime minister lost confidence in me and is unable to cooperate with me, is it his right to

propose my future political destiny? I presume I will remain in political life. I remain a member of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. My expulsion contravenes the statutes of this Movement. The Movement has a rectifying mechanism, and I will do everything to use it because I think that the Movement is based on democracy. In democracy, people can express their views freely, and they cannot be punished for it. I am convinced that we will be able to defend and justify our views and that the expulsion will be nullified.

President Kovac Wants New Prime Minister

LD1502231294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1750 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Report on a news conference by Slovak President Michal Kovac at the Borik Hotel in Bratislava on 15 February by correspondents Magda Pospisilova and Zuzana Stukovska; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today, 365 days have passed since the National Council [of the Slovak Republic—the Slovak Parliament] elected the first president of the independent Slovak Republic. On this occasion, Michal Kovac met journalists at the Borik Hotel in Bratislava. Our editors Magda Pospisilova and Zuzana Stukovska were at the news conference.

[Stukovska] As expected, the majority of questions asked by journalists concerned Slovakia's internal political crisis. Commenting on the current situation, the president said that it might bring about a certain denouement, or at least a temporary one. He expects that an agreement to call early parliamentary elections will be reached. This might, according to Kovac, calm our society to a certain extent. [passage omitted]

Because the 26th session of the National Council is to resume tomorrow [16 February], our colleague Magda Pospisilova asked the following question:

[Pospisilova] Mr. President, if parliament passes a vote of no-confidence in the coalition government and the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] parliamentary group goes into opposition, what conditions will you set for agreeing to lead the Cabinet, or what are your criteria for selecting someone to whom you would ask to form an interim government?

[Kovac] "There is no way I intend to lead the government. This is out of question. As far as these criteria are concerned, I want to hold talks with all representatives, above all with HZDS representatives, to ask them to remain in government and to propose somebody else [for the post of prime minister]. I will concentrate my attention on this.

"If we fail to convince the HZDS representatives, following an agreement with other representatives of parliamentary political parties and movements, I will look for someone prepared to be asked to form a government."

[Pospisilova] Journalists went on to ask: The foreign minister, whose current position is extraordinary, is supposed to accompany you on the planned visit to Austria. Do you think the complications are accidental?

[Kovac] "I think that these things are not connected. I firmly believe that, at the time when the visit is to take place, the foreign minister will be able to accompany me."

[Pospisilova] Two early elections dates have been mentioned: June and November 1994. Which of them is favored by the president, and what sort of government should be ruling Slovakia before the elections?

[Kovac] "With regard to the debate, I think that the majority of the parties favor November. I do not want to get involved in this because this is really the business of the political entities, but, on the basis of what I was able to find out so far, I think that this [November] would be the optimal choice. If a vote of no-confidence in the government was passed before November, it would certainly be most suitable to have a broad coalition government of all parliamentary parties and movements. This government should prepare a number of bills that need to be passed by the government." [passage omitted]

[Pospisilova] The next question is from Radiozurnal. Mr. President, it is known that relations between Prime Minister Klaus and President Havel are not ideal, but no one says that their relationship could damage the state's interests. This cannot be said about Slovakia. Do you think that relations will be the same between Neuwirth and Carnogursky [both of the Christian Democratic Party] or Weiss and Ftacnik [of the Movement for a Democratic Left]?

[Kovac] "I do not know whether it will be, but, in any case, it is a pity because the lack of proper relations between the president and the prime minister can be negatively reflected in internal policy and also in foreign policy. This depends on personalities. To speak for myself, I have no pangs of conscience. I feel no share of guilt for the state of this relationship, and I do not know what I can do to improve it. I do not seek controversy, I am not conceited, I am cooperative and ready to cooperate. I am really vexed with this situation. I do not know what I can do apart from resigning."

[Pospisilova] Have you received such an offer in the interests of improving relations? President Kovac's reply to this question was the last at this news conference.

[Kovac] "No, I have not, and I do not intend to resign either. I was only mentioning it as a theoretical possibility, but I do not think the situation requires it. I see it as my duty to stay until the end, as long as my health

allows me to do so, because I am becoming convinced that it is necessary to have patience, not to give up, to bring integrating and unifying elements into our society. As long as I am even slightly successful in this, it is my duty to continue in this policy."

Meciar on Elections, Government Events

LD1602044694 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Good evening from the Hotel Danube. This is a direct relay of the discussion program "Pressclub." Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Health Minister Irena Belohorska, and Minister of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family Olga Keltosova are here to report on the results of the 84th meeting of the Slovak Government today.

As you know, the government today followed an amended agenda. Most points were left out of the agenda, and the session concentrated on the assessment and endorsement of privatization projects and a statement on the current internal political situation. We want to concentrate on both. [passage omitted]

What stance has been assumed by the government today on the current situation, and what solutions can you envisage?

[Meciar] [passage omitted] The Government of the Slovak Republic therefore proposes that this election period be shortened by half and that it end by 30 June 1994. It is submitting a bill of the constitutional law to the Slovak parliament to this effect. The Slovak Government proceeds from the proposals made within the movement [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)], which state that, should the government reject this date, it would be necessary to rely on the citizens' decision in a referendum. If there is a delay in solving this situation, this will have a negative impact on this state with regard to its position abroad and its internal economic and social situation. What is being prepared for tomorrow and for the day after is extremely foolish and irresponsible. Therefore, the government's stance is that the crisis should be overcome by the citizens as soon as possible.

[Announcer] Mr. Prime Minister, you held talks today also in parliamentary, groups where all this has been discussed. Do all deputies agree that early elections should be held in June?

[Unidentified speaker] The chairman of the Slovak National Party's parliamentary club, Miroslav Kona, said that early parliamentary elections would suit them, too, but only in the fall.

[Meciar] [passage omitted] Can we afford a provisional government and instability for several months? Who would hold talks with it, and what important decisions could such a government make? What would be its time span?

The second problem: A number of economic issues are already being worked on, such as loans, talks on transport lines, on commerce and so on. [passage omitted]

Having a provisional government can have a serious impact on commercial relations. [passage omitted] Everything will come to a standstill.

Take the visit of Mr. Kozyrev, which was to be of key importance and which is not going to take place for these political reasons. This is a great loss for the Slovak Republic, and not only in the political sense. It will, naturally, be reflected elsewhere as well. Therefore a delay is not good for us. [passage omitted]

If the governmental bill is not passed in parliament—and we shall submit the proposal already at this parliamentary session—we envisage that petitions will start immediately from the coming Monday. Should 350,000 citizens sign a petition in favor of early elections or in favor of changing the ratio of deputies in parliament or in favor of two other questions, which, according to our proposal, should be answered in a referendum, a referendum is necessary. This means that all citizens will make a decision in a pan-national vote. It is a new institution, common in Switzerland, still not used in our country but it is the most democratic one. [passage omitted]

We have been given responsibility by the people; we must humbly and respectfully go to them and ask whether they continue to want us and trust us. If they confirm us, we shall continue to work. If they reject us it is their right which we have to respect. In any case, however, things must be left to run freely in this direction and till then the simplest thing is to leave the government to prepare the elections in a democratic way because any other change would mean enormous losses. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] I would like to ask about a debate on two amendments to the law on large-scale privatization. You have said that you would like to connect it with a vote of confidence in the government. Is it still true or have you given up this intention? My second question: There have been rumors that pressure actions are being prepared, and that coach trips to Bratislava to support you are being prepared by the districts. Do you know something about this?

[Meciar] [passage omitted] We are willing, with regard to this bill, to make some concessions. For example, the finance minister does not need to be the chairman of the supervisory council. We will, however, not retreat on the point of the government having influence on the Presidium of the [National Property] Fund and being interlined with its personnel because the proposal of the other side contains some badly thought-out mechanisms. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] You have not answered my question: Will you consider the vote of confidence in the government if the privatization bill is not passed?

[Meciar] We have discussed it in the government. Part of the cabinet was for connecting the two, the majority was against. This means that the government will not link tomorrow the privatization bill with the proposal of the vote of confidence in the government. Should the Slovak parliament pass a law which is not acceptable by the government, we should return it to parliament in a constitutional way, through the president.

[Announcer] What about the pressure actions?

[Meciar] This is a novelty to me. If somebody wants to change some structures, he cannot leave out the citizens because consequently they have behaved without restraint. We have, however, not organized it and I know nothing of it.

[Announcer] Is the government prepared, for example, for the presence of several hundred people in front of parliament tomorrow who would not behave in a very civilized fashion?

[Meciar] [passage omitted] Why should the government deal with it if the public order is not in jeopardy? [passage omitted] Until the citizens violate the public order the government will not take any measures against them. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The president has also given a press conference today: he asked his constitutional experts for opinion on the question to be asked in a referendum with regard to retroactivity. If 350,000 citizens sign a petition in favor of a referendum he will submit the issue to the constitutional court before the referendum is called.

[Meciar] [passage omitted] If there are 350,000 signatories, the president is obliged to call a referendum within 30 days. [passage omitted] The force of a referendum surpasses that of the constitutional court. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The constitution says that a deputy is to carry out his duty according to his conscience. A referendum on this issue would be about this basic human right. The constitution says that there can be no referendum on basic human rights.

[Meciar] [passage omitted] A deputy cannot be free to the extent that he can act independently of his original programm and of the party on behalf of which he is elected. [passage omitted] It is up to the citizens to decide whether they want to be represented in parliament by Messrs Knazko and company, by Messrs Cernak and company: if the citizens say that they do not want them they will be replaced by people who will, on their behalf, carry out their duties following from their original programs. It is not possible to have part of a movement tear itself away, for the intentions which might not be always be that of common good, and then having them start to destroy the party which has paid for them to be provided for for quite a long time by an institution such as parliament. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] According to the Constitution, political parties are independent of the state, and the state representatives have no right to interfere in their internal affairs.

If the presidential castle had not been mentioning for months that Mr. Kovac or Mr. Moravcik were to be alternative prime ministers, this crisis did not have to happen. [passage omitted] Therefore the HZDS has decided: Either it will continue to form a government—and we are sincerely willing to talk about coalition—or it will be in opposition and nobody will force upon it any prime minister. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] We are to discuss here the course of the government session today. In the afternoon, this session was closed but we presume that you decided about the further destiny of Roman Kovac and Moravcik. They told Slovak Television today that you asked them to leave while Lexa and Hanko said at noon that they left on their own accord. What was the decision you made this afternoon?

[Meciar] They went on their own accord. I recommended to them to resign, but it is not the same thing as dismissing them. Mr. Kovac said that they were leaving the cabinet session and they left; it is their business. If somebody has the courage for a political action, he must be able to face the consequences. If somebody is preparing a new government, behind the back of the existing government—and I have spoken to five people who told me that Mr. Kovac had told them to be ready to join the government this week and a sixth was being discussed by somebody else [as heard]—this is an unfair action, to say the least.

When we asked Mr. Kovac openly whether he acted in this way he denied it. Mr. Moravcik did the same. When we asked them whether they were preparing a fraction within the parliamentary group, they gave their word of honor that they were not. When we asked them whether they were conducting negotiations with opposition parties, they claimed not only to me but before the whole political board of the movement that this was a lie.

This is not an opinion of a minority; this is a political construction which has grown into a destruction of the parliamentary group of the HZDS, into almost conspiratorial talks with other political entities and into the formation of a new government without being asked to do so by the Movement, or by the president, or by the legitimate constitutional bodies.

If this is called a normal or alternative activity, we cannot approve of it. Therefore we have said that the right thing is for these gentlemen to leave of their own will. As they do not want to do so, the government finds it natural that in this case I have to submit to the president a proposal to have them recalled because they lost the confidence of the Movement. [passage omitted]

Now they rely on the positive attitude of the president towards them. Meciar will propose their dismissal, and

the president will not accept it, they think. The government, however, does not want to have them in its midst. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Does it mean, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are going to submit a proposal to have them dismissed?

[Meciar] I am going to submit the proposal for their dismissal tomorrow. I have informed the president about it on Monday [14 February]; he asked for time to think it over. The government was unanimous on this. The great majority of the HZDS presidium has decided that they cannot be trusted in this office. Then it is up to me to decide on what pretext to keep them in the government: as representatives of the opposition which they joined? And of what sort of opposition? On what basis? This is against democratic principles and this is another pretext for the creation of a new political problem.

[Announcer] The president has said today that you had pointed out to you today that the dismissal of the deputy prime minister and minister Moravcik could have a negative impact on the international reputation of Slovakia.

[Meciar] I have told the president that this argument cannot be accepted. What sort of foreign minister announces publicly that the government of which he forms a part should be overthrown? Is this a good signal for the world? Is it good when Mr. Kozyrev is to come, and the government agrees with his visit and decides which member of the government is to hold talks with him and in the meantime, somebody else is holding talks about cancelling this visit? This is working against the government and its policy.

There have been also many specific objections to the work of the foreign minister, which the government frequently criticised. The foreign minister knew about them and also the president knew about them. [passage omitted]

The president was looking for a pretext to justify what he told me on Monday, and none of us accepted it. I and my deputies, with the exception of Mr. Kovac, and Parliamentary Speaker Mr. Gasparovic held those talks with him. The president has the right to have his opinion and he has also the right, according to that unfortunate constitutional court, to say that he would not accept the dismissals. What will be achieved by this? There will a minister in the government who will represent nobody, who will be there against the will of all, apart from the will of the president. But I am the one who is responsible for the work of the government. Will I be assessed on the work of the person who was forced upon me? [passage omitted]

The world wants us to be stable, instead of having another source of tension. I would therefore ask the president to solve the situation speedily to stabilize the situation. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] The Czech side has obviously been taken by surprise that the Slovak customs officers have started to ask for special certificates on the quality of [exported] foodstuffs. Minister Dlouhy called it unfair; allegedly you had informed them only 24 hours before the introduction of these measures, and Prime Minister Klaus allegedly had a telephone conversation with you yesterday morning and you promised him that the government would be discussing this problem seriously at its session today. According to the Czech press, he asked us to halt these measures prior to the extraordinary session of the Customs Union. What measures have you adopted?

[Meciar] The government has discussed it. It is not such a big problem as it seems as these are usual [word indistinct] norms which must be observed, and everybody who exports food must submit a certificate that his goods are of the agreed quality. The only change is that in the past, the quality certificate was to be submitted to the customs office at the destination and now it is demanded at the border because at the destination this had not been done. Naturally it caused problems for people who had neglected this obligation. Few lorries—not too many—were stuck on the Czech side and this created anxiety.

Therefore the government reassessed the situation and asked Mr. Ducky, as chairman of the Customs Union Council, to convene an extraordinary session of the Council tomorrow where everything is to be discussed—not only the quality of goods but also the balance of payment. [passage omitted]

Visit by Russian Foreign Minister Postponed

LD1502165094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] The Slovak Republic Foreign Ministry reported a while ago that, following an agreement with the Russian side, the official visit to Slovakia by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has been postponed. The visit was scheduled to start tomorrow. The date will be specified later through diplomatic channels.

The official visit to Bulgaria by our foreign minister, Jozef Moravcik, has also been postponed.

Correction to Moravcik Foreign Policy Report

AU1302202694

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Moravcik Presents Foreign Policy Report," published in the 8 February East Europe DAILY REPORT, pages 5-7:

Page 6, column one, paragraph four, sentence three make read: ...NACC ad hoc group on peacekeeping operations; and gave their.... (supplying dropped words "on peacekeeping operations");

Same paragraph, sentence four make read: ...the level of foreign ministers in Athens. (changing "defense" to "foreign");

Page 6, column two, end of first partial paragraph make read: ...at the WEU. One diplomat at the embassy in Brussels deals with NATO-related and other problems.

CSCE

The Slovak.... (supplying dropped sentence);

Same column, paragraph two, sentence two make read: ...with the U.S. Department of State, the Foreign Ministries of Sweden.... (changing "Department of Defense" to "Department of State" and "Defense" to "Foreign");

Same column, paragraph three, sentence four make read: ...for human rights and basic freedoms were satisfactory in.... (supplying dropped words "and basic freedoms");

Same column, paragraph four, sentence one make read: The mission of the CSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities, which took place on the basis of an invitation from the Slovak Republic Government, has arrived at similar results. In.... (correcting title, adding dropped words);

Page 7, column one, sentence one make read: ...the meeting between the foreign ministers of the Three and.... (supplying dropped words "the foreign ministers of").

Jeszenszky Views Croat Relations, Balkan War

AU1602120694 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 94 pp 14-15

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Igor Uranic in Budapest; date not given: "The Bosnian Croats Are Now Victims"]

[Text] Dr. Geza Jeszenszky is one of the people who in the past four years has lead the young Hungarian democracy toward Europe, from which this country was divided by an "iron curtain" after World War II. Always pleasant to talk to, rationally interpreting political events, he shook my hand at the door to his office, saying "Good afternoon" in Croatian. I replied in Hungarian. This was the first long interview with him, and I felt that I should start from what has already become history. However, I skipped the first nine centuries of Croatian-Hungarian history.

[Uranic] Minister Jeszenszky, how would you assess the relations between Croatia and Hungary from the fall of communism to the present day?

[Jeszenszky] I think that every Croat and every Hungarian realize that these two nations and two countries have for centuries lived within one state and that this life together was not at all bad. It was only in the 19th century that there were serious controversies and tensions between the two nations. The relations were good—whether we discuss the present, the time of the former Yugoslavia, or the time of the Croato-Hungarian Compromise of 1868, which was also not bad. Naturally, we could discuss its implementation. However, if I am to talk about how relations between the two countries have developed since 1990, then I would like to say with the utmost sincerity that I am very happy that another "compromise" has been made between Croatia and Hungary. This one was much easier to make, since we are living in two states.

Hungary never wanted to meddle in the relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia, but it also respected the will of the Croatian people when we realized that the Croats saw their future in an independent state. After Croatia established peace following a very difficult war, which peace is, unfortunately, still very fragile, political relations were established between Hungary and Croatia at all levels. Much has been done in the areas of economy and culture.

Unfortunately, economic cooperation is not as strong and intensive as we would like it to be, which the war is largely responsible for. For instance, you see that Hungarian tourists have understood this unusual situation of the war being waged in certain parts of Croatia, while it is possible to swim in the Adriatic in peace, so there have been many on holiday in Croatia in the past two years. I think that, generally speaking, permanent and solid foundations have been laid for good relations between the two countries and two nations in this period.

[Uranic] In your opinion, how does the war in the Balkans influence Hungary, and how does it influence the political situation in this part of Europe? Do you agree with those who say that "Europe is dying in the Balkans"?

[Jeszenszky] The war in the Balkans is undoubtedly a burden to primarily the Balkan peoples, the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The neighboring countries also feel the consequences of the war—naturally not the way the people of Vukovar or Sarajevo have felt it, but Hungary does indeed feel the consequences of the war. We do not see this war as an American who sees it all on TV and thinks: "This is far away. What is happening there is terrible, but the main thing is that it is not here." This war is close to us, and the Hungarian people have shown their solidarity with those who suffer by accepting refugees and through the significant aid offered by the members of the Maltese order and many others. Unfortunately, the war in the Balkans does indeed have a very bad influence on the entire region.

I am not only talking about these direct consequences. Looking from a distance, the war is here, several hundred kilometers away, in this part of Europe. More tourists and more investors from the United States would have come to Hungary if this war had been over. I will not say that this war could stimulate others to fight wars, but, unfortunately, it indicates that the use of force and occupation of territory have so far yielded results. It is, therefore, a very bad example to the entire world, particularly Central and Eastern Europe. I personally think that the events that have occurred there are a hard blow to the civilization of Christian Europe.

We know that war conventions have been in power since the last century and that they were mostly observed even then. Let me quote from a work of a great Hungarian writer Sandor Maroy, who said: "To be European means to believe that reason and solidarity are stronger than the tyranny of low passions." Unforfunately, we have seen that this basic principle of Europeanism was not actualized here. Moreover, I think that it should be in the interest of all Europeans, especially those who have been inflicted by the war, to stop the conflict and that it is their obligation.

[Uranic] Do you think that the UN action, which has so far been unsuccessful, indicates the international community's weakness? Should the keeping of peace be replaced by the imposing of peace or, more precisely, military intervention?

[Jeszenszky] Unfortunately, we can conclude that the international community has not been able to deal not only with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the entire Balkan crisis. It soon threw the ball in the European Union's court. After the mediation of the three failed, as did the very reasonable Carrington plan, the issue fell into the hands of the United Nations, and since then, I have seen much willingness to deal with the issue.

The UN countries are providing considerable amounts of aid for the people who are suffering. The fact is that hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in the war, but it should also be said that several dozen Europeans from the countries participating in UN missions have also lost their lives. Thus, they became a part of the suffering, too. I would, therefore, not say that either Europe or the international community have completely failed in the Balkans. We could have said there was a true failure if no efforts had been made to achieve peace. Unfortunately, there were no appropriate means; there was not enough political willingness to impose peace. The issue is that it is not enough to keep the peace because that would come into power when peace or at least some cease-fire has been achieved.

The United Nations has so far only been prepared to keep peace. The member countries were not prepared to take the risk for which military experts established would take an army of at least 100 soldiers to impose peace, but with the uncertainty as to how long such peace would last. We may conclude that the United Nations has learned from all this that, in fighting similar crises in the future, preventive diplomacy should be instituted on time.

[Uranic] There have been many accusations recently concerning Croatia's alleged military involvement in the Bosnian war. How do you think the existence of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be secured, knowing they are a minority, both in relation to the Serbs and the Muslims?

[Jeszenszky] The world's reaction to the events during the entire war have always been strong but somewhat late. The world did not pay any attention to the destruction of Vukovar and Dubrovnik or to the fact that hospitals and churches were being shot. Only later did everyone realize that the Muslims and the Croats were the victims in the beginning of the Bosnian war. However, when the truth did emerge, it took quite some time before the public started to apply pressure and stimulate activity.

It seems to me that the Bosnian Croats are really the victims at the moment. It is they who are threatened. I can understand that the Croatian Government and the Croat people are very worried about it. However, I also hope that we neighboring countries and the international community will find a way to prevent the threat of their extinction or exile and that not only Croatia will have to protect them. The question is whether Croatia has the power to protect them alone, and what the reaction of the international community to such attempt would be.

I do not know how much truth there is in the news according to which there are regular Croatian troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even if it is undoubtedly aimed at protecting the Bosnian Croats, it could cause the imposing of sanctions against Croatia, which should be avoided at all costs. However, the Bosnian Croats becoming victims of ethnic cleansing or being forced to flee to Croatia should also be avoided. The world should not only watch what the Croats are doing; it should pay equal attention to all the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Uranic] To what extent does the delicate issue of Hungarians in Vojvodina influence the Hungarian policies toward Belgrade?

[Jeszenszky] It is clear that Hungary would like the entire crisis to be resolved, but it has paid particular attention to keeping up with the position of the Hungarians, as well as the Croats, Slovaks, and Ruthenians in Vojvodina. When ethnic cleansing was in full swing, so to speak, we were worried that the Hungarians in Vojvodina would not only flee because of poverty and forced mobilization, but also because of the possibility that some paramilitary formations could expel them and other non-Serb people from Vojvodina. A large number of Hungarians fled from there—almost 15 percent of the total number. I hope that this is temporary and that the situation will improve. This direct danger has subsided in the past several weeks, which is perhaps because the radicals there have lost a certain amount of power—this was shown in the election results.

Naturally, the economic situation has not changed at all. All we can do to mitigate it is to send as much humanitarian aid as we can. However, Hungary has not considered giving up certain principles to try to buy peace for the Hungarians in Vojvodina or their rights. I think that we have abided by a principled policy during the entire crisis and that we have worked on trying to retain good relations with all the peoples who are part of it, which we succeeded in with Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, the Serbs were condemned by the international community but, in that case as well, we keep in mind that they are our neighbors and that they will continue to be so. Bearing in mind not only the future of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, but also the long-term Serbian-Hungarian relations, we wanted to keep good relations with them, too. We did not introduce compulsory visas; we enabled the regular flow of the local traffic and so on.

However, at the same time, we believe that the concept of autonomy, which the Democratic Union of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, is their right. In that we do not believe that this is some special right of the Hungarians, but that this model of local self- management is one of the possible ways of democracy and coexistence in the Balkans and even further. As Croatia is, to my knowledge, prepared to provide minority rights for the Serbs, Serbia should provide a special status to the Croats in Serbia.

All in all, it seems to me that in the past few weeks, as recent events have indicated, the government in Belgrade has realized that what the Hungarians are asking for is not all that impossible. They have realized that it does not endanger the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and that with that move, they could win some positive points with the international community and maybe

even come closer to a solution for Kosovo. I do not want to be too optimistic, but there have been serious suggestions lately, primarily from Serbian President Milosevic. Andras Agoston was invited to negotiate. This is a sign, and the days and weeks to follow will answer the question if it was a tactical move or a political decision that could have positive consequences in the long run.

I sincerely hope that this will be actualized, and I would like to point out that during my stay in Belgrade, I felt that the government there was seriously prepared to make certain steps toward peace and that they will start serious negotiations with the Hungarians. The Serb-Croat agreement, which happened several days before, had to me been a good sign of "breaking the ice" and more than that. It showed that Serb-Croat relations had moved from a standstill, which is extremely important for us, because it means that there is no danger of another conflict in our neighborhood, which may open the possibility of the return of the refugees, the opening of the Adriatic pipeline....

[Uranic] Hungary has achieved remarkable success in European political integration. However, many believe that this is not accompanied by a corresponding level of economic prosperity.

[Jeszenszky] It would be difficult to summarize the condition of the Hungarian economy in a few sentences. However, I think that the achieved level of transformation of the Hungarian economy is not at all bad. I would like to point out that our inflation has never reached the proportions that most of our neighbors have experienced; it is currently kept at approximately 20 percent a year, and it will be even lower. We have made a significant part of state property private and half of the capital intended for this part of Europe still flows into Hungary. I would not like to embark upon a rivalry concerning who is in a better situation—us, the Czechs, or the Polish. The most important thing is that a lot of capital is arriving here. As far as I am concerned, let there be talk that other countries are better off, as long as the greater part of the capital comes here. Capital does not read the papers and does not listen to propaganda, but simply goes where it pays to invest. That is why I think that the success of the Hungarian economy is at a far more serious level than is commonly thought.

I recently visited Ukraine, and I went to the foot of the Carpathians. The Hungarians there are surprised at the people in Hungary complaining about the situation so much. Not only because things are much worse there, but also because they see how much is being built here, and not only concerning infrastructure. There is a large number of new companies, new technology is being implemented, apartments built. All in all, I think that we have achieved relatively good economic growth in Hungary. We have not achieved everything we wanted, precisely because of the general international crisis and the war. Nevertheless, we did protect the people from the economic crisis that has struck all our neighbors.

[Uranic] Hungary has accepted the "Partnership for Peace" plan. Do you think this was the most the West could have offered to the Central and Eastern European countries, considering the situation in Russia?

[Jeszenszky] Many say that this is less than we expected and that the West has given in to Russia, or at least shown too much consideration toward Russia. I do not think this is true. Hungary and other East European countries clearly want to be full members of NATO, and they would not mind this coming into power immediately. However, a long transition period would follow. The conditions in the Hungarian Army, in the economy, and the education of the officers would certainly not enable us to become part of this integrated military structure immediately. However, I do not claim that we could not have done more.

The United States bears a historical responsibility, not only concerning Russian-U.S. relations, but also for what course Russian politics will take. It was, therefore, motivated to make Russia its partner and thus encourage those who are positively disposed toward the West, the democratic forces. Hungary, Poland, and other countries therefore accepted this—I would not say sacrifice, but waiting patiently. It is also best for us not to have to fear Russia forever and to have Russia not only stop being a military threat, but also start on the way of economic development, to continue being the source of raw materials and all its other potentials. We have a special interest in Russia becoming a large eastern market and in Russia and the Baltic countries becoming the center of Europe, as now they are its outskirts.

Therefore, if Russia and Ukraine stabilize and start going the way of democracy and market economy, we will be the first to profit from that. Hungary supported the "Partnership" under those terms. This is why we are not complaining. We believe that this is an achievement that was unthinkable a year ago. We have come closer to NATO membership and we have been given promises that this plan would lead to it. This depends primarily on us, on our handling of the situation, our progress, and our readiness to cooperate.

[Box p 15]

Lifting the Sanctions Against Belgrade

[Uranic] According to some sources, Hungary is prepared to support the lifting of the sanctions against the FRY. Could you comment on that?

[Jeszenszky] I think we can establish that over a year ago, the international community decided to achieve the desired aim—the end to the war—by imposing economic sanctions instead of carrying out military intervention. The sanctions have undoubtedly been effective. Serbia's economy has collapsed. I was there myself and I saw the direct consequences. Naturally, this is still a lesser price than having a city or people destroyed. However, it was no one's intention to make the innocent suffer the sanctions—for instance, the Serbian opposition or the

non-Serb population, which certainly did not support the policies that were to be punished by these sanctions. The aim of sanctions is not to destroy a nation and a state but to force them to change policies. The European Union has, therefore, recently made a proposal that mentions the suspension or lifting of the sanctions—not unconditional, but in case those whom these measures relate to, that is, the government in Belgrade as well as the Bosnian Serbs, make the moves they are expected to make. Hungary supports this way of thinking. It should be seen if the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims accept this within the framework of the peace plan.

The Bosnian Muslims have suffered a lot. I can understand their bitterness. They presently think that they have grown militarily stronger. However, I think it is clear that a military solution really does not exist. The Muslims may perhaps occupy several villages or maybe towns, but they can certainly not win against the Serbs. They will certainly not make it to Belgrade. Therefore, a peaceful solution is still the only solution there.

I talked to international mediator Stoltenberg and Romanian Foreign Minister Melesceu today. We have arranged to suggest that the neighboring countries of the former Yugoslavia hold a special session at the level of foreign ministers, at which we would discuss how we, the closest neighbors, can contribute to a peaceful resolution of the entire crisis. On the basis of the plan of the European Union and the peace envoys, we would seek the ways of putting an end to this war, and then, naturally, the lifting of the sanctions could follow.

Zhirinovskiy's 'Insulting' Remarks Protested

LD1502133394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Zhirinovskiy's bad behavior in Budapest has led to a memorandum. Istvan Kulcsar reports from the foreign affairs spokesman's briefing, which was held today.

[Kulcsar] The spokesman outlined the program of Prime Minister Peter Boross's visit to Paris at the end of this month. He will meet President Francois Mitterrand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, and will take part in a working lunch with Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Answering a question, the spokesman said that the Hungarian Government continues to appreciate the Balladur plan.

Then Russian topics were on the news briefing's agenda. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev will hold talks in Budapest from 21 to 22 February. He will be received by the Hungarian president and the prime minister as well. The expected topics of his talks with [Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky are, in addition to bilateral ties, the Yugoslav crisis, the European situation, and Hungary's integration into Europe.

At the beginning of March the head of the Russian Church, Patriarch Aleksii II, will visit Hungary.

Janos Herman outlined the memorandum, which was addressed by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Russian embassy in Budapest in connection with the scandal of Zhirinovskiy, who travelled through Budapest. It has come to the Foreign Ministry's notice that on 3 February 1994 Mr. Vladimir Volkovich Zhirinovskiy, a member of the Russian State Duma, during his private journey through Ferihegy Airport in Budapest, violated basic behavioral norms by publicly making insulting remarks about the Hungarian Republic and the airport staff on duty who were acting in accordance with regulations on passenger traffic, the memorandum reads. The Hungarian Republic's Foreign Ministry considers it unacceptable that a responsible politician and parliamentary deputy should express his opinion about Hungary and our fellow citizens in such a disreputable [meltatlan] manner and style. This was stated in the Foreign Ministry's memorandum addressed to the Russian embassy, which was outlined by the foreign affairs spokesman at his news briefing this morning.

Horn Discusses Zhirinovskiy, Russia, NATO

AU1002181794 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 10 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn by Gregor Mayer; place and date not given: "A Call for the Guiding Hand of the State"]

[Excerpt] [Mayer] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy recently said that Hungary is a "weak, poor country" and that Eastern Central Europe will "unite in an alliance under Slovakia's leadership." Should Hungary fear Russia again?

[Horn] One should not take Mr. Zhirinovskiy's statements seriously. Of course, one must not ignore him either because this nationalist-imperialist direction that he represents is a certain challenge. However, I do not fear that Russia will again turn Eastern Central Europe into its sphere of influence.

[Mayer] Why not?

[Horn] Russia neither has a reason nor the power. It is struggling with its own internal difficulties. It is not easy to hold Russia together.

[Mayer] Moscow's aspirations to push through some kind of Monroe Doctrine for the territory within the ex-Soviet borders do not alarm you either?

[Horn] Hungary and the other countries of Eastern Central Europe never belonged to Moscow. This is completely different from Georgia or the other ex-USSR republics.

[Mayer] However, you proposed as early as in 1990 that Hungary should strive for its admission to NATO.

[Horn] At that time, I proposed that close relations with NATO be developed. Even though this may have been differently interpreted, I meant political, not military cooperation.

[Mayer] At any rate, at that time, when the new democratic parties still talked of neutrality, you were a silent caller in Hungary. Are you disappointed today at NATO's hesitation to admit the Eastern European candidates as members?

[Horn] The "Partnership for Peace" program is a clever idea because it holds out the prospect of the development of cooperation to the East Europeans and does not commit NATO to anything in the question of admission.

[Mayer] Poland has, therefore, reacted with frustration.

[Horn] I am rather disappointed, because I do not see a guarantee that NATO would do something against a possible crisis in this region or how this would be done. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Views Regional Issues

AU0802164194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Feb 94 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Peter Vajda; place and date not given: "Lajos Fur: The MDF Has Come Around"]

[Excerpts] It can be seen as virtually settled that Lajos Fur will be the official nominee for party chairmanship in the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and his election can be seen as certain. He will probably keep his office of defense minister even when he is party chairman. Our correspondent interviewed him on issues he will be responsible for in his two capacities. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] The situation is different from that before 1990 and you are probably thinking in terms of some kind of coalition. I assume that various versions emerge. [MDF Deputy Chairman Sandor] Lezsak, whose views are considered to be close to yours in many respects, once said that he cannot imagine any kind of cooperation with the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz], the main reason being its attitude toward the churches. Do you share Lezsak's view on this?

[Fur] More or less I do, although he said this rather a long time ago, perhaps two months ago.... The Fidesz appears to be undergoing a big process of change. It is impossible to know its direction because all changes, if the Fidesz's mentality will indeed change, are difficult to accomplish. It is difficult to give up the habits. It is a fact that they have lately been proclaiming that the Fidesz is a center party and wishes to remain so, it has a national commitment, it fully represents the cause of the Hungarian national minorities, and it wishes to remain free of all extremisms. This, I believe, means distancing from the extreme right as well as the extreme left or left-wing parties. In my view, it would not now be possible to say that we will not enter into any kind of political dialogue with the Fidesz under any circumstances, but we cannot say that let us embrace each other, either. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] Let us turn to the Army. To be frank: Is it able to function?

[Fur] The current situation is indeed very difficult but this is not a result of the past two to three years. The last big purchases were done in the first half of the 1970's. A little was also done in the early 1980's but nothing at all has been bought in the past 10 to 15 years. This is not to mention the structures, barracks, buildings, and dwellings. The last big constructions took place in the 1950's and 1960's, nothing has been done since then. Not even maintenance. It is not in these two to three years that everything is trying to fall on top of us, this is the result of a long process. Everyone is aware of the country's economic situation. Whenever it was possible, I fought tooth and nail for increasing our budget. It would hardly have been possible to achieve more than what we actually received, and even this is reduced by various taxes and levies. I know that for a lieutenant who has basic problems of survival—whether he can buy meat for himself or he can pay rent or heating—this is poor comfort but this is how much we have. If the government accepts the proposal on the legal status of soldiers and it is also passed by Parliament then the pay of regular soldiers can significantly be increased possibly this year, but certainly from 1995. [passage omitted]

[Vajda] Are you, the first team of the change of the regime, a little bitter because your hopes of receiving Western help—for example, in developing the Army, among other things—have not really materialized? During talks with your Western colleagues, do you express that a certain amount of disappointment exists because of this?

[Fur] I certainly voice these feelings. I partly express our disappointment because we did not manage to make any progress, or at least we did not really manage to start including modern technology in the Hungarian Army. We also express our feeling of regret because this region has not received the necessary guarantees we would have liked in the area of security.

[Vajda] You are obviously also thinking of the case when we allowed certain aerial activity in our airspace, and [former] Prime Minister Antall had asked for definite guarantees—and this was leaked in the Western press—but we did not receive these, either.

[Fur] AWACS planes circled above us at that time. As for guarantees, we received verbal promise that any kind of harm to Hungary would at the same time mean a challenge for the West and it would not leave it at that. However, it is difficult to know what this actually means in practice. This kind of disappointment exists in Hungary and in other countries of the region. On the other hand, it will still be possible to make progress through the new partnership, if in nothing else then in establishing real military links because, up to now, we have only had visits....

[Vajda] Nevertheless, this is a little less than what you wanted.

[Fur] It is less because obviously we wanted more, but this is what we can have and we have to make do with this. More precisely, we will have to be able to make good use of this because certain possibilities do exist here. For example, we might be able to start bringing in small amounts of new technology mainly through setting up and operating the peacekeeping forces.

Normalization With Serbia

[Vajda] What do we expect from the Russians? What will happen to the remainder of their debt?

[Fuir] As a minister, I would be happiest if we managed to settle this remaining $800 million through some military purchases, but other viewpoints also exist. We do not yet fully know the Russian views, either. In Russia, various guesses and ideas emerge from time to time but I do not know if they all have a realistic basis.

[Vajda] A military expert actually wrote that the leadership of the Defense Ministry, including the minister, are in love with the E300 defense system. Have we really fully committed ourselves to this system?

[Fur] This is not a matter of love, this is a forced situation.

[Vajda] However, do we need this system?

[Fur] We would need it. Our sky still has a hole in it. This system would be the best one to fill this hole.

[Vajda] The reconstruction of the MiG-21s: Have you managed to achieve anything with the Israelis who, as it is known, deal with modernizing the airplanes? Is there a realistic hope or are we going to throw out these airplanes?

[Fur] No, we do not want to discard them. This also depends on the budget and on what methods the Israelis happen to find to modernize them. We have looked at a few bases in Israel where this is done. They would be ready to modernize these airplanes; they are also conducting talks with other countries on similar issues. The question is whether we can assign adequate funds to this and whether they can give us favorable offers on future payments or other financial methods. A number of solutions can exist.

[Vajda] You were a champion of developing military links with our neighbors, namely Slovakia and Romania. Relations with the Serbs have come on the agenda in Hungarian foreign policy. Can we expect some kind of settlement of Hungarian-Serbian relations?

[Fur] We have had links and still have them, mainly in the areas of aerial control and air defense.

[Vajda] All the public can see from this is that the Serbian military attache is called in and we protest against the aerial violations over Szeged.

[Fur] We also have other contacts and we have had higher level meetings in the past period where these cases of border violations, more precisely, the ways to prevent them, were discussed. Recently, since the fighting moved over to Bosnia, we have not really had any such events. Our military contacts have not been severed although, as it is known, the Serbian, or little Yugoslavian, higher level military leadership has been replaced three times in the past two to three years. The 1990 leadership was replaced in 1992, then these were also replaced later including the generals, the leadership, and everything.

[Vajda] This also happens in Hungary below the level of minister....

[Fur] Not to this extent.... In our case, this is a natural turnover while there, I believe, an artificial replacement took place. The main point is that we do have contacts, and I trust that, if we manage to settle relations on a political level—as [Foreign Minister] Geza Jeszenszky's recent visit to Belgrade indicated this, having confidence in advance—then higher level or top level meetings can also take place.

[Vajda] Would you accept an invitation to Belgrade?

[Fur] I certainly would if the conditions were right.

Official Views Ethnic Hungarian Issues Abroad

AU1502054894 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 12 Feb 94 p 14

[Interview with State Secretary Geza Entz, chairman of the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, by Jozsef Botlik; place and date not given: "We Cannot Count on a Spectacular Breakthrough"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Botlik] Prime Minister Peter Boross received representatives of ethnic Hungarians living abroad on 11 February. How did the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders participate in the preparation of this meeting and what made this meeting timely?

[Entz] Given the nature of our office, it is our primary task to keep contact with the organizations of ethnic Hungarians abroad. Regular contacts are held with the heads of organizations of ethnic Hungarians abroad at a prime ministerial level and at the level of other government officials, and this means the implementation of the constitutional obligation of this cabinet. The fact that the mother country and the Hungarian Government deal with the issue of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries has a stabilizing effect in the region. If we did not do this and failed to take up this responsibility, the deterioration in their situation would carry the danger of an advance of extremist forces, and this would definitely destabilize the situation.

With the current meeting, the old-new government also wants to express our political continuity, a continuity that cannot be broken even by the upcoming elections, given the basic national interests involved. [passage omitted]

[Botlik] Is there any division of labor between your office and the Foreign Ministry?

[Entz] It is the task of the Foreign Ministry to keep contacts with governments; our task is to cooperate with various organizations of the civil society, namely with the Hungarian communities living in the neighboring countries and with Hungarian organizations and churches all over the world. We regard these communities as partners in solving the international and domestic administrative tasks that affect them. It would be a mistake to treat the issue of ethnic Hungarians abroad as a foreign affairs issue only, because it practically affects the activity of every ministry in one way or another. Naturally, we offer partnership to the neighboring countries in these matters too, and there are countries that accept this offer and there are countries that do not yet accept it. Obviously, the decisions made in the various government spheres must form a uniform whole. It is our main task to coordinate these various activities. [passage omitted]

[Botlik] Where did you start from in analyzing the situation of Hungarians living abroad?

[Entz] We cannot disregard the fact that, with the Trianon Treaty of 1920, some 3.5 million Hungarians found themselves citizens of neighboring countries. These Hungarian communities are native inhabitants and have been playing an important role in shaping the civilization of those areas for centuries. If the real needs of this Hungarian minority are disregarded and if the regime and logic of these states aim at eliminating these communities by various milder or tougher forms of ethnic cleansing, up to genocide, then one must declare that this is the real source of the tension. It is also the fundamental interest of the other nations that have been living together with the Hungarians for centuries to treat the issue of the Hungarian minority positively, because only this approach can create the conditions for a fruitful cooperation and, in a wider sense, the bases of equal European integration. [passage omitted]

[Botlik] Could a dialogue emerge between the government and the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia?

[Entz] There are no realistic chances for such a thing in the current situation; however, there will surely be such a development in the long run. The Slovaks and Hungarians are interdependent, and this must emerge in Slovak politics sooner or later. We would like to see such a development as soon as possible.

[Botlik] With what neighboring countries are there possibilities of strengthening bilateral relations and improving the situation of the Hungarian minority?

[Entz] We can hardly count on a spectacular breakthrough in this respect. The current situation is the result of decisions made in this century, decisions opposing the interests of nations living in this region. It is characteristic of the situation that, in our region, nations that came out as victors in wars are now in the worst situation. This is definitely not good for Hungary. The fact that most of our neighbors are more unstable and their economy is also more unstable than ours hinders the assertion of the nice principle of making the borders traversable. This is not a matter of subjective decision; this requires the implementation of considerable market economy and social conditions. If these conditions are not there, the borders will continue to be difficult to traverse.

[Botlik] The fate of the Carpathian Euroregion clearly shows the problems....

[Entz] Yes, we can have no illusion regarding the complete openness of borders in the near future. We do not have to fear a Balkans-type conflict leading to armed violence in the region, but we do have to consider an economic stagnation, something that represents a constant crisis. This is mainly the reason for difficulties in improving relations. On the other hand, the extremist manifestations of national state ideas play a role in the region, and this represents a serious political obstacle.

[Botlik] In view of your recent talks with the heads of Hungarian organizations abroad, what chances do you see in improving the situation of ethnic Hungarians abroad?

[Entz] For example, there is not a large-scale immigration of Hungarians from Slovakia into Hungary, or brain-drain, or any other negative process. However, the same type of problems are of worrying size in Romania. Emigration from the Subcarpathian region has also become considerable lately. Unfortunately, some countries continue their traditional policy toward national minorities. Serbia regards Hungary as a long-term strategic partner, and this could work in peacetime. The need for Slovakia and Hungary to cooperate is obvious.

[Botlik] The Hungarian public is mainly focusing its attention on our eastern neighbor and Transylvania....

[Entz] Unfortunately, in the case of Romania, this need for cooperation is not so obvious. For example, in the eighties, when the CEMA was "flourishing" and cooperation was so "excellent" that some people are sorry for the collapse, our eastern neighbor occupied 16th place among Hungary's trade partners, and the same position is valid today. Lasting political trends can be clearly seen from economic indicators. In this situation, when economic contacts are so insignificant, every element of interstate relations easily becomes political, especially if there are organizational frameworks for this. This is why hysterical waves play an important role occasionally in Hungarian-Romanian relations, just like in the past. As long as there is no change in such basic issues, we cannot expect much better things from the future either. [passage omitted]

NATO Official: Poland Ready for Cooperation

LD1502135894 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1220 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Feb—Poland is well prepared for military cooperation with NATO, Field Marshal Richard Vincent, chairman of the NATO military committee, said today after his meeting with Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense.

In a statement to the media, Vincent underscored that "Poland is an important and prospective partner" for the North Atlantic Treaty. According to him, the issue of Partnership for Peace, which was discussed during his meeting with the defense minister, is neither a substitute issue nor an attempt to avoid a direct response to the issue of Poland's membership in NATO.

In response to the question of whether NATO can make technical data and information concerning air defense systems available to Poland, Vincent said that all these issues are on the list of priorities for implementation within the framework of closer cooperation and bringing Poland closer to NATO. "We want to understand each other better at the military level; we want to create operational effectiveness for cooperation," the field marshal added. The aforementioned air defense systems are very important for Poland's security, but they are very expensive.

Kolodziejczyk said that Vincent "is encouraging us to work extensively on a review document, which we should start negotiating in Brussels soon," to conclude a bilateral agreement between Poland and NATO and to join the Partnership for Peace program. According to Kolodziejczyk, bilateral cooperation between Poland and the members of NATO is a "good start for the implementation of the initiative."

Officials on Joining NATO, Arms Sales to U.S.

LD1502222494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] The work so far on Poland's participation in the Partnership for Peace program has been presented at a joint meeting of the Sejm commissions for foreign affairs and for national defense by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski and Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejdzyk. Our foreign minister told the deputies that a program was already being worked on by a joint working party of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries. National Defense Minister Kolodziejdzyk emphasized that sending a Polish mission to NATO Headquarters was a matter of urgency.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Koziol] Does the Defense Ministry have the money to send a mission to NATO headquarters?

[Kolodziejdzyk] Right now we do not. Right now we do not have money for anything because the budget has not been adopted. Of course, we are going to look for it because we cannot completely put this initiative aside. Well, we are going to look for reserves, perhaps cut something back from training, perhaps call up fewer soldiers for military service. There are no good solutions here, but we have to have a sense of vision as to what is right now the most important thing for Poland's security and what can be left to one side for another five minutes. We have to talk about actually entering NATO structures, about actual presence, participation in exercises, in missions, in symposia, in meetings. Unfortunately this cannot be done without money. That today is our great problem.

[Koziol] The Polish Government has to prepare a document....

[Kolodziejdzyk, interrupting] A presentation document, that is what it is called.

[Koziol] So, could you tell me, today we heard that there are no dates set for this. So how do you, Minister, see this in real terms? When should this (?happen)?

[Kolodziejdzyk] Well, I see this in very real terms. I would not like this government in which I participate to make any spectacular, hurried, badly prepared moves. We said today that the government still has to work on this document, consult with the Sejm National Defense Commission about it, discuss it among ourselves, calmly, and with full awareness of how much this is going to cost, whether can we afford it, and so on. So, rushing things here would not be a good idea. I think that in March we will be ready for talks with NATO HQ, for the so-called bilateral negotiations from which it will transpire how we are going to move along the road, not so much toward partnership but toward security structures. [end recording]

[Announcer] Journalists asked both ministers to comment on yesterday's WASHINGTON POST report that, in the 1980's, Poland allegedly sold weapons to the United States for $2 million. According to Minister Kolodziejdzyk, these reports are fiction.

[Begin Kolodziejdzyk recording] THE WASHINGTON POST, using its outstanding journalism, has written an article that smacks of a horror story. Why doesn't our press summon up enough courage to ponder and analyze what the purpose could be of publishing such phenomenal, even fantasy, stories? So far, the Pentagon has refused to comment on these facts. I see no reason to rush ahead of the Pentagon right now because, after all, it is their work, and they are also a suspect, seeing as allegedly, all in all, it was two parties who were involved in this underhand dealing. [end recording]

[Announcer] Minister Olechowski would not give an unambiguous reply.

[Begin Olechowski recording] It says—if it is true, of course, because I have no reason to maintain that it either is or is not—that, over several years, several million dollars' worth of equipment was sold, and no one

knows what the bottom line was, how much of this went toward some sort of bribes or middlemen, well, I do not know, they must have been selling braces because it seems that it was very cheap equipment, so, perhaps in general it was a very good move because perhaps Polish weapon components were being sold. [sentence as heard] I do not know. For me this is such a mystery that, until I have read about it and learned something, I am not going to know. [end recording]

Press Spokesman on Arms Sales

LD1602133694 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Zbigniew Ostrowski, press spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, asked to comment on THE WASHINGTON POST article that reported on Poland's sales of modern Soviet military equipment to the United States, said that the matter should be treated as press revelations. Apart from this, in his opinion it is a matter for historians. Even if such sales did take place, they would have been secret and could now probably only be traced in the Ministry of National Defense.

Zbigniew Ostrowski pointed out that the most modern Soviet weapons have never been available to Poland, so they could not have been sold to the Americans. He also emphasized that the United States does not make available the most modern weapons to its allies, either.

Ex-Generals Deny Sales

AU1602121494 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 15 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Aleksander Frydrychowicz: "Polish Generals Issue a Denial"]

[Text] A scandal has arisen following the publication by THE WASHINGTON POST of an article alleging that, in the 1980's, Poland sold Soviet supersecret missile systems to the United States, whence they reached the hands of Afghan partisans and were later used to knock down USSR aircraft. The author of the article is Benjamin Weiser, who has written controversial material based on interviews with Ryszard Kuklinski [Polish Army colonel who defected to the United States]. We decided to obtain information straight from the sources. This is what generals, without whose knowledge such a deal would not have been possible, told us.

General Florian Siwicki, former minister of national defense: "The Ministry of National Defense did not indulge in weapons deals. This kind of activity was the domain of the Central Engineering Administration, which was governed by the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry of National Defense okayed any contracts prepared by the Central Engineering Administration. I do not remember our selling weapons to the Americans. I probably would not forget such a thing.

"I rule out the existence of any deals involving the sale of arms to the United States. Such deals could not possibly have been legally implemented without my knowledge. I know of no cases involving weapons sales to the United States at all. We sold weapons to Syria, Libya, Iraq, Hungary, Bulgaria, and India. At that time, it was implausible to supply NATO member countries. Perhaps there was some kind of smuggling going on. But without concrete details, we cannot express any stance. It is mainly our own Polish-produced weapons that we sold."

General Zbigniew Nowicki, former Polish Army chief technical inspector: "When I heard this news, I wondered why we should have sold these missile systems to the Americans if the Americans themselves obtained them straight from Israel following the helicopter sortie into Iraq.

"Yes, we did sell Soviet weapons, but these were old tanks, helicopters, and airplanes, and only single units. This took place via the Central Engineering Administration.

"It was impossible to sell modern weaponry from one camp to another. We in the Ministry of National Defense might not have known about every single deal. We would certainly have known about the big ones, but I cannot rule out the possibility of some petty smuggling. But it cannot have involved tanks, missiles, or radar equipment.

"Perhaps one or two pieces of equipment might have been sold on a trial basis without my knowledge to countries to which we later sent larger quantities of weapons following a government decision. After all, just like today, there were lists of countries to which exports of our defense systems were prohibited. As our main enemy, the United States was on this embargo.

"Such a deal could not have escaped the attention of Soviet intelligence, and no government would have risked cutting itself off from new licenses and new USSR weapon systems."

General Czeslaw Kiszczak, former minister of internal affairs: "This is the first time I have heard of sales of Soviet weapons to the United States, and I exclude the possibility of such a deal having ever taken place. Of course, anything is possible in this world, but I do not think I could have been ignorant of such an issue. I was too close to General Jaruzelski, General Siwicki, and many generals on the General Staff. It would have been simply impossible for me not to know about it.

"Another story is possible, however. We sold many weapons and systems to various countries, and one cannot rule out the possibility that the Americans grabbed part of a consignment somewhere along the way. But I rule out the allegation that we sold the Americans several hundred or several thousand antiaircraft missiles that ended up in Afghanistan."

UD's Rokita on Cabinet Crisis, Party Position

WS1502143094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Feb 94 p 2

[Interview with Jan Maria Rokita, Sejm deputy for the Democratic Union and former chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, by Ryszard Rybus; place and date not given: "Pawlak's Pyrrhic Victory; Conversation with Jan Maria Rokita"]

[Text] [Rybus] Does the recent coalition crisis and the way it was resolved represent a stabilization of the governing arrangement, or the beginning of its collapse?

[Rokita] It means neither. It is obvious that the governing coalition's deep crisis, which is linked—this is my impression—not to differences of opinions on substantive issues, but rather to a struggle for power inside the cabinet, neither strengthens nor stabilizes the government. On the contrary, the crisis destabilizes and weakens the government, it ruins its social reputation.

But on the other hand, I am not very eager to draw hasty conclusions from the crisis or to say that the coalition is on the verge of collapsing. The will of being in power is a strong cementing factor for the coalition. For the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], and in particular for the old Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] apparatus, being in power has an enormous psychological significance because it means a kind of compensation for the last four years. For the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] in turn, being in power is a fulfillment of Waldemar Pawlak's "immemorial" aspirations to be the head of government; he will not give that up easily.

[Rybus] So you do not agree with the view that the unanimous showing of who in the coalition is in charge, indirectly means the coalition's stabilization since there are no longer two equal partners who could argue over leadership?

[Rokita] The effects of the crisis undoubtedly mean a defeat for Aleksander Kwasniewski. But they also represent Waldemar Pawlak's Pyrrhic victory.

[Rybus] [No question published]

[Rokita] The price paid for the victory in the battle for spheres of influence, was a decrease in public esteem, which has very negative consequences for the prime minister.

Apart from that, my view is that one cannot really speak of Prime Minister Pawlak's domination in the coalition since Marek Borowski's departure as a result of the dispute (and Kwasniewski's disavowal of him, including a brutal description) also represents a success by the PZPR apparatus which had clearly disliked Borowski. To a certain extent, the result of the dispute we are talking about here also strengthens Kwasniewski, but not as a leader of reformers within SLD, but as a real leader of the apparatus, as a leader who wants to implement the interests of the apparatus and for that goal, he is willing to betray and abandon his political friends.

[Rybus] Regardless of different views on the manner in which the prime minister resolved the conflict, it would be hard to deny political efficiency to him and PSL. A party which gained as many votes as the Democratic Union [UD] and the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD]—but far fewer votes than the SLD—is gradually acquiring an indivisible power.

[Rokita] I do not share that view. The crisis centered around [former Deputy Finance Minister] Kawalec and [former Finance Minister] Borowski, only shows a lack of the efficiency of influence by so-called SLD reformers, which by the way was easily predictable. But it does not mean a decline in influence by the hard-line, postcommunist apparatus. Forcing the chief of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic and of SLD to get rid of Borowski, over whose candidacy for the post of finance minister he [Kwasniewski] had fought vigorously, is, like I already said, Pawlak's Pyrrhic victory. It is also a real victory by the PZPR-derived apparatus.

In my view, the conclusion regarding PSL's domination as a result of the dispute we are talking about here, is completely false.

[Rybus] So if the postcommunist apparatus is now gaining victory within SLD, that means you uphold your argument you had declared immediately after the elections, about UD's refusal to take part in any coalition arrangements with SLD?

[Rokita] I have always said—and I do so now—that the political logic set in motion during the election campaign will force Kwasniewski to either lose ground in the party which will finally "spit him out," or to take the leadership of a communist apparatus.

To put it briefly: I have never believed—and I continue not to believe—in the governing parties' ability to reform themselves. That is why I have been and still am in favor of a tough opposition by UD.

[Rybus] That explains your assessment of a famous statement by [UD Deputy Chairman] Wladyslaw Frasyniuk ....

[Rokita] I think Frasyniuk's statement was a political mistake. And that is not just how I feel, but it is also the assessment of practically all of UD, including party Chairman Mazowiecki, and chairman of the parliamentary club Geremek. The mistake was made clear to Frasyniuk in harsh terms during party meetings.

But is it also true that his intentions were distorted by sensation-seeking media. Pay attention that Frasyniuk had not made an appeal for UD to come to alliance with SLD, not today, and not at any time in the future. On the contrary, he is the kind of member of UD who is in favor of a strong opposition stand toward SLD. But what he also thinks—and that is an interesting view, even though I do not agree with it—is that under a situation where

Aleksander Kwasniewski and the PZPR apparatus abandon leaders of the reform wing, there should be someone to publicly speak of these people in kind terms. There is no doubt that Borowski had played a positive role in Pawlak's cabinet.

[Rybus] So, regarding UD's opposition nature, do you regard it as necessary to maintain it until the end of this parliament's term?

[Rokita] Yes, I do. To construct a government with UD's participation, or with the participation of the club of a new party which will be formed after unification with KLD—that is not possible under the parliament which was elected on 19 September. What is possible, is a collapse of the governing coalition and one could imagine some strange forms of a government which would be openly antireform (even though I regard them as not very likely), but I cannot imagine a situation where UD, with this parliamentary composition, could find partners for itself with whom to establish a majority coalition. There are no such partners, nor will there ever be, until the end of term of this parliament, which does not necessarily mean that I think the term will last four years. After the recent events, a four-year term seems less and less likely, especially given that in the middle of the term we will have presidential elections which always change the political scene everywhere.

Solidarity's Krzaklewski on Social Issues

AU1402192394 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 11 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski by Jerzy Pawlas; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want To Strike"]

[Excerpts] [Pawlas] We are supposed to have left the recession behind, and yet this year's budget makes it look as if we are still in the depths of the recession.

[Krzaklewski] Recession means a fall in the GNP. But the GNP has been rising in recent years. In 1992 it rose by 1.9 percent, and in 1993 it rose by 4 percent. Industrial output has risen even more. In a situation like this, every trade union has the right and duty to demand wage rises in the production sphere. Wages should rise faster than prices. We included this postulate in the "accords to compensate the increase in the cost of living," in other words the Enterprise Pact. The provisions are clear. An increase in real wages in the production sphere cannot be less than half the increase in the GNP. The pact has been signed into law, but not only is the present government failing to implement this law, it is ignoring it altogether. In view of this, every self-respecting trade union must dictate harsh terms to the government, including the possibility of a general strike. Therefore we demand an increase in real wages, at least to offset the increased living costs, because the country is experiencing an economic growth. A preliminary analysis of the 1994 draft budget shows that there is a danger that the real incomes of families will fall even further. We cannot agree to that, all the more so because 1993 was another year of economic growth. And that is the main reason for our demonstration on 9 February.

[Pawlas] Governments are not accustomed to adhere to pacts. That is a tradition dating to communist times. However, they do tend to lay down so-called social guarantees, a process that can last for months. So what is the point of establishing pacts when the budget is empty?

[Krzaklewski] I fear that unless the philosophy behind fiscal policy changes soon, there will be continued talk of empty budgets over the next few years, despite the increase in output. Also, an increasingly greater proportion of the GNP is going to be swallowed by the so-called gray economic zone and by investors. The rich will get richer, and the poor poorer. [passage omitted]

[Pawlas] The defense industry has staged a strike, and the miners are demanding higher wages. Can the 9 February demonstration be regarded as a forerunner to a general strike?

[Krzaklewski] Yes, if the government fails to adjust the socioeconomic program laid down in the 1994 draft budget, and if it fails to implement the whole of the 1992-93 social pact, known as the Enterprise Pact, within a reasonable time, such as by the end of March 1994. I hope we do not reach a situation in which we have to declare a strike.

Our postulates concerning the budget and Enterprise Pact are possible for the government and parliament to fulfill, and their fulfillment will stabilize the social situation. We also insist that the government fulfill not more than 10 percent of the preelection promises of the coalition parties.

Cabinet Urges Solidarity To Join Negotiations

WS1402150994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by J.B.L.: "Solidarity Should Join In; Negotiations With Trade Unions on Social Guarantees"]

[Text] *The government positively assesses the readiness by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" to conduct talks, declared in a letter from the trade union's chairman, Marian Krzaklewski, to Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, Deputy Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said during Saturday's [12 February] session by the presidia of the Council of Ministers Economic Committee [KERM] and of the Council of Ministers Sociopolitical Committee [KSPRM].*

According to Cimoszewicz, it would be best if Solidarity joined the negotiations which are already taking place with the other trade union centers. The negotiations will continue regardless of whether Solidarity decides to participate in them since there are many partners for the talks, and they are sufficiently responsible partners, too.

Yet, the presence of Solidarity "would be a very good thing to happen," Cimoszewicz stressed.

Labor Minister Leszek Miller said the government is interested in meeting Solidarity postulates, but it is the parliament and not the government that decides on the rate of legislative proceedings; therefore the postulate to have a batch of laws on enterprises enacted by 15 March should not be addressed to the government (which is interested in speeding up the proceedings within the framework of ordinary legislative measures).

According to chiefs of six working groups in which the negotiations with the trade unions are going on currently regarding citizens' social guarantees, it is possible to reach concrete agreements within the next few weeks, among others regarding family benefits and housing supplements. For instance, the idea of withholding family benefits from people with high incomes is being debated, as well as the idea of linking the amount of the benefit with the number of children and income levels.

The presidia of KERM and of KSPRM said the negotiations are difficult, but they relate to issues which are strictly of merit, among them the fundamentals of social policies and also social protections. According to Deputy Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, the government had submitted specific proposals and it is waiting now for reasonable responses; the government is also determined to undertake measures that will facilitate a speedy coming to agreement.

The participants of the negotiations are to receive a draft of the socioeconomic program for the years 1994-97, which was prepared by the Central Planning Administration.

Silesia 'Tense'; Miners Ready To Strike

WS1602115994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Barbara Cieszewska: "Strike Readiness in Silesia; Tense Atmosphere Not Since Today"]

[Text] In eight mines of the Ruda Coal Partnership a referendum on joining the strike was conducted on Tuesday [15 February]. The miners drop the "for" or "against" ballot sheets into the ballot boxes when they are collecting their wages. Preliminary data indicate that most of them support the strike. In other concerns (such as in Bytom, Gliwice, and Rybnik) negotiations are being held on wage issues and the heads of plant "Solidarity" ["S"] sections condition the organization of a similar referendum on their results. The strike readiness has so far been limited to placing banners around the plants. In this voivodship "S" has as many as 250,000 members; it also has 1,260 plant committees. The activists of other trade unions, such as "Solidarity '80" (approximately 35,000 members) and "Kontra" (30,000 members) have already announced strike readiness.

Activists of the regional "S" are holding talks in the plants; they explain the core of the protest. It boils down to the following demands: Increasing the value of the real wages, introducing an efficient program of combating unemployment, and curbing the degradation of the Silesia-Dabrowa region. The Silesian "S" has put forward some more detailed demands: Fair distribution of the GDP, the statement that all Saturdays are constitutionally free, and a 40-hour workweek. Demand No. 9 mentions changes in the tax laws that would eliminate the excessive tax burdens that have been imposed on employees. In demand No. 10 the miners want the Treasury to "compensate the losses incurred by enterprises as a result of the blockade of payments for exported commodities and services"; in the 11th demand they suggest that legal acts be prepared which would make it possible for trade unions to take a stand on employees' affairs in commercial law partnerships. In the last one the miners demand that the demands of the branches, which have been submitted and agreed on, be implemented. The Silesian "S" is also asking the parliament to adopt this year's budget in a shape that would take into account the implementation of the demands put forward by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "S," especially the demands that aim to protect the poorest.

Continuing is the protest in the Mining and Steel Work Plant in Bukowno; 78 miners are underground in the "Pomorzany" mine; on Tuesday [15 February] 46 miners went on a hunger strike. The protest began two weeks ago. In the meantime, union activists are holding talks on wages with the directors. In the Katowice Steel Works, which is surrounded by banners, the people are not thinking about a referendum yet; they are waiting for the next moves of the region. "The atmosphere is tense, they say in the Plant Committee of the steel works; however, it is not a matter of today only—the wages are low and this is the problem." The mines of the Bytom Coal Partnership are currently negotiating new wages with the directors, so they do not expect that a referendum will be held for the time being. Unless the negotiations fail to yield any results. The same is happening in the mines of the Gliwice and Rybnik partnerships; here the referendum may be carried out early next week. In the Jasrzebie partnership, where the strike has just been finished, "S" says: "We are working; one needs a rest after a strike; then we will think what should be done next."

President Walesa Signs Copyright Bill Into Law

WS1502134194 Warsaw SERWIS INFORMACYJNY PREZYDENTA in Polish 1928 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text]

The President Signed the Law

Today, the President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa signed the **Law on Copyright and Related Rights of 4 February 1994.**

The law, which has been enacted by the Sejm, is the result of legislative measures undertaken four years ago. The law's first draft was submitted by the government before the First Term Sejm on 11 March 1992, but work on the law was not finalized due to the Sejm's having been dissolved. A new draft of the law was submitted by the government in front of the Second Term Sejm on 6 November 1993, with a motion to have the law enacted urgently. Representatives of scientific, creative associations, and authorship organizations, as well as producer organizations, took part in the Sejm's work on the draft. Opinions and comments by these groups regarding specific provisions of the law, were debated upon and, in a majority of cases, taken into account. The final text of the law enacted on 4 February 1994 is the result of a compromise that takes into account the interests of all those concerned with the copyright law, of authors, performers, video and audio [fonogram] producers, computer software producers, and radio and television organizations.

The law will replace the Copyright Law of 1952, which was in effect up to now and whose provisions are inadequate to suit the country's new economic conditions, or to the new world system for protection of intellectual property.

The legal provisions of 1952, given the enormous development of new areas—for instance, video, audio, and computer software production—are obsolete under today's conditions and are not suited to the existing international standards.

The necessity of enacting the new law was also a result of Poland's international obligations in the area—in particular, the treaty on trade and economic relations between Poland and the United States of 21 March 1990. Under the treaty, Poland obliged itself to adapt its copyright law to existing international conventions by 1 January 1991.

Apart from that, the phenomenon of piracy of intellectual property, which has been increasing radically in Poland and which was pointed out by authors and international opinion demanding that firm, legislative measures be undertaken to counteract the piracy, was another incentive for initiating urgent legislative proceedings concerning the new law.

Government Decisions on Economic Issues

LD1002203594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1508 GMT 10 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Feb—The government has adopted author's amendments to the draft budget law for the year 1994 and has addressed the proposals of Sejm commissions put forward in the course of work on the budget law. The Council of Ministers has adopted a new verson of the document on Directions for Privatization in 1994, and that is an appendix to the budget law for the current year. A decree on the issue of tarriffs on components for the industrial assembly of road tractors was also adopted, the Government Press Office reported on 10 February.

At the resolution of the minister of finance, the author's amendments introduced on 10 February will be published only after their presentation at the meeting tomorrow of the Sejm Economic Policy, Budget and Finance Commission.

The Council of Ministers adopted decisions upon the increase of expenditures upon science, culture and education. (The Government Press Office will organiz a briefing tomorrow with the participation of the heads of the Ministry of Finance and at which details on the subject of the adopted autoamendments will be presented)

The members of the government adoped a new version of the document on the Directions of Privatization in 1994, which is an appendix to the budget law for this year.

The government adopted priorities for ownership transformations and also privatization programs. The implementation of planned ownership transformations will be associated with:

—Programs of restructuring, of the increase of domestic and foreign investment, for the development of competition and strengthening of the capital market;

—The application in public offers of methods favoring the convergence of the sale price of shares to the market prices of the shares of privatized enterprises;

—The facilitation of privatization with the active participation of employees, with particular attention paid to small and medium enterprises;

—The commencement of activities to radically strengthen ownership supervision.

The tasks of the government will relate to:

—The preparation and presentation to the Sejm, by the end of June this year, of a "privatization map", that is of the branches and varieties of enterprise over which the State Treasury intends to maintain control;

—The implementation of a program of financial restructuring of enterprises and banks;

—The preparation and implementation of a program of restructuring of sectors of special significance for the national economy (electric power generation, mining, metallurgy, the armaments and oil industries, the railways);

—The development of a program of transformations in the state agricultural and agriculture and food sectors;

—Assistance for the processes of restructuring of enterprises, especially in regions threatened by strutural unemployment;

—The preparation of a system of financial support for the restructuring of industry, inter alia with the privatization of state enterprises;

—The implementation of the "Pact on the State Enterprise during the Period of Transformation";

—The implementation of the program of National Investment Funds;

—The implementation of a program of privatization of the banks through public offers;

—The creation of a system of incentives for domestic and foreign investors;

—The creation of a system of sale by instalment for domestic investors and also assistance for capital and direct privatization through a specially created Credit Guarantees Fund;

—Support for privatization by founding bodies;

—The increase of the number of enterprises quoted on the stock exchange, privatized on the basis of public offers;

—The counteraction of the takeover of capital control on given markets by single investors;

—The implementation of a review of the legal regulations for privatization procedures, with the aim of assuring the clarity and openness of procedures;

—The implementation of a review of the market conditions of the functioning of economic entities (inter alia the rules for protection of creditors, collection of debts, liquidations and bankruptcies, registration of new entities, principles for concessions and quotas);

—The undertaking of work on the preparation of an Industrial Law, and also the introduction of legal regulations, counteracting the widening of the so-called grey economic sphere;

—The undertaking of work on the regulation of the principles for privatization.

The government will present to parliament drafts for:

—A new law on the privatization of state enterprises;

—Laws specifying the principles for the management of the assets of the State Treasury.

The members of the Council of Ministers addressed the proposals for amendments put forward by Sejm commissions in the course of work on the budget law for 1994.

The Council of Ministers accepted the proposals of the Social Policy Commission for the reduction of the subsidy given to the Social Welfare Insurance Fund by 480 trillion zloties. The above sum will be allocated for the creation of a miscellaneous reserve fund for the Ministry of Labor. Investments in parishes [gminy] threatened by structural unemployment (for instance, the clearing of ground for the purposes of attracting potential investors) would be partly financed from this reserve fund.

The government acknowledged that in association with the lack of additional sources of funding for the budget, it does not see the possibility of financing the expenditures proposed by the Sejm commissions in the course of work on the budget law.

The Council of Ministers adopted a decree amending the decree on the matter of tarriffs on imports from abroad.

The decree has as its aim the specification of the requirements regarding the industrial assembly of road tractors for the haulage of trailers. In the customs tarriff in force until 31 December 1993 requirement was set for the assembly from imported parts of at least 1,000 road tractors, and carrying the entitlement to import free of tarriffs the parts for the construction of these tractors.

In the decree adopted by the Council of Ministers those enterprises will be entitled to import without tarriff parts for the assembly of road tractors which assemble at least 200 such vehicles over the course of the year.

Unemployment Registered at 16 Percent

LD1502201794 Warsaw PAP in English 1837 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 15—The number of unemployed stood at 2.9 million in January, up 2.4 percent on December figure, the Central Statistical Office (GUS) announced on Tuesday.

In January the rate of unemployment was 16 percent, an increase of 1.9 percent on December.

Also on Tuesday Deputy Labour Minister Jerzy Szreter told a press conference that the rise in unemployment probably had a seasonal character, and should be halted in March.

However, he feared that the anticipated number of unemployed of 3.05 million at the end of 1994 might be "threatened" unless more money was allocated for active forms of combatting unemployment.

Unemployment rose in 48 provinces in January with the highest growth in Chelm (by 6.3 percent) and Cracow (5.3 percent) provinces. The highest rate of unemployment was recorded in Koszalin (29.3 percent) and Suwalki (28.9 percent) provinces, the lowest in Cracow (7.6 percent) and Warsaw (7.9 percent) provinces.

Croatia's Tudjman Talks With Prime Minister

LD1502134294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Today, on the second day of his visit to Romania, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian delegation visited the Romanian parliament. They met the president of the House of Deputies, Adrian Nastase, and President of the Senate Oliviou Gherman. President Tudjman visited the House of Representatives, which was in session. He was welcomed with rapturous applause. Nastase said that all matters of political importance were discussed in the parliament comprising 14 parties and 460 representatives. He said that the main issues being discussed by the representatives were the democratic development of Romania and economic reforms. [words indistinct] the right way, he stressed, and added that all political disputes are resolved by political means in parliament and that there is a general consensus among the parties on foreign policy.

In his temporary residence in Bucharest, President Tudjman received Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. Discussing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, they agreed that the international community had reacted too late and that there is disunity regarding solutions between the United Nations, European union, and the United States. The Croatian president and the Romanian prime minister also discussed economic relations between the two countries. Tonight the Croatian president will meet representatives of the Croatian community in Romania at the Croatian embassy in Bucharest.

Ministry Denies Aircraft Overflights to Bosnia

AU1602081194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] We have received the following communique by fax from the Ministry of National Defense:

In connection with certain allegations taken from the German weekly DER SPIEGEL by the newspaper SLOBODNA SLOVO of 7 February 1994—according to which two ultralight planes and eight [as heard] Mi-8 transport helicopters would have crossed Romanian territory to help the Muslim troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the Press Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense states:

These allegations have no real foundation. No foreign planes flew over the Romanian territory to bring supplies to any side involved in the ongoing conflict in former Yugoslavia. Romania strictly observes the embargo imposed by the United Nations. The news circulated by these publications is probably part of a scenario to brainwash public, the communique reads.

Moldovan Officials Visit To Discuss Trade

Meet With Prime Minister

AU1502181694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu has received a group of dignitaries from the Republic of Moldova led by First Deputy Prime Minister Nicolae Andronati at Victoria Palace today. The meeting was attended by Romanian Ambassador in Chisinau Marian Enache.

During the meeting the two sides briefed each other on the development of the transition process in the two countries and on the specific difficulties of the current period, which are being complicated by the energy crisis. The two sides also discussed tangible problems pertaining to bilateral relations by emphasizing the importance of economic integration both for Moldova and Romania.

It was stressed that the documents that have been signed and those that are to be signed in the coming days will represent genuine support for trading companies in the two countries, as well as for expanding direct relations between economic units on the two banks of the Prut River.

Within this context, the two sides noted that relations between companies and even between ministries have exceeded cooperation at the summit. They agreed that more frequent contacts are necessary between the heads of the two governments.

Vacaroiu proposed that unsolved problems in economic cooperation be checked and examined to identify the best solutions swiftly. He assured the high-ranking guests that the Romanian Government will continue to support—economically and financially, including through the 1994 budget—the economy of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the economic integration process, a press release received from a government spokesman points out.

Economic Agreements Described

AU1502213094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] The meeting of the Interministerial Committees of Romania and the Republic of Moldova concluded tonight with the signing of three documents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to our correspondent, Eugen Baboi, the following agreements were signed:

1. A protocol of the joint session of the Interministerial Committees on cooperation in all fields, with a view to deepening economic integration and consolidating the common cultural space, signed by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu and Nicolae Andronati, first deputy prime minister of the Republic of Moldova;

2. A free trade agreement between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, signed by Romanian Minister of Commerce Cristian Ionescu and Sergiu Certan, minister of economy of the Republic of Moldova;

3. A banking arrangement on the use of the 20-billion-lei credit granted by the Romanian Government to the Republic of Moldova, signed by Ion Ghica, president of the Romanian Trade Bank, and Leonid Talmaci, governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova.

After the signing of the documents, Mr. Teodor Melescanu emphasized the importance of the meeting and of its results, laying particular emphasis on the free trade accord, which he characterized as one of the most important steps for the economic integration of Romania and the Republic of Moldova, which will lead to the unification of the economic space of the two states.

In his turn, Mr. Nicolae Andronati, head of the delegation of the Republic of Moldova, expressed satisfaction at the signing of the three documents and emphasized that they represent the foundation for the economic integration of the two states, our correspondent reports.

Iliescu Receives Officials

AU1502213194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] This evening President Ion Iliescu received Nicolae Andronati, first deputy prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, at Cotroceni Palace. The meeting was attended by the ministers of economy and trade of the Republic of Moldova, Sergiu Certan and Andrei Cheptene, by Marcel Dinu, secretary of state at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by other high-ranking state dignitaries from the two countries.

During the meeting President Ion Iliescu was briefed on the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Commission. The sides also exchanged views on the stage of the national economies of the two countries. They also discussed matters pertaining to a more profound integration of their economic units, with the sides pointing out the increase in the number of joint companies, as well as financial-banking issues, Nicolae Andronati told the press at the end of the meeting.

Commentary Views Moldova's Aversion to Union

AU1402164594 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 9-16 Feb 94 p 32

[Ion Cristoiu commentary: "Mircea Snegur Awakens Us to Reality"]

[Text] At the end of last week, the attention of Romanian press and political circles focused on the shocking statements made by two of the leaders of the Republic of Moldova regarding relations with Romania. The contents of their statements are already known from the press. During a [5 February] meeting organized within the current electoral campaign by the Civic Alliance, an organization that supports, both in its political and cultural activity, the president of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, stated that one should distinguish between what is Romanian and what is Moldovan. Elaborating further on that idea, the leader of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova [PDAM], Dumitru Motpan, at an electoral meeting held in the locality of Cantemir, pleaded against the Republic of Moldova's union with Romania, suggesting that the union should rather be accomplished merely with a part of Romania, namely with Moldavia [Romania's north-eastern region, bordering the Republic of Moldova]. The two statements came as a surprise from many points of view. First, because since that republic has gained its independence, in August 1991, this has been the first time that the Chisinau leaders have categorically rejected unification with Romania. However, one cannot say that before there have been no signs warning of the anti-unification stance of these politicians, and, generally, the representatives of the state power in the Republic of Moldova. Those signals have actually intensified lately, parallel to the increasing pressure from Moscow, intended to resurrect the former USSR. Although the substantial economic, cultural, and moral support granted by Romania was entirely accepted, the Chisinau authorities were quite prudent, not to say awkward, in their public statements made when receiving the gifts. One could clearly see that both the president and the government were trying hard not to irritate Moscow by advocating too extensive ties with Romania. Even the "brotherly" meetings of Snegur and [Romanian President] Iliescu were treated with a certain distance by the Chisinau leaders. While the pro-presidential Romanian press commented with lyrical enthusiasm, offering full-page reports about the two presidents' bearhugs and kisses, the Chisinau press and television viewed the same events with much more coolness. This is how, lately, a kind of feeling was created, a quite embarrassing one for us, Romanians, that the open acknowledgment of our brotherhood is inconvenient for the people across the Prut River, and that the process of tightening Romania's ties with the Republic of Moldova is progressing owing to our insistence, rather than that of the Chisinau leaders. Nevertheless, this has been the first time that the union with Romania has been rejected publicly in such an imperative tone, and, especially, betraying an inexplicable anger against the Romanians living in Romania.

Second, Snegur's and Motpan's statements are also shocking because they reproduce, almost word by word, the Soviet stance regarding the relations between Moldova and Romania. The thesis according to which a Moldovan nation does exist, and that, besides the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, it also comprises the people that live in Romania's Moldavia, was one of the theses that were most insisted upon by Moscow during the time of the Ceausescu regime. Moscow used it as an instrument not merely to discourage any tendencies favoring the unification, but also as means to exert political and military pressure [upon Romania]. Both the

way in which it was formulated and its logic indicated that the official Soviet propaganda was using that thesis as a reason justifying a possible military attack against rebel Romania.

Bucharest made great fuss about the statements of the two Moldovan leaders. Political leaders representing all colors expressed their indignation and engaged in fiery polemics with Snegur and Motpan. They referred to [shared] culture and history and they tried to find the real reasons behind the statements of the Moldovan politicians. According to certain opinions, we have to deal with two traitors who betrayed the Romanian cause and sold their souls to Moscow from the very beginning. According to others, the authors of the statements are heroes who are willing to play this anti-unification role precisely to safeguard the chances of unification, assuming the risk of being considered traitors. As with so many other complicated cases in history, we will probably learn much later about the real reasons behind the statements made in the Republic of Moldova. Until then, however, one thing remains certain. The statements in question were made under the circumstances of the electoral campaign in progress in the Republic of Moldova. Unfortunately, that is a detail that passed totally unnoticed by Romanian journalists and politicians. Had they discovered its importance, the reasons why Snegur and Motpan declared that they reject unification would have faded to a fact of secondary importance. Because what matters primarily is the fact that the statements were made for electoral purposes. As is well known, all electoral campaigns in political systems that allow for free ballots are dominated by the candidates' efforts to anticipate the frame of mind of the electorate. That is why all statements made during electoral campaigns have a specific character. Intended to gain as many electors as possible, they usually exaggerate the assumed expectations of the electorate. That is why many of the things stated during electoral campaigns are never implemented after the elections are over. Thus, the stance adopted by the two Chisinau leaders actually reflects the current public frame of mind in the Republic of Moldova. Obviously, if the great majority of the population would have favored unification with Romania, no one could have afforded to make statements clearly rejecting unification. Even the two politicians in question, even if they had been bitter enemies of unification, would not have merely avoided publicly rejecting it, but rather, they would have even pleaded in favor of unification.

Even if that would have meant acting against their inner convictions, they would have still been compelled to do so to gain more votes. The fact that, at the peak of the electoral campaign, Snegur and Motpan insisted on distancing themselves from the cause of unification proves that, in reality, the current public mind in the Republic of Moldova is against the unification. Regardless of their private convictions regarding the reunion of the country, the two politicians considered it necessary to speak up against it in order to please the electorate. Actually this is the most grave significance of the statements made by Snegur and Motpan. In spite of the illusions nurtured in Bucharest, they come to demonstrate that the great majority of the population in the Republic of Moldova opposes the unification.

Many people living on our side of the Prut River will probably be astonished by such a frame of mind in Bessarabia. Their astonishment is absolutely understandable. The issue of Bessarabia has been preoccupying the Romanians not only recently, but rather over the last several decades. Since 1944, when Bessarabia was lost again [to the benefit of USSR], none of the politicians or journalists has seriously examined the psychological and moral state of the Romanians living across the Prut River. During the communist regime, even in the Ceausescu era, it was impossible to publicly approach that issue. News about the state of mind of the Romanians over the Prut River could merely be conveyed to the Romanians living in Romania through underground channels. However, the use of that channel inevitably led to the creation of a false image. During the [Gheorghe] Gheorghiu-Dej era [late fifties, early sixties], that image was influenced by the Soviet occupation [of Romania]. Hating that occupation, the Romanians had the impression that the Russians prevented the Bessarabian Romanians from uniting with us. Whoever dared talk about the fact that Bessarabia is an ancient Romanian territory and that some day it might join the mother country was exposing himself to deadly danger. Under such circumstances, the fact that the discussion of the issue was prohibited led to the following reasoning: The Soviet occupation punishes the discourse on Bessarabia because the Romanians on the other bank of the Prut River want to unite with the mother country. That is absolutely false reasoning, because it ignores the specific nature of the communist dictatorship, namely that it always feels imperiled, even there where there is no peril whatsoever. Actually, their prohibiting all discussions on Bessarabia was not necessarily caused by the fact that Moscow considered this the sole way to prevent the unification of the Romanians living in the Republic of Moldova with the mother nation. During the Ceausescu era, the false image about the frame of mind of the Romanians across the Prut River was nourished, as paradoxical as it may seem, by the [Romanian] officials. Bucharest turned its conflict with Moscow into a substantial political capital. Therefore it was quite simple for it to hint at the fact that one of the reasons of that conflict was precisely the issue of Bessarabia. As a matter of fact, using the method of spreading misleading information, the Securitate made enormous efforts to convince the population that Nicolae Ceausescu would have liked to achieve the unification, but could not because of the existence of the Soviet power. It is no accident that after December 1989 the forces that feel nostalgic about Ceausescu began to circulate the thesis according to which the fall of the dictator was caused by the fact that, by the end of 1989, he had pointed the issue of Bessarabia at Gorbachev. Unfortunately, in spite of the past four years' climate favoring the freedom of opinion, the

position of the Romanians across the Prut River could not be approached with sufficient lucidity either. Once a prohibited subject, the issue of Bessarabia has become the favorite issue of journalists and politicians. Under such circumstances, as a reaction to the preceding situation, it was absolutely normal that they would exaggerate certain facts in the Republic of Moldova. In that sense, it is more than significant that thousands of pages of minor lyrical writings have been dedicated to the brethren across the Prut River and to their impetuous struggle to reunite with the mother country. At the same time, the issue of Bessarabia has also become the object of intense political demagogy. The issue of unification has been used in every conceivable way by all our political parties. While doing so, no one seemed to care whether they really wish to unite with us. As in the preceding period, it was inferred that the Romanians living in the Republic of Moldova were impatiently looking forward to their unification with the mother country, but, alas, the realization of their dream was blocked by Moscow's imperial policy.

However, a more lucid analysis would reveal clearly the fact that current reality in Moldova is much more bitter than the illusory things believed by Romanian public opinion and the image offered by our political and journalistic demagogy. As demonstrated by Snegur's and Motpan's recent statements made during the electoral campaign, the Romanians across the Prut River are not at all impatient to reunite with us. The causes of that frame of mind are complex and profound. Their exhaustive analysis would exceed 100 pages. That is why we will briefly mention just a few of them, hoping that the day will come when our journalists and politicians will approach the reality in the Republic of Moldova with much less sentimentality than they have until now. One of the causes is doubtlessly the frightening Russification process the Romanian population across the Prut River has been submitted to. That process did not confine itself, as might be thought, merely to a communist-type propaganda, pounding the people's heads, day in, day out, with ideas about the existence of a separate Moldovan nation and the Romanians having invaded their land. Russification was also carried out by using more subtle propaganda methods. Thus, using manifold channels, they nourished their sentiment of belonging to a superpower. As paradoxical as it may seem, over many years Russian imperial vanity did matter a great deal to many Romanians. The fact that the Red Army posed a threat to all of Europe and the Soviet Union was a superpower made them believe that they could be as proud of it as the Russians. After all, the Republic of Moldova was part of the superpower called the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russification was also carried out by turning pro-Russian gestures into criteria for deciding on an individuals' political and professional ascent. It was enormously important, not just for one to become a boss, but also to be admitted to university, to be married to a Russian or to be able to speak Russian and know the Russian culture perfectly. In the beginning, the Romanians complied with these things with a certain duplicity. Little by little, however, they adopted, without really meaning to, many elements of Russian spirituality. Under such circumstances, in spite of the odes written and recited in Chisinau or the statements made by a handful of people belonging to the minority of intellectuals, many Romanians living in Bessarabia view Romanian spirituality, that is, actually their own spirituality, as something that is strange to them. They consider reunification with Romania not just as an act that is difficult to achieve politically, but also psychologically and intellectually.

Normally, the statements made by the two personalities should have awakened us to reality. Unfortunately, as anyone can see from the stances adopted by our journalists and politicians, they did not manage to do so. Our illusions regarding the frame of mind of the Romanians in Bessarabia still persist. And this might have extremely grave consequences, even for the great cause of our reunification.

Rose Requests 3,000 More Troops in Sarajevo

AU1602122294 Paris AFP in English 1214 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Article by Helene Despic-Popovic]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Feb 16 (AFP)—General Michael Rose, the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, has requested up to 3,000 backup troops to oversee the ceasefire and demilitarisation of Sarajevo, a UN spokesman said here Wednesday.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Bill Aikman said 170 reinforcement troops from the UN Nordic battalion had arrived in Visoko, 40 kilometres (25 miles) north of Sarajevo, and a British battalion of some 150 soldiers equipped with about 15 armoured vehicles was on stand-by in the central Bosnian town of Vitez. He said the reinforcements requested by Rose would double the number of UN troops currently deployed in Sarajevo.

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said Wednesday in a BBC radio interview that Britain would not object to any of its troops being transferred to Sarajevo. "It's essentially a matter for General Rose to decide if some some troops would be more useful in Sarajevo," Hurd said.

The troops would oversee a ceasefire agreement reached last week between Bosnian Serb and Moslem military leaders under the threat of a NATO ultimatum for Serbs to remove their heavy weaponry from around the Bosnian capital by midnight Sunday or face air strikes.

But Russia's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Vitaliy Churkhin, said in Zagreb late Tuesday that Russian troops would not go to Sarajevo to support the NATO ultimatum, which was issued over Moscow's protests. [passage omitted]

Aikman said that four sophisticated radar systems capable of detecting a mortar were also being sent here this week by France and Britain ahead of a NATO deadline for air strikes.

He said France and Britain are each supplying two radars that are expected to arrive in the Bosnian capital by Sunday, the deadline for Bosnia's warring parties to surrender their heavy weapons or face NATO air strikes.

In Paris, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe reiterated Wednesday that France was determined to follow through with the NATO ultimatum. He told a meeting of cabinet ministers that his trip to Sarajevo over the weekend was aimed at stressing that point to the belligerants, government spokesman Nicolas Sarkozy said. [passage omitted]

Possibility of UN Troops as 'Hostages' Noted

AU1402200094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] At today's session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, chaired by President Alija Izetbegovic, support was extended to the activities of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] in the implementation of the 10 February NATO declaration referring to the removal of heavy weapons to a distance of 20 km from Sarajevo and the placement of these arms under UNPROFOR control.

In connection with this, the Presidency accepted a total cease-fire and freezing the positions of all the front lines in the Sarajevo region. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will observe this decision in full, the Presidency concluded.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency upholds UNPROFOR's proposal to collect up all those weapons that remain within the 20-km radius of Sarajevo and deposit them in a part of Sarajevo airport temporarily controlled by UNPROFOR.

At today's session the Presidency voiced concern over the positioning of UNPROFOR troops next to the Serbian positions around Sarajevo. The Presidency fears that UNPROFOR troops positioned in such a way could in several localities serve as a shield for the Serbian positions in case of a NATO air attack. There is a realistic danger that in the case of NATO air strikes the Serbian aggressor would not permit UNPROFOR units to abandon these positions, and so UNPROFOR soldiers could find themselves as hostages.

Within the framework of these activities, particularly worrying are the statements by some lower UNPROFOR commanders, who are in various ways and, in the opinion of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency members, wrongly interpreting the NATO declaration.

The current positioning of UNPROFOR troops in [the Serb occupied Sarajevo suburb of] Grbavica is acceptable only in order to supervise the cease-fire and can have no political connotations, it was concluded at today's session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

Importance of NATO Ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs

AU1602094794 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Frane Plancic: "Ultimatum—the First Step"]

[Text] The NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, and thus to Serbia too, is the first such act in the history of the Western military Alliance, and the first that extends beyond the range of its responsibility. In that it has a historical importance, politically unsurpassed in post-Cold-War Europe.

The military importance of the ultimatum, however, is much clearer, especially as it has been presented in a relatively precise way, so it seems that this component completely determines the limits of political engagement, that is, that the matter concerns a military ultimatum, a decisive threat saying that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina should end. This interpretation of the ultimatum is based on the justified wishes of the Croats and Muslims, but it is not contained in the text of the ultimatum.

This is a fact, and we can expect some more ultimatums of the same content until the Croats (in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the Muslims (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere) establish joint political, military, intellectual, and all other fronts against the aggressor. Only that could be the basis of a politically clearer and more substantial ultimatum of the Western Alliance, and, what is more important, of a clear account with Moscow.

These are only some of the reasons for the Croats and Muslims not to expect allied air strikes on Serb targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia too soon. It is quite certain that this will not happen, because the Bosnian Serbs have decided to withdraw, as was the case with the Serb rebels in Croatia, when most of the Serbian troops withdrew from Croatia.

The artillery-missile troops of the Bosnian Serbs are therefore withdrawing from the positions from which they have been stifling Sarajevo, and it is to be expected that they will not offer armed resistance to the opening of Tuzla airport and the Muslim enclaves in the Drina River valley. Their military adventures elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina have thus been significantly weakened, and so have those in Croatia. However, the Serb offensive potential has not been disabled or destroyed, which, intimately, each of us wishes, as do the countries bordering with Serbia, as can be discerned from their Geneva meeting regarding the balance of military power on the Balkans and reducing them to an acceptable defense level.

Considering all this, we can conclude that the NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs is at the same time an indirect message to the Serb rebels in Croatia and to the military-police regime that is in power in Serbia.

The content of the message is that they should put a time limit on their military actions on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they should limit the use of certain kinds of weapons, and even limit the targets. Croatia received a similar message in late 1992. It accepted it and started creating the conditions for resolving the war by political means. Serbia and the so-called Srpska republic should not be expected to accept the NATO message-ultimatum from such prudent positions. They will accept it simply because they must accept it, and will observe it until they have to, and where they have to.

This has been happening so far. During the past two years, the Serb armed forces were limited by time, space, and means, by which they were forced into a defensive, a strategic defense of the conquered territories.

The first such limit was imposed on the sea front—thanks to the activities of the Croatian Navy and the naval forces of the Western alliance. The strategy of Croatian defense and the liberation of the occupied territories was thus simplified. The significance of this at present is the inability of the Serb policy of conquest to indirectly improve the position in Bosnia-Herzegovina by threatening Croatia from the sea, that is, the all of southern Croatian and Herzegovina.

The following such limit was imposed on the use of Serb air forces. It was also imposed toward the end of the war against Croatia, and supported during the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina by ultimatums and patrols by the allied air forces. Thus, the Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina lost its second important strategic support.

The third, most important strategic support of the aggression have been the land forces. Following the bad experience in Croatia, where they attempted to fight the classical way, these forces—the only remaining ones—could carry out the strategy of conquest only using ways and means employed in stifling Sarajevo or conquering the territory along the Drina River.

The methods are familiar. They boil down to the expression "genocidal cleansing of desired territory." This—and the NATO ultimatum does not mention it because it is not within its jurisdiction—displays all the weakness of the ultimatum-like political position of the West toward Serbia.

The means are also familiar. They boil down to artillery-missile strikes, taking dominant positions, and destroying everything that is not Serb or that will not be useful. This—though it is within the NATO jurisdiction—also does not comprise as much as the meaning of the word "ultimatum" does. The truth is that it does relate to those means also, but only on one or two territories and in certain situations, and it leaves them in the hands of the aggressor, failing to threaten the aggressor's strong negotiating position, which is the worst thing.

The limits imposed through the ultimatum on the use of the Serb armed forces—primarily naval, then air forces, and now also the ground forces—introduces the new quality described above into the war for Bosnia-Herzegovina; a gradual and increasingly decisive pushing out of the Serb armed forces from the conquered territories. The humanitarian "intervention" can now only count on success. Their combination is, however, a sure failure without political intervention, which will not occur with the attitudes current in Russia and Greece. This is what Serbia relies on, withdrawing and not having withdrawn for three years.

Responsibility for 5 Feb Attack Undetermined

AU1602124394 Paris AFP in English 1238 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 16 (AFP)—An UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] fact-finding mission has been unable to determine the origin of mortar fire that killed 68 people in a Sarajevo market earlier this month, an official of the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia announced Wednesday.

The mortar shell which also wounded 200 other people on February 5 may have been fired by either side, Serb or Moslem, Canadian Colonel Michel Gauthier, who heads the investigation committee, told the press.

Izetbegovic, Redman on Ultimatum, Peace Talks

AU1502152794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Report by Enes Musabasic on statements by President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Charles Redman, special U.S. envoy at the Geneva talks, in Sarajevo on 15 February—recorded]

[Text] [Musabasic] After holding talks with Charles Redman, special U.S. envoy at the Geneva talks, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, said that the talks focused on the continuation of the peace process, the effective cease-fire on the Sarajevo front, and the execution of the NATO declaration.

[Izetbegovic] Mr. Redman reiterated the readiness of the U.S. Government to insist as a NATO member on the complete and consistent execution of the 10 February declaration, to be carried out without condition or change. This is what Mr. Christopher also confirmed in a telephone conversation with me late last night. He called me at about midnight to present the view of the U.S. Government on this issue. He had heard that we were concerned that a certain hesitation had emerged, and that certain misinterpretations by lower-ranking officers in the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] had been put forward. Mr. Christopher—now that I have mentioned that conversation—insisted that we too, for our part, observe the cease-fire. I promised him that and that is what we will do. I also said that there would be no front line changes on our part in Sarajevo. The Presidency also reiterated that point yesterday.

As for the peace negotiations, Mr. Redman and I have discussed ways for furthering the talks, and (we presented various ideas) on this issue. We concluded, among other things, that the clashes in central Bosnia had to stop in order to facilitate negotiations between us and Croatia on a more constructive basis. When it comes to talks on the resumption of the Geneva negotiations, we expressed our readiness to continue with them in order to reach the finale, that is, to establish a just peace. As you know, the United States has decided to participate actively in these talks, which is a good sign and will definitely contribute to these talks being more successful and effective than has been the case so far.

[Musabasic] Charles Redman first stressed that the talks in Sarajevo were very useful and productive, and added:

[Redman, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Of course a lot of people here in Sarajevo will focus on the NATO ultimatum and whether it will be followed up. I certainly hope that it will be, and I think that there are many indications that it will be realized. However, at the same time one of the main reasons for my being here is to see whether we can use this new momentum to put some energy into the peace negotiations. I believe that we all agree. We have held very serious talks on ways in which we can try to strengthen the efforts towards resolving the negotiations in order to reach finally a solution acceptable to all sides.

It will not be easy. It is something that has been discussed for months, but I hope that the involvement of the United States—with strong support and in full cooperation with the European Union, and consultations with the Russian Federation—will help us find new ways to resolve the problems that have been preventing a negotiated settlement from being reached.

So, this is still in an exploratory phase, as we consider various options. I think that we have identified some useful ideas, and I will be working on that, (and in some other places), but I will remain in constant touch with President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Silajdzic, and the government in Sarajevo so that we can reach a lasting peace in Bosnia.

Attacks on Muslims Continue in Sarajevo, Bihac

AU1602122494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] As our correspondent from Bihac, Mirza Sadikovic, reports, the Serbian aggressor today continues with fierce attacks on Bihac. The heroes of the 5th Corps are resisting horrendous artillery-tank cannonades and infantry attacks that are being carried out in waves by the so-called Glamoc Wolves—Karadzic's killers and mercenaries. Helicopters have been reintroduced again which are skillfully taking advantage of [word indistinct] and performing a twofold task. First, they are bringing heavy artillery from the hills around Sarajevo and at the same time surveying the hills. They help in evacuation of injured and killed chetniks, whose number in Vrapcici is growing. Several tens of howitzer bombs have landed on the villages around Cazin and Bihac since this morning. While the heroes of the 5th Corps and the people of the free part of the Bihac district have been bleeding for 11 days, dying on the streets while everything here is being destroyed, Fikret Abdic [president of autonomous region of western Bosnia] proceeds in his shameful task of betraying his own people. In the morning the forces of his army in the Cazin commune again attacked the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers in the area [word indistinct] and (?Resic). Because the attacks are still

underway, no information about the casualties has been released yet, but it is certain that several of the 5th Corps soldiers have been wounded.

The Croatian Army is attacking the center of Gornji Vakuf today also. Our correspondent Akif Agic reports that the Croatian offensive in central Bosnia is suffering blows daily.

Yesterday, the enemy continued with the provocations in the zone of responsibility of the 3d Operative Group. Our correspondent Smajl Terzic reports that in Tesanj, in the Kalosevic area, a great number of our fighters managed to repel what has, so far, been the strongest enemy infantry attack. In the ensuing counterattack in the form of a saboteur action, they inflicted great losses in manpower to the enemy.

As the information service of the 1st Corps reports, some parts of the town [Sarajevo] were not spared the chetnik activities today either. The aggressor is contemplating [words indistinct] cease-fire. This particularly refers to Sokolje and its surroundings, which has been targeted by antiaircraft machine guns from Rajlovac since early morning. [Word indistinct] localities from the same direction several tens of grenades have landed already. Chetnik killers with sniper rifles with silencers are active at several localities in the town. In the vicinity of Vrbanja Most, one person was killed. The perfidiousness of [word indistinct] is, therefore, limitless. (?The Army) urges maximal caution while moving about the town.

Karadzic: Air Strikes Will 'Destroy' NATO

AU1502204394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, by unidentified correspondent; place not given; Karadzic and the correspondent speak in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation—recorded]

[Text] Speaking at a news conference today, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, said that the decision on whether NATO will bomb us or not does not depend on the Serbian side. The Srpska republic will tomorrow issue an official statement on the NATO ultimatum. This is what Karadzic told the British (WTN) Agency:

[Correspondent] Do you envisage handing over any more heavy weapons to the United Nations or are you going to leave them where they are, albeit under UN control?

[Karadzic] We are going to make some combinations. We are probably going to give something over and to regroup something in order to make it possible for the United Nations to have efficient control. We also want reciprocity from the Muslim side.

[Correspondent] Do you think we are now closer to an agreement?

[Karadzic] Well, I think we may be closer since the United States has interfered. The United States cannot afford to interfere and not to come and help peace to be reached. The United States and Russia will probably have the last word, but probably in line with a plan by the European Union. In any case, we are ready for peace, we are ready to give over some territories that we control, and even some traditionally Serbian territories, but we are not going to go much below 64 percent of the private property that we possess. For peace and in the name of peace we are going to give something, but not everything.

[Correspondent] Do you think that air strikes are now more or less likely?

[Karadzic] Air strikes have always been realistic. We have always taken them seriously, not because of other people's behavior, but because of NATO's internal needs. NATO is experiencing a deep crisis just as the Western alliance is. They are showing their muscle and in our case they are also trying to scare Russia. They are doing things that are going simply to interrupt and destroy the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance is not needed in this war. NATO resembles a giant who has no feeling for reality. It will try to destroy somebody, but will destroy itself this time. If there are any air strikes, many NATO nations are going to distance themselves from this moral catastrophe. Then they are going to become completely divided.

Dismisses NATO Ultimatum

LD1502190594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1711 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Jahorina, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—The Serb side is ready to move some of its weapons to enable more efficient control, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic said at Jahorina [near Sarajevo] today.

At a very well attended news conference, Karadzic said that the decision on whether NATO will bomb us or not does not depend on the Serb side.

By tomorrow we will issue an official statement regarding the NATO ultimatum. We are not an internationally recognized state and therefore an ultimatum in such a form cannot be issued to us, Karadzic said, adding that such moves were unnecessary and reminded him of knocking on an open door.

To explain this assertion, he recalled that on 7 February all details of the demilitarization of Sarajevo had been agreed with Yasushi Akashi.

We are satisfied with the UN mission and its unbiased position and we fully cooperate with their representatives in order to reduce tension, but we are not satisfied with the NATO position, for their decisions are completely anti-Serb, Karadzic said, and stressed that he

subsequently welcomed the additional explanations by the United States and Russia that the ultimatum referred to all the warring sides, and not only to the Serbs.

We are a small people who are fighting for their freedom and rights, something to which other people are entitled. If NATO exists only to threaten small peoples, then its' member countries ought to ask themselves what they spend so much money on, Karadzic said, emphasizing the Serbian people's gratitude to Russia. We must, however, rely on our own forces while believing that there is commonsense in one part of the international community.

In reply to questions that referred to the withdrawal of Serb artillery around Sarajevo, Karadzic stressed the Serb side's willingness to move some of the weaponry in order to facilitate more effective UN control, since the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] lacks staff who can effectively control all the armed positions.

We are going to group some of the weaponry to enable observers to take control more easily, something that should lead to the further restoration of peace in Sarajevo and that could set a precedent for other areas in ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina. Peace does not suit the Muslim side, though. Their true intentions will soon be revealed, Karadzic cautions.

Both the United Nations and the Serb side want a lasting peace in Sarajevo, which is not a besieged city but a city split into a Serb and a Muslim part, a situation that will remain pending a final political settlement, Karadzic said. By no means are we going to provoke NATO, as we know to what extent some circles in the West are interested in continuing the bloodshed, because their ultimate aim is to demonstrate force to Russia by punishing the Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic said at today's news conference.

Says Muslims Planning Massacres

LD1502174494 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] As we mentioned in the headlines, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, held a news conference today. He spoke about the current political circumstances surrounding the resolving—that is, the complicating—of the situation in and around Bosnia. Coming up now, at the beginning of our bulletin, are several highlights from the address the president of our republic delivered to a large number of reporters.

[Begin Karadzic recording] The truth of the terrorist event in Merkale [Sarajevo's marketplace] has further crystallized. There is an increasing amount of evidence that this was a terrorist act. There are clear testimonies that no one heard any whistling sound from the shell and that, evidently, this was not a shell. The crater is too small. The number of dead and wounded is out of all proportion for a 120-mm shell. Turkish doctor (Senegal Karlovac) told CNN, in its diplomatic licence program, that he had seen the wounded and that all their wounds were inflicted below the waist level, that some of the wounds were burns, that there were no traces of alien material—that is, no shrapnel in the bodies and that most deaths had been caused by internal damage to organs due to the explosion.

It is evident that the wounds and burns are most likely to have been inflicted by phosphorus. We have been in contact with a group of Israeli experts on terrorism. They told us this morning that, on the basis of all the data they had, they were able to draw a conclusion that this was a cone-shaped explosive whose flat side was aimed at the victims, that this explosive was either triggered on the spot or dropped from a neighbouring building, and that this was the form of terrorism practised by Hezbollah and Afghans.

I also want to tell you that we have obtained reliable reports that the Muslim side is planning to stage further incidents, probably once the ultimatum deadline has expired. There is also a plan for an attack by Muslim forces disguised in Serbian uniforms on a small UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] squad, most probably a French squad. According to this plan there would be no survivors, all the soldiers would be killed, and even several dead Serbs, wearing uniforms of the Serb army, would remain on the spot, having been killed earlier. This is a very hellish plan which is supposed to fuel the tension in the world which is at the moment by and large on the wane. [end recording]

Says NATO Campaign Targets Russia

LD1502180094 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, gave a news conference in the international press center on Mount Jahorina today. Numerous journalists' questions referred to the current situation in the Srpska republic after the latest NATO threats. [passage omitted]

The ultimatum is a direct consequence of the Sarajevo massacre. An international investigative commission has been set up. Asked by a reporter whether the Serbs will insist that the investigation be fully completed by the ultimatum deadline and whether the operation of withdrawing Serb artillery will be canceled if the investigation ends up with some positive results for the Serb side, and whether the international community will turn the spearhead of its ultimatum on to the perpetrators in such a case, Radovan Karadzic replied:

[Begin Karadzic recording] I believe that the international community already knows who committed the massacre in Merkale marketplace. It is in our interest to have the investigation carried out as soon as possible and to have the results published as soon as possible. The main reason is that delaying the investigation will result

in the loss of evidence; the passage of time blurs any conclusions about the perpetrator of this crime, this act of terrorism.

We believe that the Muslim side is doing everything to disguise and conceal the evidence so as to prevent the commission from drawing adequate legal conclusions. This nothwithstanding, even if the fact that it was the Muslims who did it is revealed and announced, NATO and some countries, some NATO member countries, will not change their decision regarding the Serbs. Although they know all too well what the Serbs are doing, that the Serbs favor peace whereas the Muslims opt for war, they have not changed their attitude. [end recording]

At today's news conference the president of the Srpska republic also spoke about the UN Security Council's current position and Russia's stance in this context.

[Begin Karadzic recording] I believe that the UN Security Council is in a precarious situation, as it is clear that the Serb side is doing its best to bring about peace while the Muslim side is advocating war. There is, however, no willingness within the UN Security Council and the international community to tell the full truth. In this light the position of the UN Security Council is delicate. China's attitude to this issue, though, is to be applauded. I also believe that Russia is getting increasingly aware that the true target of the entire campaign and crisis is Russia rather than Serbia. [end recording]

Churkin: Sending Russian Troops 'Unthinkable'

AU1502203894 Paris AFP in English 2026 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 15 (AFP)—Russia would under no circumstances sent troops to bolster the UN contingent in Sarajevo to enforce adherence to the NATO air strikes ultimatum, Moscow's envoy to Bosnia said here late Tuesday.

Vitaly Churkin said it was "absolutely unthinkable" that Russian forces should be "somewhere on the ground where their lives and safety can be endangered" as a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation decision.

He recalled that the NATO ultimatum giving Bosnian Serbs until midnight Sunday to withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo or face air strikes had been taken without consulting Moscow.

President Boris Yeltsin's envoy travelled to Zagreb from the Bosnian capital, where he met Bosnian government leaders, and Bosnian Serb and United Nations Protection Force commanders.

Silajdzic, Churkin Hold Briefing in Sarajevo

AU1502162694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] As we have already said, Vitaliy Churkin, Russian envoy to the Geneva talks, visited Sarajevo today. After he had held talks with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency, Churkin met and held talks with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Summing up today's talks, Churkin told journalists the following.

[Begin Churkin recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] First of all, I am very glad to have had the opportunity to meet Prime Minister Silajdzic and President Izetbegovic. This time I came here mainly because I wanted to see that the military disengagement that has started around Sarajevo is being carried out without a problem. You may recall that shortly after the tragedy in this town on 5 February, Russia demanded that the siege around Sarajevo be lifted, (?immediately).

We are following this process very carefully and are trying to do what we can to make sure that this process continues. If this process turns out to be successful, we will have a new opportunity to find a political solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. I am very encouraged by what I heard today from President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic.

Naturally, I stressed that we hope that the forces of the Bosnian Government will show restraint in the days and weeks ahead. This will be demanded from all sides. I was also encouraged by the fact that the hosts spoke not only about the current crisis in and around Sarajevo, but also about the prospects for a political solution, and even more than that, about what can be accomplished between us in the time of peace that will hopefully come soon. [end recording]

Briefly addressing journalists, Prime Minister Silajdzic stressed two aspects of today's talks.

[Begin Silajdzic recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The first is that we asked Mr. Churkin to influence as much as possible the situation in Sandzak, which is not in line with rapprochement and the peace talks. People are being arrested in Sandzak. The situation in Sandzak is very grave. We fear that the conflict could escalate, that stronger, more repressive measures could be taken. We know that 200 people have been arrested. We asked Mr. Churkin to work in this direction with the people in Belgrade as much as he can.

This was one issue. The other issue concerned the possibilities for developing Bosnian-Russian relations in the future. We think that these relations do not have to be at the present level, and that they could be developed in the direction of global rapprochement. We are all slowly beginning to live in this global village. [sentence as heard] These are the two issues. Mr. Churkin spoke about other aspects of the talks. [end recording]

Vitaliy Churkin then commented on his statement for Belgrade Radio that Russia will put a stop to the prospect of air strikes on Serbian positions.

[Begin Churkin recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I do not recall saying anything like that. The media also reported that a joint statement was issued after my meeting with Milosevic. This is not correct. There was no joint statement, neither a formal nor an informal statement. What I stressed, and I can repeat it, is that we believe that everything must be done to achieve this encouraging process of peaceful military disengagement in and around Sarajevo. I think that continuing the fighting and confrontations is in noone's interest. In this sense, yes, we are trying everything to prevent the escalation of the conflict here.

However, I am also saying personally and publicly that if the process of demilitarization in and around Sarajevo fails, worst things will happen. I have made this point again and again. [end recording]

The journalists were than again addressed by Prime Minister Silajdzic.

[Begin Silajdzic recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] This must be the first step toward peace. NATO's ultimatum should be the first step toward peace, because, as I have stressed in the past, there used to be a military imbalance. This ultimatum is now restoring this balance to a certain degree. I believe that the balance of power maintained peace in Europe for 50 years. This principle was abandoned with everything else in Bosnia, but is now coming back. This will not be easy. However, goodwill must exist on all sides. Regarding our side, this will exists. We will meet all our obligations and we are striving for peace. [end recording]

Army Warns Citizens on Bombing, Downed Planes

LD1502163294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1301 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Bileca, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—The Command of the Herzegovina Corps today issued a cautionary note to the population of this area. It says that protective measures should be immediately taken to provide maximum protection for people and property from possible attacks by the NATO air force.

It stresses that it is necessary to tidy up cellars and communal shelters and secure the most basic quantities of food and equipment for administering first aid to the wounded. In the event of attack one should behave sensibly and follow instructions by civil defense officials.

The Command of the Herzegovina Corps believes that the territory of Serbian Herzegovina can be threatened by deliberate bombardment as well as by technical faults along the flight path of NATO aircraft. It also points out the possibility of aircraft carrying lethal loads being shot down or crashing into each other and their dropping lethal loads at random on inhabited settlements.

"Serb units are taking every measure to protect free territory and the population from possible attacks by the NATO air force and they will warn the population in time about any possible threat from the air," the Command of the Herzegovina Corps says in its warning announcement.

Croat Paper Views Air Strikes Against Serbs

94P20353A

[Editorial Report] The 31 January issue of the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA on page 4 reports that, in the event of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, there is no doubt that the majority of entrenched Serb batteries would be erased in a few minutes. However, the paper adds, Serb reinforcements and reserves massed in the vicinity of Tuzla (for example around Bijeljina) and Srebrenica (where the so-called Drina Corps with six brigades is operating) are sufficient to continue to hinder the deblocking of both Srebrenica and Dubrava. NATO would then certainly have to repeat and expand the air strikes to the Bosnian Serbs' "remaining strategic centers." The action would have to be on at least the scale of the several consecutive, mass attacks on Iraq in the first half of last year, the paper notes, adding that the Serbs believe that they would be able to survive the "first, selective attack from the sky, and then, while they still have the upper hand on the land, they would begin conducting what they have been announcing for a long time: an all-out war against all UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, combining the experience of the Vietnam guerrillas with the tactics that the Blue Helmets have already felt themselves in Somalia."

Abdic Struggles To Retain Support in Bihac Area

AU1502195694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Excerpt] Yet another chetnik offensive, this time in the Bihac region, has failed to yield results. The traitor Fikret Abdic has many problems maintaining his authority in the Kladusa region.

[Sadikovic] The preoccupation of Bihac region residents and members of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina with internal clashes and the agreed support of Fikret Abdic, were obviously the reason Radovan Karadzic launched his strongest offensive so far to finally finish off the Bihac pocket, the Muslim enclave not in physical contact with Sarajevo.

Four brigades and a few additional chetnik units were supposed to capture the Grmecko-Srbljanski plateau and Grabez in the first stage, and in the second reach the right bank of the Una river. At the same time, Fikret Abdic's so-called forces were supposed to enter Cazin,

link up with the Grmecko-Srbljanski plateau and then enter Bihac itself with the help of the Croatian Defense Council, which allegedly controls the plateau.

However, this did not happen. The heros of the 5th Corps have been resisting the chetniks for 10 days. Chetniks did not make much progress from the Grabez wasteland. Kladusa's Babo [Fikret Abdic] also spoiled the game. He did not carry out any of his promises. The conscience of the residents of Velika Kladusa came to the fore. They expressed allegiance to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 5th Corps. Abdic now has the problem of how to keep back hundreds, even thousands of those who want to go to Bihac. He appealed for help in the fight against the 5th Corps, forgetting that it was actually the local people who make up the 5th Corps. Neither Milosevic nor Tudjman are listening to him any longer. He has yet to settle accounts with Karadzic. [passage omitted]

Mladic Protecting Serbs From 'Fanatical' Muslims

LD1502221294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2023 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—General Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the Srpska army, said after meeting UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] commanders in Lukavica today that there will be no withdrawal of Serb artillery.

"We will not leave our people—who have always lived here—unprotected. We have no right to do something like that and nothing can force us to abandon our people to the mercy of the fanatical Muslim units," he said.

Mladic held talks today with General Jean Cot, UNPROFOR commander for the former Yugoslavia, and General Michael Rose, UNPROFOR commander for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin attended a part of the talks.

General Mladic described the talks with Generals Cot and Rose as very useful. "We exchanged views and I promised them we will fully observe the cease-fire agreed on 10 February and that we are ready to discuss any contentious issues with the other side," he said.

Mladic recalled that it was the Muslims who started the war against the Serbs, declaring it jointly with the Croats, and that now the Bosnian Serbs expect that "those who declared war on us should withdraw such a declaration now."

"When this happens at the highest political level, then everything else will be technical detail," General Mladic said, adding that "we are offering peace to our adversaries and we will try to halt any combat activities in Sarajevo in the forthcoming period."

Asked what kind of guarantees the Serb side demanded from NATO, General Mladic said he expects that "NATO will understand the trick of the Muslim side, which wants Sarajevo to ignite a new world war."

"I expect all NATO members to perform their duties and threaten the Serbs as much as the Serbs are threatening them. I also told Cot that every member of the international forces and humanitarian organizations has been and will be safe on our territory. NATO should stick to its original policy—defending the territories of those countries that created it. If I were in the shoes of the people who make decisions in NATO, I would not be transforming that organization into an international beating stick, because each stick has got two ends and does not have a part that cannot be broken," Mladic said.

Commenting on the failure of the Muslim army commander Rasim Delic to attend the meeting, allegedly due to other business engagements, Mladic said that "General Delic is in fact busy with affairs in central Bosnia, where he is waging a war against the Croats."

"However, for them this is only an excuse, because most probably they are not going to contact us before 21 February, expecting NATO to do their job. They are fervently hoping that air strikes against the Serb people, villages, towns, and army will take place and are doing everything for this to happen," Mladic said.

Speaking about the withdrawal of the Serb artillery from positions surrounding Sarajevo, Mladic said that this could be discussed only after the signing of a peace agreement.

"We will allow UN observers to be deployed at certain positions and I will not disclose any other details in this connection. I told General Cot what to suggest to the Muslim side. I believe you understand that as soon as I withdraw our forces from Sarajevo, I will leave the Serb population to be slaughtered by the Muslims, as happened on 4 May 1992," Mladic said. [passage omitted]

Islamic Fundamentalism With NATO Aid Examined

LD1502204594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1923 GMT 15 Feb 94

["Pool" item; commentary by Vladimir Resetar]

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (TANJUG)—The published transcript of the phone-in programme broadcast by the Sarajevo-based Moslem radio station Hayat on February 5, after the massacre at the Markale open air market, a programme whose horrendous message was—all Serbs should immediately be killed, has found no room in reports carried by leading foreign news agencies.

News agencies failed to react not because they doubted the authenticity of the Moslem calls for Serbs to be lynched but because of their view of the reality in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, a view shaped by the political leaderships of the countries in which the agencies' headquarters are based.

It is not clear why it is in the interest of the West to ignore even the obvious aggressiveness of mounting pan-Islamism, which itself, has termed the number one threat in the world.

"The arrow has been shot and is moving towards its target"—were the words of the sentence passed by the Iranian fundamentalists, headed by their late religious leader Ayatollah Khomeyni, on poet Salman Rushdie five years ago. Rushdie, sentenced by fundamentalists for a book he has written, has to remain in hiding because the sentence was confirmed yesterday—Rushdie must die, as must also the Serbs in Bosnia.

The progressive world public was indignant with the death sentence passed on Rushdie by the fundamentalists and it strongly reacted, defending the poet. On the other hand, that same public is threatening Serbs with NATO bombs and missiles only because Serbs do not fit into the visions contained in the "Islamic declaration" of Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic.

There is no answer to the question what it is that Serbs should do to finally eliminate the threats they have been facing for two years, i.e., since the outbreak of the Bosnian Moslem "holy war" for Izetbegovic's state whose genuinely Islamic order would be based on the Koran.

All negotiations to date have failed because the Bosnian Moslem side has been set on achieving its goal, but has not been able to do so because "there are too many Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina," as it sets out.

The Moslems have rejected all offers made by the Serbs. Whatever concessions the Serbs have made, the Moslems have asked for more in an effort to achieve their goal by means of war. They are not doing bad in central Bosnia, where they are confronted with Croats, but they need NATO's assistance in the case of Serbs.

The world omnipotents, who have engineered the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and everything that has happened in the past three years, surely know whether NATO's arrow has already been shot at the Serbs or if it has just been drawn back.

The scenario and stage-managing in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been brought to perfection, and the story continues to unfold towards its pre-conceived end. Only Serbs in no way fit in. They should disappear according to Izetbegovic's idea, but they refuse to do so. And, NATO can hardly do anything about it.

Izetbegovic Protests as Serbs Shell Hospital

AU1402204394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] The aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to take its deadly toll, currently at its worst in the Bihac region, according to a letter sent today by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, to (Cornelio Sommaruga), chairman of the International Red Cross Committee.

An extremely fierce offensive has been going on for days. There have been many civilian casualties. The municipal hospital in Bihac is constantly being targeted by the shelling and over the last few days it has been hit on nine occasions. There have been 14 patients killed and the building itself has been seriously damaged, the letter reads.

I urge you to declare that this hospital is in a neutral zone and to make it exempt from all enemy attacks by securing the permanent presence of the International Red Cross Committee delegates, the letter from President Izetbegovic to (Cornelio Sommaruga) concludes.

Prospects for 'Partnership' Admission Viewed

AU1502192794 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 94 pp 2-3

[Article by Frane Plancic: "The Door Is Ajar"]

[Text] Last Friday [4 February], Croatia again declared that it was prepared to join the "Partnership for Peace [PFP]," a NATO program for military and political cooperation.

The first unofficial declaration was presented in Vienna by Bekic, our ambassador to the CSCE, and it consisted of one sentence. The second declaration was made by Foreign Minister Granic, and it was a little more elaborate, but was again just a signal.

The third declaration, this time official and unambiguous, was sent from the session of the Presidential Council for Defense and National Security. It is worth quoting again because of that, but also because it is a complex task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"The Council has adopted the proposal to join the NATO program 'PFP' and supports the intention of the Republic of Croatia to take part in the process. With regard to that, the Ministry has been entrusted with preparing the final proposal and taking steps to that effect."

The final proposal, therefore, is to be drafted by the Foreign Ministry and presented to the appropriate state bodies and other political factors to be finally reshaped.

Coordinated Admission Form

The report makes it clear that the basic views of the president of the republic, key state bodies (whose leaders sit on the council), and of the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community have been coordinated. Thus coordinated admission to the PFP process does not need to go through parliament, for example, or be reviewed and discussed with other parliamentary parties. Only the agreement between Croatia and NATO worequire this, and even then it would probably boil down to mere formal acceptance. As yet, no one has declared himself against NATO or for nonpartnership with NATO.

However, if drafting the final proposal is a routine part of the job given to the Foreign Ministry, preparing "concrete steps for it" is an incredibly complex part of the job. Moreover, it cannot be implemented without the participation of the Ministry of Defense, the main repository of all future implementation plans, then also of expert groups from other departments, as well as strong public support.

It is definitely not easy to predict what lies ahead for the Croatian delegation on the way to being registered on the list of candidates for membership of the PFP. Croatia is not in the position to have all the doors automatically open for it, but it will not have any doors slammed in its face either, although it does fall into the "high-risk group." The doors are closed to Serbia, for example, as it is involved in a three-year war against everything and everybody, but also because, from the standpoint of international law, it is a nonexistent country. The doors are wide open for Poland, for example, among other things, because it is doing a good job of meeting the political requirements, but also because its territory is strategically extremely important.

First the Center and Then South

If Croatia manages to refute accusations of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only the fact that it is still in a state of war will stand in the way of becoming a member of the PFP. But that can be "patched up" with a promise to integrate the occupied territory into the state system in a peaceful manner, provided that the obligation is accepted and guaranteed by both sides.

Until Croatia meets that condition, it could get into trouble walking both ways toward the PFP. On one hand, it would be met by those NATO members which think that a country in a state of war expects something that the PFP does not offer, and on the other, by those who accept Croatia but—because of the principle of unanimous decisionmaking—would hold back until Croatia's domestic problems were solved.

All this has resulted in Croatia officially committing itself to the PFP so late and has made it decide to leave some time for the Foreign Ministry to prepare the proposal and decide on concrete steps.

In the meantime, more and more East European and European nonaligned countries are being admitted to the PFP. Perhaps NATO headquarters is waiting to fill the quota for those countries first and then they will start seriously considering the admission of countries from the territory of former Yugoslavia. In other words, only when the problem of strategically the most important part of Europe—its central plain—is solved, will they deal with the south of Europe and with the European Mediterranean front.

Security Problems

The assumption is that there will be no serious problems with Slovenia at that point, but that it will also start demanding safety guarantees in case the Balkan powder keg explodes. There could be some problems with Croatia's admission and a loud demand for mutual guarantees for a peaceful solution to the problem of occupied territory. But this would only be for those countries that already have such security problems or could be predicted as having some in the future, and thus would want to delay giving such guarantees to another country.

This variant (and there are other, easier ones) of political problems which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is facing and the fact that it is walking in both directions is an organizational and working "piece of cake" compared

with problems that the ministry will have to deal with once it chooses how to get into the PFP.

The expert group for admission to the PFP, which will mostly consist of members of the upper echelons of the Defense Ministry, will have to have many members, and to be very mobile, diverse in specialities, abundantly financed, and authorized to participate in implementing foreign policy and defense strategy. If the group does not have the above characteristics, it will not be able to represent Croatia as a member of the PFP, whose demands reach far into Croatian state policy. That is also evident from the concept of the PFP and its inner mechanism of operation, which has only recently been publicly represented in some detail.

[Box, p 2]

To Mons—Brigadier

Since the idea of the PFP being the best way to move eastward as evolved last summer in Washington, after the NATO summit in January organization preparations for functioning of PFP institutions and procedures were expedited.

The recently established Board of Directors of the PFP, directly supervised by the NATO Council, will be in charge of accepting signed admissions, members, and coordinating activities.

According to Undersecretary Wisner, one of the first and most important tasks of PFP candidates is to draw up a "Presentation Document." Croatia will use such a document to present to the Board of Directors those activities that it wants to engage in within this cooperation, and the forces and means it will place at the disposal of the PFP; Croatia will present the main goals of defense planning and plans for reaching common goals. In those activities, the Croatian Army can expect to be assisted by NATO experts, for that is the key document in which they will together determine the goals, the momentum, and the extent of the Republic of Croatia's participation in NATO activities.

The Board of Directors coordinates the work on a series of such "Presentation Documents," plans common activities of all PFP members, and assesses the progress of the PFP program according to political and military integration.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), whose seat is in Mons (Belgium), is entrusted with drawing up military plans. It is already planning the joint exercise, and the command and staff exercise is to come first toward the end of spring, while units would practise various common procedures in autumn. It was required that small-scale exercises be held in some East European countries.

Some rules have been established regarding planning common activities. It is expected that high-level political representatives will be accredited to NATO at its seat in Brussels, while military representatives holding the rank of brigadier will be accredited to SHAPE in Mons. With regard to that, an additional administrative network is being formed that will comprise a number of functions, from diplomatic to legal.

[Box, p 3]

Three Main Goals

Regarding the concept of the PFP, it is emphasized that the PFP has three main goals. The first is described as another step toward a safer Europe, as it spreads democracy to new areas and transfers strategic stability to the east of Europe. The second goal is developing NATO's capacity to respond to challenges that were hitherto outside the domain of the collective defense of NATO members. The third goal is to open the doors for new members.

Realizing that the first goal is politically extremely important and will bring extremely difficult problems. Primarily because the cooperation with the Russian Federation, according to Clinton, is first on the list of priority matters of national security. Fortunately, European strategists and realistic politicians are placing more and more confidence in "the artfulness of history," that is in the belief that overcoming the Russian obstacle (complicated by the Zhirinovskiy factor) can easily be compensated. In this way, other items from the priority list are to be realized more quickly and completely, and the first item is to be left for later.

Realizing the second goal would be done by means of a very tangible method. It concerns adapting to ways of cooperation among NATO members on the military level and beginning such cooperation this year on operations that are being opened up in the post-Cold-War period.

For the Croatian Army, for instance, this would mean that it will have to get standard NATO weapons and equipment, or at least compatible ones, and that it will develop systems of education, training, exercises, communications, etc. totally compatible with NATO systems. Apart from that "hardware," the Croatian Army will have to single out units, make plans and define joint missions together with members of NATO and the PFP. It is planned that those will originally only be search and rescue missions, help in areas devastated by natural catastrophes, ecological treatment of areas contaminated by war, or basing military forces, and, on a higher level of cooperation, peacekeeping missions in crisis areas in Europe and elsewhere.

The gradual implementation of the third goal, according to F. Wisner, political under secretary of the U.S. secretary of state for defense, has been globally determined for the next five years. During that period, some countries will gradually be admitted and guarantees will be given that there will be no new borders dividing Europe's east and west, but this will also be a period for the United

States to assess the stability or irretrievablity of the democratization process in Russia.

During that period, very few members of the PFP can count on being admitted to NATO as full members. Paragraph 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which guarantees the total security of NATO members, will extend to those countries and their security problems only formally.

In spite of formal refusals to comment on what would happen with urgent admissions to NATO if "the Zhirinovskiy factor" or some other factor goes mad in Russia, it is predicted that countries thus imperiled will have to be admitted rapidly and almost indiscriminately.

Russia's Churkin Departs Zagreb for Sarajevo

LD1502105794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Vitaliy Churkin, special envoy of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, departed Zagreb for Sarajevo this morning. He is expected to discuss the end of the siege of Sarajevo and its demilitarization with Alija Izetbegovic and top officials of the Muslim authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Churkin will return to Zagreb this afternoon. He is expected to meet officials from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to hold a news conference.

'Disagreements' Disrupt RSK Assembly Session

LD1202153494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1359 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Knin, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—The constituent session of the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] has started in Knin. The session is chaired by Branko Peric of Knin, the oldest deputy. However, the session was interrupted and a recess announced due to serious disagreements over the adoption of the agenda and the verification of the deputies' mandates.

The assembly became divided into two camps: deputies from the Serb Democratic Party of Krajina [SDS] and from the Serbian Radical Party in one, and deputies from all the other parties and citizens' groups in the other.

This development dashed hopes that the first session of the new Krajina parliament would be held in a jubilant atmosphere and that the deputies would transcend party interests—something the Chairman Peric had called for at the beginning of the session. Drago Kovacevic, head of the SDS group of deputies, proposed that the assembly president and deputy presidents be elected first and that Milan Martic be sworn in as president afterward, while the agenda proposed the opposite. [passage omitted]

Request To Join Partnership for Peace Revealed

LD1602120894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1142 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Skopje, 16 Feb (TANJUG)—It was stated in Skopje today that NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner has received a letter from Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski informing NATO of Macedonia's intention to join and actively participate in the Partnership for Peace program.

According to the statement, the Macedonian request will be discussed at an upcoming NATO meeting. [passage omitted]

New Bulgarian Envoy Reviews Relations

AU1502212994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] On 15 February in Skopje Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov received Angel Dimitrov, the newly appointed Bulgarian ambassador to Macedonia, who presented his credentials. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, our reporter Kostadin Filipov reports.

[Begin Filipov recording] In his speech Ambassador Angel Dimitrov stressed that Bulgaria had been the first state to recognize the Republic of Macedonia, and the first direct neighbor of Macedonia that had established full diplomatic relations with that state.

This is an expression of the Republic of Bulgaria's prudence, farsightedness, and determination to develop relations with the Republic of Macedonia on the basis of mutual respect and sincere friendship—the only possibility of asserting peace and stability on the Balkan peninsula, Ambassador Dimitrov pointed out.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov stressed the unique personal contribution of Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, with whom he said he has relations of sincere friendship and understanding. He also pointed out Macedonia's great interest in maintaining stable and goodneighborly relations with Bulgaria. Mr. Gligorov also expressed Macedonia's interest in developing and strengthening cooperation in all areas of mutual interest and benefit.

Now a broad field opens for cultural, economic, scientific, and other cooperation, connecting the two countries with the necessary railroad, modern highways, and telecommunications, Kiro Gligorov stressed. [end recording]

Report Examines Split in PDP, Albanian Role

AU1602120594 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 15 Feb 94 p 4

[Report by Panta Dzambazovski: "Who in the PDP Is the PDP?"]

[Text] The inevitable has happened—the largest party of the Albanians in Macedonia, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], has split. The attempt to reach a compromise between the two opposing sides at an early congress produced no results—it was precisely at this congress that the final split occurred.

The deputies and ministers group, as well as the majority of congress delegates, left the hall when they saw that the other side, the supporters of the radical Menduh Taci [chairman of the Tetovo branch of the PDP], was making every effort to hold the congress outside the Statute. What is more, Taci's group, which made the technical preparations for the congress—it never crossed their minds to raise the Macedonian flag beside the party flag and the Albanian flag—used force: They barred entry to members of the Central Assembly and prevented them from participating in the congress (a congress body), they prevented former president Nevzat Halili attending, and they deprived the delegates and ministers of their right to vote! A working presidency was not elected, for which only Menduh Taci's supporters were proposed! Some delegates of several simultaneously "formed" branches were also introduced. The intention was clear—to ensure that Taci's current won at all costs.

His supporters had another objective—to take over the name and property of the party. The party seal was "sequestered," and the rooms of the Tetovo Center occupied. Obviously, it will be up to the court to decide—who in the PDP is the PDP.

Political Differences

Something that has been clear for some time was once again confirmed: Taci's group is supported by the Republic of Albania. The delegation attending from Tirana, besides delivering the welcome speech (after the ministers and deputies group had left), remained till the end with Taci's supporters. The Kosovo delegation, sitting in the fourth row and not together with the guests from Albania, who were sitting in the first row, remained neutral after the "split" and left for Pristina, although they are on the side of the deputies group.

Here is further evidence that Tirana is deeply involved in the party division and that it supports the "Tacists": Albanian Television's report on the congress was confined to Taci's congress, with the solitary remark that "a group of delegates left the congress," without mentioning the fact that it also held a congress. Let us recall that Albania has hosted Menduh Taci a couple of times, giving him support at very high level: the leadership of the ruling Democratic Party of Albania, various ministers, and even the Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi.

Only at first sight does it seem that there are no differences in the programs of the two sides. As far as political activities are concerned, however, the differences are enormous and very substantial. At its congress Taci's group assessed that the deputies and ministers had a different ideology—progovernment. They assessed that the final goal must be the unification of all Albanians!

According to Taci, under the old leadership "Ilirida" remained undefined, and the result of the (government) coalition was the arms affair and the creation of other Albanian parties, which "destroyed the Albanian people." Another conclusion was that—the Yugoslav Army and the Macedonian authorities were arming the Macedonians in their homes, and therefore the "Albanians had to create paramilitary formations!"

In his report Taci accused the PDP and the deputies group of failing "to accentuate the interests of the Albanians" and said that the Albanians were not "an equal and authentic subject in Macedonia." As if the process of political activities aiming at national equality were limited in time, after which other methods of activities had to be undertaken. It is weird that a negative reply was given to the "authenticity" of the Albanian subject in Macedonia. Taci remarked that the position of the deputies group in parliament was dependent (is it not logical and normal with 22 deputies positions?) and that the coalition was created without having a political platform (and what is the PDP program, which is normally represented by the deputies group, with its additional requests, depending on the activities and agenda of parliament, which are not constant?).

No More Coming Together

Quite a different tune from that of Taci's supporters prevailed at the congress held by the supporters of the group of deputies and ministers, where all conditions were fulfilled to make it the Second PDP Congress. Aside from raising a large Macedonian flag, it was reiterated that the PDP will operate only through the institutions of the state, and that it was in the interest of the Albanian factor to have the party operate within the state authority. How the Albanians could otherwise pledge to promote their status in the state is dangerous even to think of. It was also said that the PDP must pledge to maintain peace and stability in the state, which was their fatherland, and official Albania was accused of interfering in the affairs of an "authentic party."

The question now is—what will become of the PDP? According to the first statements in the course of the two congresses, both sides claimed to have the right to the party. Taci was precise: "One of the dilemmas is over—we inherit the party." This is probably not the case, however, because their congress was of doubtful legitimacy. The deputies and ministers group did not even think of whose hands continuity was in: "They had created a scenario and a voting team" (Naser Ziberi, their elected secretary, said).

Yesterday, when we believed passions had cooled, we put the same question to both sides. The leader of the so-called "hard current," radical Menduh Taci, elected vice president by his supporters, declined to make a statement. He simply directed us to someone else: "Ask President Arben Djaferi." Djaferi said he would be giving neither statements nor interviews this week, but he agreed to give us an interview after the end of the week. Let us recall, Taci had also promised to give us an interview, but he did not keep his promise.

We asked Djeladin Murati, the newly elected president of the other side, to make a statement. He is also vice chairman of the Macedonian People's Assembly. First, he told us he would occupy this position only temporarily. He was candidate for president of both sides, but he said he could not remain with the "Tacists" because they worked contrary to the Statute. "Privately, I never believed this would happen, and the PDP must survive even if there is a small degree unity and even if there are the problems of a careerist nature. The struggle for power must be waged in a democratic way, and not by way of disqualifying and labeling people," Murati told us.

Further, Murati pointed out that divisions occur in other parties, too, and that the process of political differentiation and definition was normal, and usually beneficial. Murati said that the dispute within the PDP was of a program nature. He also emphasized, however, that arguments were needed, not simply some desires for autonomy, "Iliridas," or the refusal to join the Macedonian Army..... "The PDP pledges the maintenance of peace and stability, prosperity for the Albanians, without neglecting the others in Macedonia. I believe there will be a process of reexamination in the demonstrated relations, but it is unlikely the two sides will come together." If the other side wanted the name PDP, in Murati's opinion, it would have to give it a suffix.

U.S. F-16 Fighter Plane Crashes; Pilot Safe

AU1602120494 Paris AFP in English 1156 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Rome, Feb 16 (AFP)—A U.S. military fighter plane from NATO's base in Aviano, northern Italy, crashed in Slovenia Wednesday though the pilot managed to eject from the craft and escaped unhurt, informed sources here said.

The F-16 crashed while the pilot was attempting to make an emergency landing in the former Yugoslav republic bordering Italy though it was not immediately known why.

Planes at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in Aviano have been patrolling Bosnian skies for months and are among those that would be used should NATO go ahead with its threat to launch air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces besieging Sarajevo.

Technical Failure Cited

AU1602125494 Paris AFP in English 1243 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Aviano, Italy, Feb 16 (AFP)—A U.S. military fighter plane from the NATO base here crashed in the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia Wednesday attempting an emergency landing but the pilot ejected and is safe, a U.S. spokesman at the base said.

He said the pilot had been hospitalized, but did not say where nor give his condition.

The F-16 fighter plane was on a routine training flight when it went down near the small town of Portoroz near the Adriatic coast as the pilot tried to make an emergency landing for reasons that were not immedialy known.

In Ljubljana, the Slovenian news agency STA said the fighter's pilot had contacted Portoroz' small civilian airport shortly before the crash asking permission to land because of a technical failure on board his aircraft.

When given the go-ahead, he tried to bring his plane down on the tiny landing strip but was unable to keep it on the runway.

STA said the plane crashed into the Adriatic after the pilot ejected.

It also said the fighter had weapons on board but the pilot ejected them into the sea before attempting to land.

The U.S. spokesman here said the plane had been training for NATO's operation Deny Flight, which enforces the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Planes at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in Aviano have been patrolling Bosnian skies for months and are among those that would be used should NATO go ahead with its threat to launch air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces besieging Sarajevo.

UN Officials Discussing Safety of Aid Workers

AU1602100094 Paris AFP in English 0958 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 16 (AFP)—UN officials were meeting in the Slovenian border town of Mokrice Wednesday to discuss the safety of humanitarian aid workers in Bosnia in view of the threat of a NATO air strike against Bosnia's defiant Serbs.

"The main issue of the meeting is going to be the safety of humanitarian aid workers in Bosnia under present conditions," said special UN representative Yasushi Akashi.

Akashi was meeting with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and UN peace mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg. Mokrice is about 30 kilometres (18 miles) west of Zagreb.

NATO last week issued an ultimatum to Bosnia's warring parties, particularly the Serbs, to move their weapons from around Sarajevo by midnight Sunday or face air strikes.

Federal

Foreign Ministry on Diplomats' Evacuation

LD1402154894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1453 GMT 14 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] received with surprise and regret the news of the evacuation from Belgrade of family members of diplomatic representatives of some European countries and the United States, as well as the news on advice not to travel to the FRY or to leave FRY territory, given to citizens of these countries, a Foreign Ministry statement says.

Similar hasty moves have been made before in order to put political and psychological pressure on the FRY and to inflict damage on its reputation. These moves are completely unfounded today, as they were in the past, and do not make any contribution toward creating an atmosphere needed for a successful completion of the peace negotiations.

The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that on the territory of the FRY, full personal safety and conditions for normal life and work are guaranteed for all diplomatic personnel, members of their families, and all foreigners. We therefore expect that these decisions will soon be reexamined and withdrawn, the statement says in conclusion.

No Plans for Evacuation of French From Belgrade

LD1302145894 Paris France-Info Radio in French 1430 GMT 13 Feb 94

[Excerpts] France, for now, has no intention of evacuating its nationals from Belgrade in Serbia. We have to stay cool, said the foreign minister, Alain Juppe. [passage omitted] Yesterday, the United States ordered the families of their diplomats to leave Belgrade, while the British Government has evacuated nine of its citizens.

Parties Condemn Ultimatum To Bosnian Serbs

LD1402235094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2341 GMT 14 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, February 14 (TANJUG)—Several parties from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Monday strongly condemned the NATO threats to bomb Serb positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pointing out that this would jeopardize the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis in this former Yugoslav republic.

President of the opposition parliamentary Democratic Party Zoran Djindjic said that the NATO ultimatum "is contrary to U.N. Security Council resolutions and dangerously threatens the peace process" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Speaking at a meeting in Knjazevac, a town in southeastern Serbia, Djindjic assessed that it was evident that the ultimatum did not have any humanitarian or security foundations, but was primarily a tool to "pressure the Serb negotiators in Geneva."

"Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must join the efforts to oppose this dangerous and irresponsible policy of the NATO pact," he said.

The League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia most sharply condemns the by-passing of the U.N. in seeking a solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said a statement released by the party, assessing that the ultimatum was a "threat to all small peoples and states if they do not bow to the will of the mighty."

"As in World War II, the Communists will place themselves at the head of the battle against any foreign aggressor and in the interest of the people they will resolutely oppose Western military powers and all supporters of the civil war in former Yugoslavia," said the statement.

The Democratic Party of Yugoslavia sent an appeal to all warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina to see reason and opt for compromise and agreement by easing tensions at all points.

The Party of Serb Unity warned that peace could not be achieved with threats and ultimatums.

"If only one bomb falls on Serb positions and homes in Bosnia, the Party of Serb Unity will put into operation its military agreement with the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and call Russian volunteers to stand in the defence of the Christian Orthodox religion, side by side with their Serb brethren," said a party statement.

POLITIKA on Croatia's Involvement in Bosnia

94P20371A

[Editorial Report] The 31 January issue of the Belgrade daily POLITIKA on page 7 discusses a "real political scandal" going on in Croatia regarding the issue of whether Croatia is directly involved in the war in Bosnia. The "affair" resulted from the appearance on Croatian Television's "TV Parliament" program "several evenings ago" of Vice Vukojevic, a deputy in the Croatian parliament and, until recently, chief of the security service in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was wearing the uniform of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], the army of Herceg-Bosna. Moreover, POLITIKA reports, Vukojevic, responding to a question from the program's host, "coolly answered" that he had been "a member of the HVO since 11 April 1992" with the rank of brigade commander, a rank above that of colonel. What is interesting about this affair, POLITIKA observes, is that Vukojevic's appearance in "a foreign uniform" provoked "quite a bit of surprise" among the Croatian public and even astonishment that Vukojevic

was a member of the army of another country while holding a high position in the security service of Croatia.

Of course, there are very few people naive enough to believe sincerely the official claims of Croatian leaders that the Republic of Croatia is not directly involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, POLITIKA states, adding that even Stipe Mesic, the president of the Croatian Assembly, could not deny this "very unpleasant fact." POLITIKA cites Mesic's statement in the 30 January edition of the Split newspaper FERAL TRIBUNE: "Nothing can be concealed, nothing denied, everything is accessible to everyone, even to foreign officials. Vice Vukojevic is a deputy in the Croatian parliament, and I saw him, just as you did, on television in the uniform of a foreign country. I do not know how he went there and how he received his rank, because I was caught by surprise, just as you were. Regardless of how it happened, this is the first case of a deputy appearing in the military uniform of another country."

POLITIKA states that the Croatian public knew that "something serious was happening with regard to this issue" when the Social Democratic Union issued information that in Zagreb alone about 2,000 Croatian citizens born in Bosnia-Herzegovina were mobilized overnight and, following training in the Kroacija [formerly Marshal Tito] Barracks in New Zagreb, sent to the front in Bosnia. Those who refused to go were sent to a military prison, POLITIKA notes, adding that Croatian lawyer Slobodan Budak has lodged appeals about the imposition of army prison sentences on two Croat soldiers who refused to fight in another country, i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina. One soldier was a member of the 175th Brigade in Zagreb and the other a member of the 101st Brigade in Bosanska Posavina.

FRY Official Views Talks With Croatia

LD1202233994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2201 GMT 12 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 12 Feb—Zeljko Simic, deputy prime minister of the Federal Government [of Yugoslavia], said at [Belgrade's] Surcin airport this evening that serious and detailed talks were held today in Zagreb and that they represented the realization of previous negotiations.

A commission for missing persons and humanitarian issues was formally and legally constituted and it would work under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees].

The commission has eight members—three each from Yugoslavia and from Croatia and one each from the ICRC and the UNHCR.

Simic also said that all details in connection with the opening of offices in Belgrade and Zagreb were agreed and that they would be opened, most likely at the end of this or at the beginning of next month. [passage omitted]

Simic said that his talks with Croatian President Tudjman were successful, pointing out that the Croatian president showed that he was very interested in the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia.

Simic also said that after these talks he was even more convinced that meetings at the highest level were, he said, "more than realistic."

Asked whether the status of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] was discussed, Simic said that the Yugoslav standpoints were clear but not so inflexible that they could prevent a normalization of relations.

The issue of Krajina is very sensitive but the RSK is a political reality and must be respected, Simic stressed, and went on to say that the current situation did not suit Zagreb but an aggressive resolution of the situation would suit Zagreb even less.

Serbia

Greek Foreign Minister Visits Belgrade

LD1502172594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias, who has held talks in Belgrade with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, said after the talks today that he arrived in Belgrade, as the chairman of the European Union [EU] Council of Ministers, to do his utmost to prevent the worst—NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs.

"Although we are going through a difficult time, we are still optimistic to a certain degree and we believe that the worst will be avoided. That would be useful not only for the Balkans but also for the whole of Europe," Papoulias said.

Describing his talks with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic as "cordial, as usual," Papoulias stressed that at this moment in time it is extremely important to direct all efforts toward finding a peaceful solution to the Bosnian conflict, and also underlined that it is important that all the key players accept the EU's peace plan.

Reminding journalists that Greece has reservations as regards the latest NATO decision on the ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, Papoulias said—stressing that he is speaking about this as the Greek foreign minister, not as the EU chairman—that Greece has reservations essentially because it does not believe that actions such as air attacks could contribute toward achieving peace in Bosnia.

"We insist on the resumption of negotiations, that is, on finding a solution to the Bosnian conflict through negotiation," Papoulias said, emphasizing that the NATO decision on air strikes was made against the wishes of the Greek Government.

Replying to numerous questions which exclusively referred to the NATO threat against the Bosnian Serbs, the Greek foreign minister said that, according to the latest information, the process of withdrawing heavy weapons from the positions around Sarajevo in under way, which is cause for hope, and that he sees no reason for additional pressure on the Serbs.

"I believe, however, that the withdrawal of heavy weapons is not an obligation for the Bosnian Serbs alone. The same should be done by Bosnian Muslims," Papoulias said, adding: "Greek policy is well known—all the warring sides in Bosnia must make the same concessions in order to restore peace and maintain the EU peace initiative. As a country that holds the EU presidency, Greece insists on this."

What will Athens do if, nevertheless, air strikes take place?

"We are doing everything in our power to avoid the spread of the war, because there is a real danger of the Bosnian crisis spreading south. Should that happen, it would mean a dramatic escalation of the conflict which would no longer be limited to the Balkans but would also be a European conflict, given the fact that nobody in that case could rule out the possibility of the involvement of third parties."

As EU president, is Greece is able to convene an urgent session of the EU ministers before the NATO ultimatum expires?

"Yes, this possibility exists and we are examining it," Papoulias briefly replied without going into details.

At the end of his news conference, the Greek foreign minister confirmed that the Belgian, German, and Greek foreign ministers will meet in Athens tomorrow and that Andrey Kozyrev will be joining them.

"This is the usual practice of the EU troika (the former, present and the future president), and dialogue with Russia fits into this. However, one of the issues to which we will devote attention will be the crisis in former Yugoslavia," Karolos Papoulias said.

Visits With Milosevic

NC1502200694 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1800 GMT 15 Feb 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias will tonight return from Belgrade where he held talks with the leadership of the new Yugoslavia in his capacity as the European Union [EU] Council of Ministers president and as the Greek foreign minister. Papoulias will meet Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic at 2100 today.

Papoulias said his talks in Belgrade were held in a warm atmosphere. Within the framework of the new Greek initiative to avert NATO intervention in Bosnia, Papoulias held talks with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic and said that both he and Milosevic ascertained that times are difficult but there is hope that worse might be avoided. He said: This will not only benefit Europe, but the Balkans too.

The foreign minister said the Greek Presidency is considering convening the EU Council of Ministers before the NATO ultimatum expires. Papoulias said the procedure to withdraw the heavy weaponry from Sarajevo is proceeding well and this is hopeful. But he noted that this is not solely the Serb side's responsibility and that the Muslims should do the same to save peace and the EU peace plan, on which the Greek side insists.

Asked if Greece will exercise its veto right at NATO against the air raids, Papoulias said Greece is considering using every available means to avert extensive clashes. The foreign minister said he and Milosevic discussed the possibility of the war spreading to the south, stressing that this would be a dramatic development—the beginning of an armed clash that would have broader European dimensions. Papoulias said no one can rule out the participation of third forces.

Replying to another question, Papoulias said the Greeks in Serbia are safe. He said: They consider it their second home and there is no need to abandon it. Papoulias said citizens from other Western countries are evacuated following their countries' evaluations and decisions.

Extremists Plan To Attack UNPROFOR, Germans

LD1602145794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1348 GMT 16 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 16 Feb (TANJUG)—Sinisa Vucinic, chairman of the Serb Royalist Movement [Srpski Rojalisticki Pokret, SRP], said in Belgrade today that if NATO launches air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions on 20 February, "a special unit of the SRP would attack UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] members in Belgrade."

He said that "the West should take this threat seriously" and that the SRP would carry out its threats regardless of the Serbian Interior Ministry's reaction.

Vucinic stressed that SRP members in Frankfurt were ready to "launch terrorist attacks on the German people" if air strikes were launched against Bosnian Serb positions. [passage omitted]

Arkan Threatens To Use 'Russian Secret Weapon'

AU1602124494 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 94 p 10

[Report by "D.S.": "Arkan Is Calling Volunteers"]

[Text] On the occasion of the NATO ultimatum and the threats of air strikes, Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, chairman

of the Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ], has called on Serbian volunteers "to be prepared to again gather under the Serbian flag."

If a single bomb falls on the Serbian positions in Bosnia, it is said in yesterday's announcement, the SSJ will activate the military agreement with Zhirinovskiy's Liberal-Democratic Party and invite Russian volunteers. The SSJ warns that in case the war escalates, it will use the Russian secret weapon [the Elipton], obtained from Zhirinovskiy, against the aggressor's manpower and enemy aircraft.

'Ethnic Cleansing' in Sandzak Viewed

AU1502202794 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 11-18 Feb 94 p 24

[Article by Azem Hajdarevic: "Persecution of the Muslims"]

[Text] The state of "Yugoslavia" has intensively been using various methods of ethnic cleansing in Sandzak. Media propaganda, police repression, and permanent killing and kidnapping of the Muslims have played the most important role in that.

Through the Serbian and Montenegrin media, especially television and the daily press (POLITIKA EXPRES, VECERNJE NOVOSTI, POBJEDA...), the state is intensively spreading anti-Muslim propaganda. These state media misinform both the local and international public and cover up the dramatic position of the non- Serb population, especially the Muslims, in what is left of "Yugoslavia."

This is evident from many examples and we are providing but a few.

Twenty-five Muslims from Sandzak, from Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin, suspected of possessing illegal weapons, threatening the territorial integrity of the "FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]," and creating an independent state of Sandzak were put on trial on 31 January 1994, eight months after the suspects had been arrested. During the pre-trial investigation, the media, especially POLITIKA EXPRES, published numerous articles and three features accusing the suspects of terrorism, secession, and Islamic fundamentalism. The authors published those articles and features in collusion with police directly to influence public opinion, which is against the law. The pretrial investigation was much longer than permitted by law, and the suspects were interrogated by the police and then by the investigating judge without having their lawyers present, but the media failed to mention all this.

Nor have the Serbian and Montenegrin media revealed the truth about how the suspects were treated when they were interrogated in Kraljevo prison, where they were tortured both physically and mentally in order to force a confession.

New "Standard Language"

Suspects are charged under Article 116 of the Criminal Law of the "FRY," although that law does not exist in this "Yugoslavia," for it was enacted by the Assembly of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, so this law cannot apply. The attorneys of the arrested suspects, 12 of them, claim that this is a political show trial, that people cannot be tried for terrorist acts that they did not commit, but only for the illegal possession of weapons, which is again controversial, for it presents a one-sided application of the law for one section of the population, in this case the Muslims, and that is an obvious example of discriminatory policy in applying the law.

The following people were put to trial: Ibrahim Fakovic, Sefkija Rasljanin, Safet Zilkic, Hodo Jakupovic, Asim Sacirovic, Hajriz Fejzovic, Fadil Ugljanin, Jonuz Skrijelj, Adem Hasic, Dzemail Etemovic, Mersad Plojevic, Nusuf Halilovic, Murat Music, Alija Halilovic, Hajriz Kolasinac, Hajro Aljkovic, Mustafa Alic, Rifat Dupljak, Sefcet Gracanin, Zuhdija Hodzic, Nedzib Hodzic, all from Novi Pazar, Jakup Hodzic and Mirsad Hodzic from Sjenica, Semsudin Kucevic and Zekrija Hajrovic from Tutin.

For propaganda purposes, the media have also used the foreign policy activity of President of the Sandzak Muslim National Council Sulejman Ugljanin, which lasted for a couple of days during September and October, accusing him and the above people on the same grounds, reporting that an international arrest warrant has been issued by the Serbian authorities.

Another fine example of anti-Muslim propaganda is an event of 27 December 1993, when the police raided the Zejnilovic family of Loznica in Bijelo Polje. The police shot Alen Zejnilovic and his mother Zurafeta, while his younger brother Adnan (17), sister Amela (18), and Mirela (19) were seriously injured. In order to justify this action of the police, the media presented the Zejnilovic family as terrorists.

Together with the media already mentioned, the local media of Novi Pazar, Bijelo Polje, and other Sandzak municipalities have also used disinformation to assist the exodus of Muslims: such as the Information Center of Bijelo Polje, which consists of BIJELOPOLJSKE NOVINE and the local radio station. Under the pretext of "using the standard language," they decided to abolish all terms, names, and expressions that are used by the Muslims or even resemble the culture, customs, tradition, and unique characteristics of the Muslims. On the other hand, chetnik songs and praise for the chetnik movement can be heard every day.

Persecution and genocide against the Muslims is presented as the just fight of the Serbs and the Montenegrins for Serbianity against "Islamic fundamentalism." Such propaganda encourages the Serbs and the Montenegrins to treat Muslims even more brutally, as is evident from the following examples:

On 7 January 1994, a group of armed Montenegrins dispersed all the Muslim tradesmen from the market in Pavino Polje and warned them not to return there again.

On 11 January 1994, in Gubavac in Bijelo Polje, three Montenegrins attempted to rape Sefka Bucan (25) in her back yard, and no measures were taken against them.

Ethnic Composition Is Changing

In addition to media propaganda and satanization, the repression or, better still, the terrorism of the Serbian-Montenegrin authorities is another way to apply pressure to ethnically cleanse Sandzak of the Muslims.

Let us recall that, on 22 October 1992, under the auspices of the authorities, 17 Muslims from the village of Sjeverin in the Priboj commune were kidnapped and then killed near Visegradska Banja.

On 16 February 1993, 12 Muslims were kidnapped in Bukovica, in Pljevlja, among whom there were also two children, aged three and five, and they were then taken to Cajnici (in Bosnia-Herzegovina); six of them were exchanged and six returned to Pljevlja. During the kidnapping, Latif Bungur (95) was killed on the spot, although he was not buried until eight months later.

On 18 February 1993, in the village of Kukurovici in Priboj three people were killed: Bulut Huzeir, Husovic Musan, and Sarac Sadeta, and they have still not been given a decent burial.

On 27 February 1993, 20 Muslims and one Croat were kidnapped in Strpci from a train going from Belgrade to Bar and they are still missing today, in spite of all appeals.

In 1993, in the villages in Priboj and Pljevlja, 47 Muslim homes, three mosques, and several other buildings were burnt down or destroyed by explosives. In this area, 36 villages were ethnically cleansed and most were ransacked.

Increasing police repression is being recorded in Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin, where the Muslims form an overwhelming majority, and this has contributed to changing the ethnic situation in those Sandzak communes. In Tutin alone, in 1993 the Serbian police raided 36 villages, arrested 68 people, and 83 were brought in for so-called informative interrogations, of whom 57 were physically injured.

Even more severe repression during 1993 was observed around Sjenica, where 21 villages were raided (350 families were raided), 13 people arrested, 190 taken away for these so-called informative interrogations, and 250 sustained physical injuries.

Growing fear and uncertainty among Muslims is being caused by the opening of new police stations in these places.

For those reasons, the Muslims are fleeing the area in great numbers, especially to Western Europe, so that some 85,000 are now in exile. The program of the author of the "greater Orthodox Serbia" was designed to do exactly that. Unfortunately, even if we suppose that peace and security will return to these areas and that the so called FRY will become a democratic and rule-of-law state, the ethnic composition has already been changed, as historical and demographic indicators show that 20 to 30 percent of those who are in exile will never return to their native country. That means that Sandzak has, in any case, lost between 20,000 to 25,000 Muslims.

The only solution for the survival of the Muslims in Sandzak is for their indigenousness to be recognized and for the Sandzak region to be granted the right to its political and territorial uniqueness, something for which the people voted in the October 1991 referendum.

Serbian Assembly Elects Officials

LD1102232194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1945 GMT 11 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 11 Feb (TANJUG)—The Serbian Assembly this evening elected the following three candidates to the posts of vice president of the republic's parliament in the first round of voting: Vojislav Mihailovic (DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] and Serbian Renewal Movement), Vojislav Andric (DEPOS and New Democracy) and Djordje Basic (Democratic Party). Deputies Dragan Todorovic of the Serb Radical Party [Srpska Radikalna Stranka] and Vladan Batic of the Democratic Party of Serbia [Demokratska Stranka Srbije] failed to gain the necessary number of votes and subsequently withdrew their candidature. Simultaneously with withdrawing their candidate for vice president the Radicals also withdrew their members from 23 asembly committees and ther candidates for the Chamber of the Republics of the Federal Assembly. [passage omitted]

After a brief break Serbian Assembly president Dragan Tomic said that the heads of the groups of deputies failed to nominate a candidate for the fourth vice president's position, so this election will take place at one of the next sessions.

The Serbian Assembly elected 16 of the 20 deputies to the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Republics—nine from the Socialist Party of Serbia, four from DEPOS, two from the Democratic Party [DS], and one from the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM].

This group consists of Socialists Zoran Andjelkovic, Slobodan Babic, Radmilo Bogdanovic, Vojislav Zivkovic, Branka Jesic, Milivoje Miletic, Miroljub Mladenovic, Radovan Pankov and Zoran Sokolovic. The DEPOS federal deputies are Milan Bozic, Vuk Draskovic, Dusan Mihajlovic and Gvozden Rosic. The DS

members of this group are Zoran Djindjic and Borivoje Radic. The DZVM deputy is Mihalj Secei. [passage omitted]

This evening the assembly re-elected Ljiljana Petkovic as general secretary of the parliament. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Report on Zhirinovskiy's Activities

94P20357A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by D. Becirovic: "Zhirinovskiy: There Will Be No Bombing of Serbian Towns"]

[Text] "Do you believe that NATO will indeed attack the Serbs from the air?" Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was asked today at a news conference.

"This will not happen. They only want to affect the morale of the Serbs by threatening them. And if that should happen, there is a group of Russian officers in Europe who support me. They would use a secret weapon, unused thus far, which destroys any force in the air and on the ground, in order to cool off the Western heads that threaten attacks on peaceful towns in Bosnia. There will be no bombing whatsoever because they know very well how Napoleon and Hitler fared, and if they do not know we will once again show them," Zhirinovskiy said.

Asked what he thought about independent Montenegro, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy stated that he believes that there should be two to three Orthodox states in the Balkans and that he opposes the creation of small states. "The West wants to introduce this in the Balkans in order to partition them. Because it wants to divide the Balkans: With Catholicism from the west and Turkey in the east, and the Germans would arrive from the north, Turkish and German would be spoken in the Balkans by the middle of the 21st century. It will not be able to do so because the Balkans are the land of Orthodoxy, where Serbian and Russian will be spoken," Vladimir Zhirinovskiy predicts. Speaking about the strategy of the West, Zhirinovskiy also said the following: "The time will come when the Western politicians will be standing in line so that I may receive them."

Otherwise, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who came to Montenegro at the invitation of the Russian-Serbian Friendship Society, the Serbian National Renewal, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro, also talked this morning with a group of representatives of some opposition parties and was received by the secretary of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), Svetozar Marovic. According to the information issued by Marovic's office, the guest was informed of the DPS efforts to resolve the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in a peaceful and democratic way, because the people are tired of wars and conflicts.

"We must fight for our religion, our spirit, and our mind in order to survive in this area. This is why we do this today as well, in spite of all the injustices, pressures, and decisions of the West. We remember that the Russian people were with us in the past, and they are with us today in spite of all the tribulations, and we expect to be together in the defense of what is ours," Marovic said.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, strongly praising the contribution of the DPS in the resolution of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, stressed that "the Russian policy in this respect did not always correspond adequately to the expectations of the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro," that the policy of his party consists of supporting the Slavs and resolving problems through peaceful means, and that his party will actively participate in the resolution of the crisis and do everything in order for the sanctions to be lifted as soon as possible.

At exactly 1300 hours in Ivan Milutinovic Square in Podgorica, a large assembly was held at which more than 1,000 citizens were present. Greeted enthusiastically with shouts "Russians, Russians" and posters, saying, for example, "Priyekhal Petr Velikiy" [Russian for "Peter the Great has arrived"], Vladimir Zhirinovskiy addressed the citizens: "We do not threaten anyone, but one should know what Russian tanks and Russian airplanes are and who was the first to fly into the cosmos. Brother Serbs, Montenegrins, be proud to be Orthodox. We are both spiritually and economically richer. If they are forming the European Gommunity from London to Vienna, we will form the Eastern European Community from Knin to Crimea."

Offering all possible aid, as he said, to the heroic Serbian people, Zhirinovskiy added: "On Saturday, 5 February, I will personally organize a meeting in support of the Serbian people, and I will ask in the sharpest way in the Russian parliament for the resignation of minister-traitor Kozyrev."

"Only a short time remains before the leadership in Russia is removed. We will force it to remove the blockade in Yugoslavia and find a way to compensate the Serbs for the material losses they have suffered. We are obligated to take care of you more than anyone else. Let the war move on to Latin America, Africa, and the Far East," Zhirinovskiy said, among other things, at today's meeting in Podgorica, which was in a way spontaneous, because it was announced only late last night.

Gasoline Smuggled From Albania to Montenegro

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[Report by Branko Jokic: "Business Is Business"]

[Text] (From our correspondent) Podgorica, 28 January—According to an article published in the Novi Pazar magazine SANDZAK, Montenegrin and Albanian authorities concluded a secret agreement on the export of gasoline from Albania to Montenegro, from where it is

delivered to Pale [capital of the Srpska republic] to be used by the Bosnian Serb military.

According to the article, Montenegrin Albanians living along the Montenegrin-Albanian border are involved in the deals. Some of them have been licensed by the Montenegrin Government to "import" gasoline. Gasoline, which costs one German mark per liter in the Albanian town of Scutari, is transported in large quantities across Lake Skutari to Montenegro. The Yugoslav Army provides specially equipped boats.

The citizens of Montenegro involved in this business earn one-half mark per liter. Almost all local residents participate in this trade (actually it is a state-sanctioned smuggling operation) because of the high earnings. Montenegro and the Srpska republic are well supplied with gasoline. The Pizon Petrol Enterprise, owned by the former Crvena Zvezda soccer player Vladimir Petrovic Pizon, transports gasoline from Lake Scutari to Pale.

As reported, the Albanian authorities have recently tightened control over gasoline sales in Scutari, but it is a well-known secret that gasoline stations in Scutari work at full speed and sell almost half of all the gasoline sold in Albania. We are talking about very large quantities, knowing that last year Albanians registered several thousand vehicles that they had purchased at European junkyards. According to the article, Pale receives five to seven tanker-truck loads of Albanian gasoline each day.

In addition to Albania, Macedonia is also accused of sanctions violations. At the border crossings near Ohrid and Rozaj (on the Macedonian-Albanian and Montenegrin-Albanian borders), aluminum is exported from Montenegro and raw materials are imported for Montenegro and Serbia without hindrance. Heavy trucks and trailers wait for hours on both sides of the border crossings, which in the past were almost without traffic.

If all this is true, we could conclude that this type of border trade, uncontrolled by representatives of the international community, was agreed to by Momir Bulatovic and Sali Berisha when the Montenegrin president visited Tirana. At the same time, Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic paid a visit to Skopje. It is a fact that we can only guess now how Albania benefits. Maybe it is alleviation of discontent in the western part of the country, where at least some hundred local residents are earning good incomes trafficking in gasoline.